Contempt for violating Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 1989-1 by recording a court proceeding without the judge’s permission; A court’s power to hold a party in contempt; Const. 1963, art. 6, § 1; MCL 600.1701 et seq.; In re Contempt of Auto Club Ins. Ass’n; In re Contempt of United Stationers Supply Co.; Principle that courts have the power to hold an attorney in contempt for a willful violation of a lawful court order; MCL 600.1701(c); Principle that the contempt must be willful; People v. Matish; Whether the contempt “altered the status quo so that it cannot be restored or the relief intended has become impossible”; In re Contempt of Rapanos; Harvey v. Lewis; People v. MacLean; City of Pontiac v. Grimaldi; In re Contempt of Dorsey; Credibility; In re Contempt of Henry

The court held that appellant-attorney was properly held in contempt of court for filming a court proceeding without the judge’s permission. A district judge held him in contempt for recording a court proceeding without permission. A hearing was held before the chief district judge, who found appellant in contempt and fined him $100. The circuit court affirmed. On appeal, the court rejected appellant’s argument that the district judge abused his discretion by holding him in contempt. “There is no dispute that an associate of appellant, at appellant’s direction, filmed the proceedings . . . without first obtaining” the judge’s permission. As such, he violated AO 1989-1, and could be held in contempt. In so finding, the court rejected appellant’s claim that he could not be held in contempt because his violation was not willful. “In light of (1) the fact that appellant is an attorney and as such is generally familiar with the rules governing the courts and (2) [the chief district judge’s] determination that respondent was not credible when he said that he did not knowingly violate AO 1989-1,” the chief judge did not err by “finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant willfully violated AO 1989-1 . . . .” It also rejected his contention that he could not be held in contempt because his conduct did not alter the status quo of the court room. “[A]ssuming that altering the status quo so that it cannot be restored is an ‘element’ of criminal contempt that must be proven to hold an individual in contempt, there was competent evidence to support a finding of this element beyond a reasonable doubt.” Because appellant “had already filmed the proceedings without permission, there was no way to restore the status quo. That is, appellant’s conduct altered the status quo so that it could not be restored. Thus, criminal contempt was appropriate . . . .” Finally, the court rejected his argument that the circuit court erred in “dismissing his appeal as untimely. The circuit court never stated that it was dismissing appellant’s appeal for being untimely, so appellant’s argument appears factually incorrect.” In addition, any error it made in dismissing his appeal was harmless in light of the conclusion that the judge did not abuse his discretion by holding him in contempt. Affirmed.