Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Matter of Dahms; Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re Moss Minors; In re White; In re Schadler; Compliance with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 USC § 1901 et seq.) & the Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA) (MCL 712B.1 et seq.); In re Morris; MCR 3.965(B)(2); In re Jones

The court held that § (c)(i) supported termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights and that doing so was in the children’s best interests. But as the DHHS and the trial court did not comply with the notice requirements of the ICWA and the MIFPA, the court conditionally reversed the order terminating both respondents’ rights and remanded. It first determined that clear and convincing evidence supported terminating the mother’s parental rights under § (c)(i). Over “182 days elapsed between the issuance of the initial disposition order and the termination of” her rights. The barriers leading “to adjudication, such as substance abuse, lack of adequate housing and food, inability to manage resources, emotional instability, and lack of parenting skills, all continued to exist throughout the case with no reasonable likelihood that [she] would rectify them considering the children’s ages.” She did not resolve her substance abuse issues or the housing situation, and her relationship and parenting skills continued to pose a barrier. As to her ability to rectify the conditions, she waited nearly a year before engaging “in substance abuse services, and she never fully decided that she needed to change anything. Additionally, although she completed her parenting-skills programs, she struggled to interact properly with the children at parenting visits.” The court noted that the children, aged six and nine, “needed stability and permanency to deal with the trauma and behavioral issues that they developed as a result of” her care. Respondent-father’s only argument was that the DHHS and the trial court failed to comply with the ICWA’s and MIFPA’s notice requirements. The DHHS conceded this, and the record supported it. He “informed the trial court at the preliminary hearing that he might have Native American heritage because his brother was a member of the Cherokee tribe.” As a result, the notice requirements of § 1912(a) were triggered. Also, given that “the DHHS had information that suggested that the children may be Indian children and the trial court and respondent-father’s counsel knew that the children may be Indian children, the notice requirements of MCL 712B.9(1) were triggered.” Yet the record indicated that “no steps were taken to satisfy” them. Thus, conditional reversal of the termination order was required with remand for compliance with the requirements.