Due process; The right to be present at one’s trial; MCL 768.3; People v Montgomery; Waiver of the right to be present by being so disorderly or disruptive that the trial cannot be continued while defendant is present; People v Buie (On Remand); Whether defendant was warned that he might be removed based on disruptive conduct; Illinois v Allen; The purpose of closing argument; People v Finley; Whether defendant was prejudiced by his removal; People v Armstrong; The right to representation; “Standby” counsel; Jury instructions; People v Traver; Adverse possession; Beach v Lima Twp; M Crim JI 7.5; People v March; Claim-of-right; Smith v Feneley

The court held that defendant’s right to be present and his right to representation were not violated when the trial court removed him from the courtroom for repeatedly objecting during the prosecutor’s closing argument. It also rejected his claims as to the jury instructions. After remand for a new trial, he was convicted of conducting a criminal enterprise and false pretenses ($1,000 or more but less than $20,000) for attempting to sell properties he did not own. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was entitled to another new trial because his right to be present and his right to representation were violated when the trial court removed him from the courtroom during a portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument and during the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument. “[W]ith defendant repeatedly interrupting the prosecutor’s argument for unfounded reasons, it is clear that defendant was being disruptive and was subject to being removed.” However, there was “no indication in the record that the trial court warned [him] that his continued behavior of interrupting the proceeding could result in his removal.” As such, it appeared “that the trial court erred—not by removing defendant, but by removing him without first warning him that removal would be a consequence of his continued disruptive actions.” However, his “inability to raise a futile objection cannot constitute prejudice.” In addition, “he was not prohibited from raising objections to anything that was said while he was absent from the courtroom.” Further, the fact that standby counsel “did not raise any objections during the remainder of the prosecutor’s closing argument or during the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument should not be considered significant where defendant does not identify any specific, valid grounds for an objection, and none are apparent.” Thus, he could not show “he was without representation during closing arguments.” The court also concluded that “the trial court did not err by refusing to provide an instruction on adverse possession when it was undisputed that the elements were not satisfied.” And because “M Crim JI 7.5 addresses larceny-type crimes,” it did not err by failing to provide the instruction given that “this case dealt with real property that cannot be the subject of a larceny.” Moreover, it would not have been proper “to provide the requested instruction regarding a claim of right.” Affirmed, but remanded for the ministerial task of correcting the amended judgments of sentence.