Trip & fall in a hole; The gravamen of an action; Buhalis v. Trinity Continuing Care Servs.; Premises liability; Open & obvious dangers; Lugo v. Ameritech Corp., Inc.; Hoffner v. Lanctoe; Duty; Distinguishing Finazzo v. Fire Equip. Co.; Possession & control; Kubczak v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co.; Principle that the court will not reverse a trial court’s order of summary disposition when the right result was reached for the wrong reason; Forest Hills Coop. v. Ann Arbor

Holding that the trial court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reason, the court affirmed its grant of summary disposition for defendant-contractor. Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries she sustained when she tripped and fell in a hole next to a newly poured concrete driveway on which she had parked. She claimed defendant failed to properly repave the driveway, “creating gaps and holes along its sides[,]” failed to warn her of the potentially dangerous conditions around it, and “failed to repair defective and dangerous conditions on the land.” On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by holding that the alleged defect that caused her fall was open and obvious. The court found that although a genuine issue of material fact existed and the trial court erred by ruling the condition was open and obvious, defendant was entitled to summary disposition because it owed her no duty. It first noted that plaintiff’s claim sounded in premises liability, not ordinary negligence. It then found that a “rational trier of fact might reasonably conclude that no visibly dangerous condition existed before plaintiff stepped on the exposed dirt; rather, a dangerous hole was created when plaintiff stepped there, with the surface ground giving way because the underlying soil had been saturated or washed away by a subterranean sewer leak.” However, in contrast to “the Finazzo defendants, defendant here was not situated to prevent harm to invitees or others on the premises arising from any conditions on the land.” Indeed, there was no “evidence indicating that defendant had either notice of the condition at issue or authority to inspect the premises such that defendant reasonably should have had notice.” As such, the court could not hold that “defendant—rather than the actual owner and possessor of the subject premises—owed a duty to plaintiff that would support her premises-liability claim.”