Action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); MCL 15.232(d) & (e); Federation of Teachers & Sch. Related Pers., AFT, AFL-CIO v. University of MI; Privacy exemption; MCL 15.243(1)(a); Mager v. Department of State Police; Bradley v. Saranac Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ.; Rataj v. Romulus; Civil action exemption; MCL 15.243(1)(v); Taylor v. Lansing Bd. of Water & Light; Redaction & production of nonexempt records; MCL 15.244(1); Bitterman v. Oakley; Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Department of State Police; Abandonment of an argument on appeal; Berger v. Berger; Attorney fees & costs; MCL 15.240(6); Scharret v. Berkley; “Must”; Allard v. State Farm Ins. Co.

The court held that the trial court did not err by finding names and addresses were exempt under the FOIA, but did err by failing to order defendant-city to produce all nonexempt records. Thus, it affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Plaintiff-attorney sent a FOIA request to defendant seeking records related to vendor invoices received by defendant for services such as grass cutting, weed and debris removal, or other maintenance services for privately-held properties located in defendant’s city, including two specific properties. Defendant denied the request, indicating the records were exempt from disclosure under the FOIA’s privacy and civil action exemptions. The trial court granted partial summary disposition for defendant. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by concluding the names and addresses contained in the requested records were exempt from disclosure under the privacy exemption. While “the records themselves would demonstrate how defendant’s government operates, the specific disclosure of names and addresses of property owners would not further that understanding.” However, it remanded for entry of an order requiring defendant to produce the nonexempt portions of the records. It also found that plaintiff met his burden as to whether he was entitled to attorney fees and costs “because the lawsuit was reasonably necessary to compel disclosure, and . . . had a substantial effect on obtaining the records.” Thus, it also remanded “for determination of reasonable attorney fees and costs.”