Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), & (j); In re Moss Minors; In re Ellis; In re White; In re LaFrance; Whether the trial court identified the statutory grounds under which it terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights; Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Frey; In re Utrera; In re Fried; In re Mason

The court held that as to respondent-father, §§ (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j) were established. Also, the claim that the trial court failed to identify the statutory grounds under which it terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights was without merit. Further, termination of both respondents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Finally, reasonable reunification efforts were made as to the mother. As to § (c)(i), the condition that led to the adjudication as to the father was his lack of suitable housing. Specifically, he was homeless at the time his children were taken into custody in 1/18. Although he had a home at the time of the statutory-grounds hearing in 7/19, the home was deemed unsuitable for his children. “Thus, the condition that led to the adjudication—a lack of suitable housing— remained after 182 or more days had elapsed since issuance of the initial dispositional order.” Given that he “had more than 18 months after the children were taken into custody to obtain suitable housing, it was reasonable to find that this condition would not be rectified within a reasonable time given the young ages of” his children. As to § (c)(ii), the trial court found that the other condition was the father’s domestic violence. It found that he “was given a reasonable amount of time to rectify this condition, yet failed to address it and there was no reasonable likelihood that he would rectify his domestic violence issues within a reasonable time considering” his children’s ages. It did not clearly err. He repeatedly denied ever committing any acts of domestic violence against the mother, but the trial court found him not credible. His “denials were belied by the record, which included evidence of his conviction of domestic violence, where he pleaded guilty to having committed domestic violence—second offense.” His denials were “evidence that he has not rectified his issues with domestic violence and that there was no reasonable likelihood that the issues would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the young ages of” his children. Although he “was provided with therapy to help address his domestic violence, he did not fully participate in or benefit from those services.” The evidence that he failed to participate in and benefit from the provided services further supported the existence of §§ (g) and (j). Affirmed.