Admission of the victim’s oral statements to the police under MCL 768.27c(1); Notice requirement in MCL 768.27c(3); People v. Jurewicz; Evidence of other acts of “domestic violence”; MCL 768.27b(1); MCL 768.27b(6)(a)(i); People v. Rosa; MRE 403; People v. Cameron; People v. Watkins; Presumption jurors follow their instructions; People v. Mullins; Due process argument as to propensity evidence; Bugh v. Mitchell (6th Cir.); Admission of a diary entry by the victim; The recorded recollections hearsay exception; MRE 803(5); Denial of a directed verdict on charges of CSC I, unlawful imprisonment, & AWIGBH; MCL750.520b(1)(c); People v. Lockett; MCL 750.349b; People v. Chelmicki; “Restrain”; MCL 750.349b(3)(a); MCL 750.84(1)(b); People v. Stevens; “Strangulation or suffocation”; MCL 750.84(2); “Assault”; People v. Starks; “Battery”; People v. Reeves; Waiver; People v. Kowalski; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 3 & 10; MCL 777.33(1)(e); MCL 777.40(1)(b); People v. Needham; “Vulnerability” & “exploit”; MCL 777.40(3)(c) & (b); “Domestic relationship”; People v. Jamison

Finding that the prosecution complied with MCL 768.27c(3), the court held that there was no error in its use of the victim’s statements to the police to impeach her. It further held that other acts evidence was properly admitted under MCL 768.27b. Defendant’s claim that the victim’s diary entry was erroneously admitted under MRE 803(1) failed given that it was admitted under MRE 803(5). The court also held that his motion for a directed verdict on the CSC I, unlawful imprisonment, and AWIGBH charges was properly denied, and that OVs 3 and 10 were properly scored at 5 and 10 points, respectively. Thus, it affirmed his convictions of CSC I under MCL 750.520b(1)(c), unlawful imprisonment, AWIGBH, and domestic offense, as well as his sentences (as a second-offense habitual offender) to 14 to 25 years for CSC I, 8 to 22 years for unlawful imprisonment, 5 to 15 years for AWIGBH, and 48 days for domestic violence. While he asserted that the prosecution did not provide the 15 days’ notice of its intent to use the victim’s statements as required by MCL 768.27c(3), the record showed the prosecution disclosed the evidence months before trial, clearly meeting the requirement. The court next held that testimony about violence defendant perpetrated against his former father-in-law and ex-wife met “the threshold requirement of admissibility under MCL 768.27b . . . .” In addition, the 2009 incident was “similar to the charged crime in that it shows defendant’s propensity to resort to violence when he is displeased. The act occurred within 10 years of the charged offenses. Three separate witnesses testified to the 2009 incident making the evidence more reliable. Finally, there was need for evidence beyond the victim’s testimony” here given that she “denied much of the alleged violence committed against her when testifying at trial.” The 2016 incident was also “similar to the charged crime because both involved violence committed by defendant and directed at his romantic partner—first his then wife and later his then girlfriend.” His actions in 2016 showed “his propensity to commit domestic violence when he is angry at his romantic partner. The 2016 incident occurred only two years before the charged crimes occurred.” The trial court also gave a limiting jury instruction, and there was no due process violation in admitting this evidence.