Waiver of counsel; People v. Anderson; MCR 6.005(D); People v. Russell; The right to self-representation; Faretta v. California; Requirement that a waiver be knowing, voluntary, & intelligent; Iowa v. Tovar; Plain error review; People v. Carines; Whether defendant suffered a complete deprivation of counsel; Purpose of the guarantee of the right to counsel; Johnson v. Zerbst; Effect of a pro se defendant’s inviting or agreeing to any substantial participation by counsel; McKaskle v. Wiggins; An agreement under People v. Cobbs

While the trial court plainly erred by failing to comply with the substance of Anderson and MCR 6.005(D), the court affirmed defendant’s no-contest plea-based conviction of first-degree home invasion because the underlying purposes of the right to counsel were alternatively upheld during his Cobbs plea. Applying the Carines plain error standard, it noted that even if the first three prongs were met, it still had to exercise its discretion to determine whether reversal was justified under the fourth one. Since he did not assert actual innocence, the question was “whether the trial court’s plain error in this case ‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of’” his innocence. Reversal is not warranted under this “prong if the ‘underlying purposes’ of the right at issue have been alternatively upheld.” The court noted that he “made it evident to the trial court that he, in fact, was not ignorant of his legal and constitutional rights.” In his written motion seeking to terminate his counsel’s representation and to represent himself, he “claimed that defense counsel had declined to file and investigate defenses and pretrial motions that defendant had expressed a desire to pursue.” He also cited the Sixth Amendment and Faretta. In addition, his motion “mirrored substantive language in" Anderson. Thus, the court concluded that, “despite the trial court failing to create an adequate record regarding defendant’s waiver, defendant nonetheless made it apparent that his assertion of the right to self-representation was unequivocal, that he understood the rights and risks involved in his request, that he possessed an understanding of the applicable legal rules and procedures involved in asserting his request, and that he would not unduly burden or inconvenience the” trial court. Further, the court’s exercise of discretion was “significantly influenced in this case by the fact that defendant was convicted by plea and the record reflects that defense counsel played a significant role in the plea process, advising defendant in much the same way as if he had been in his typical representative role with respect to defendant even though defense counsel was purportedly only serving in a ‘standby’ capacity.” It appeared that, whether by acquiescence or consent, he “actually reaped the benefits of being represented by counsel despite purporting to represent himself.”