Breach of agreements for payments in lieu of taxes (PILOT); The Michigan State Housing Development Authority Act (the MHSDA Act) (MCL 125.1401 et seq.); Interpretation of the plaintiff-city’s PILOT Ordinance & MCL 125.1415a; “Low income persons & families”; “Eligible”; Statutory & ordinance interpretation; Sau-Tuk Indus., Inc. v. Allegan Cnty.; Applicability of the in pari materia doctrine; In re Implementing § 6w of 2016 PA 3341 for Cloverland Elec. Coop.; Summer v. Southfield Bd. of Educ.; Voorhies v. Faust; Tyler v. Livonia Pub. Sch.; Hughes v. Almena Twp.; Enforcing plain statutory language as written; Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward; Preventing absurd results, injustice, or prejudice to the public interest; McAuley v. General Motors Corp.; Use of dictionaries to define terms undefined by statute; Anzaldua v. Neogen Corp.; Preemption; McNeil v. Charlevoix Cnty.; Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming; Respectful consideration of the interpretation of a statute by those charged with executing it; In re Rovas Against SBC MI; Treatment of municipal resolutions; Rollingwood Homeowners Corp. v. City of Flint

The court held that the trial court correctly ruled that MCL 125.1415a required plaintiff-city to calculate the annual PILOT charges on defendants’ low-income housing projects by distinguishing portions occupied by low-income persons from portions occupied by others. The trial court’s decision comported with and enforced the plain language of the statute, and enforced the city’s PILOT Ordinance to the extent it did not conflict with state law. It also correctly determined that defendants breached the parties’ contracts and were liable for the difference between what they paid and what the contracts required them to pay the city. Thus, the court affirmed summary disposition for the city. It found that the trial court was correct in ruling that the city “had a statutory obligation to charge defendants fees based upon plaintiff’s PILOT Ordinance in the amount of 4% of the annual shelter rents for the rents collected from low-income persons and families who occupied the housing projects, exclusive of any charges for gas, electricity, heat, or other utilities furnished to the occupants, and charge defendants pursuant to MCL 125.1415a(6) in amounts equal to the ad valorem taxes for the portions of the housing projects occupied by other than low-income persons or families.” The record showed that it considered MCL 125.1415a’s plain language “in the context of the purpose of the MSHDA Act, and read the section’s subparts in harmony with one another. The trial court properly determined that the statute did not permit the imposition of a uniform PILOT charge based on the annual shelter rent collected for the total number of units in the project. Further, the trial court correctly interpreted the statute as requiring differentiation of PILOT charges for the rental units occupied by low-income persons and families from those occupied by” other persons who paid the market rate. It “did not err by interpreting MCL 125.1415a(1), (2), (6), and (7) together and in harmony.” The court concluded that the trial court correctly “declined to enforce the PILOT Ordinance as written to charge a uniform amount for all units” in the projects because the Ordinance did not “fully comply with and conflicted with MCL 125.1415a(6). Further, the trial court correctly treated the resolutions as evidence in conjunction with other evidence of the terms of the parties’ contractual agreements.”