Express easement dispute; Determining an easement’s purpose; Little v. Kin; Ambiguity; Royal Prop. Group, LLC v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, Inc.; Conveyance of a right of way; Harvey v. Crane; Use of more general words; Blackhawk Dev. Corp. v. Village of Dexter; An unlimited conveyance of an easement as a grant of unlimited reasonable use; Kirby v. Meyering Land Co.; Overburdening; Bang v. Forman; Schadewald v. Brule; Schumacher v. Department of Natural Res.; The trial court’s reference to a zoning statute (MCL 125.3206(1)); Applicability of Livonia v. Department of Soc. Servs.; Easement improvements; A mere increase in the number of persons using an unlimited right of way; Henkle v. Goldenson; Principle that if a dominant estate with easement rights is divided, all resulting parcels take a share in the easement as long as an unreasonable burden is not imposed on the servient estate; Morse v. Colitti; Changes in the manner, frequency, & intensity of the grantee’s use over time; Michigan Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc.; Exclusion of extrinsic evidence; MCR 2.613(A)

While the court concluded that the trial court erred in looking to a zoning statute in a private easement dispute, it held that the error was harmless. The trial court provided multiple alternative grounds for its decision to deny plaintiffs injunctive relief and to allow defendants to expand the existing roadway’s width and grade it with gravel. The express easement at issue burdened plaintiffs’ property. Defendants planned to build four assisted-living facilities on one of the properties (the Lakeshore property) it benefited. The grant provided “for a ‘right of way,’ absent conditions or restrictive language.” Thus, the court found it could “only be reasonably construed as creating a broad easement right. It cannot plausibly be read to prohibit commercial uses or to create an easement with ingress and egress limited to particular purposes—such as single-family residential purposes—as” plaintiffs asserted. But despite its broad language, it was unambiguous, and the trial court did not err in excluding extrinsic evidence to determine its scope. While the proposed evidence may have been relevant to “whether defendants’ planned development would overburden the easement beyond what was contemplated when” it was created, the court concluded that its exclusion did not warrant relief because plaintiffs’ substantial rights were not affected. The potential evidence was cumulative. Next, in rejecting plaintiffs’ argument “that defendants’ planned facility was commercial in nature, the trial court cited MCL 125.3206(1) and Livonia . . . .” While the fact that defendants’ proposed use did not violate zoning laws was not determinative of the easement questions here, the court held that the trial court correctly determined “the deed did not limit defendants’ use of the easement to ‘residential’ purposes or prohibit ‘commercial’ activities, making it largely irrelevant whether defendants’ facility is ‘residential’ or ‘commercial’ in nature.” In addition, the basic holding in Livonia – “that a group home ‘constitutes a residential use of property’—has application to private agreements” as to property use. The court found that the trial court did not clearly err in ruling “that defendants’ subdivision of the dominant estate to build four assisted-living facilities and the associated increase in traffic on the easement did not overburden the servient estate.” Affirmed.