Age discrimination action under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (MCL 37.2101 et seq.); MCL 37.2202(1)(a); Hazle v. Ford Motor Co.; Attorney fees; MCL 37.2802; Meyer v. City of Ctr. Line

Holding that defendant-employer was entitled to summary disposition of plaintiff-employee’s age discrimination claim, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion, remanded, and vacated the award of attorney fees for plaintiff. Plaintiff sued defendant alleging age and race discrimination when it hired a younger white male for an open position instead of promoting her to the position. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the basis that plaintiff established a genuine issue of material fact as to “whether defendant’s proffered reasons were merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” The jury then found defendant had committed age discrimination and the trial court ordered defendant to pay plaintiff’s attorney fees. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred by denying it summary disposition. It noted that the trial court erred by relying “on a single piece of evidence in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition—a notation by [one of the interviewers] on her interview scoring sheet about [the successful candidate] ‘being young.’” Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, “the notation did not provide any evidence of ‘defendant’s preference for a younger applicant.’” It found this case “directly analogous” to Hazle and held that the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the age discrimination claim. Further, although plaintiff “produced additional evidence at trial that defendant may have violated its own policies by failing to favor an internal candidate for the” position, the court was “charged with viewing only the evidence presented to the trial court at the time it decided defendant’s motion for summary disposition.” Finally, the court agreed with defendant that the award of attorney fees must also be vacated. “Because the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition, plaintiff was not a prevailing party in this case.”