Amended judgment of sentence resentencing defendant to lifetime electronic monitoring; People v. Comer; MCR 6.435 & 6.429(A); Whether the former or the amended version of MCR 6.429(A) applied; Ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations; People v. Douglas; Motion to withdraw a plea; People v. Seadorf; MCR 6.302(A), (B)(1), (C)(1), & (D)(1)

Agreeing with defendant that the trial court erred when it sua sponte resentenced him to lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM), the court vacated his amended judgment of sentence (JOS) and remanded for reinstatement of his original JOS. But it rejected his claim that defense counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations, and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. He pled no contest to two counts of CSC II under MCL 750.520c(1)(a) and (2)(b). He did “not dispute that his convictions would ordinarily be subject to” LEM, or that the failure to order it “rendered his sentences invalid.” But the trial court at his original sentencing did not sentence him to LEM and the original JOS was silent on the matter. After the Department of Corrections notified the trial court of the omission and the trial court ordered the parties to brief the issue, it sua sponte entered an amended JOS ordering LEM. While the parties disputed whether the former version of MCR 6.429(A), in effect at his original sentencing, or the amended version, in effect at the time of resentencing, should apply, the prosecution failed to address the part of the rule requiring “the trial court to correct an invalid sentence within six months of entry of the original sentence.” Even under the amended version of the rule, it lacked authority to sua sponte amend the invalid sentence because over six months had passed since the original JOS was entered. However, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that defendant received effective assistance of counsel, and the court held that, based on defendant’s testimony, it also did not abuse its discretion in ruling that his “plea was made voluntarily and knowingly.” The prosecution clearly placed on the record that he was accepting a plea of two counts of CSC II, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, with minimum sentences of 15 years in exchange for the dismissal of five CSC I counts. The trial “court acknowledged that there was a plea agreement on the record as stated by the prosecutor, asked defendant whether he understood the terms of the plea agreement, and defendant responded ‘yes.’” It also asked him if he understood that his plea carried a maximum of life imprisonment, and he stated he understood. Thus, the court affirmed his convictions.