Sentencing; Whether defendant’s “amount of loss” argument was preserved for review; United States v. Huntington Nat’l Bank; United States v. Bostic; Plain error review; United States v. Vonner; Calculating the applicable USSG range for a defendant convicted of fraud; USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1) & cmt. n.3(A); United States v. Donadeo; United States v. Ellis; United States v. Wendlandt; § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); United States v. Burns (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Howard (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Wilson; Two-level sophisticated-means enhancement; § 2B1.1(b)(10); United States v. Kraig; United States v. Pierce (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Ealy (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Benchick (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Crosgrove

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court affirmed the district court, holding that it did not err by attributing $4.1 million in tax fraud losses to defendant-Igboba at sentencing where the preponderance of the evidence showed that these losses could be attributed to him and his individual activity. As a preliminary matter, the court agreed that his argument as to the amount of loss he was responsible for in the scheme to defraud the IRS by filing fraudulent tax returns was not properly preserved for review. Thus, this claim was reviewed for plain error. When calculating the applicable USSG range for fraud, a defendant’s base-offense level is increased as it relates to the actual or intended amount of pecuniary loss resulting from the offense. It appeared that the district court determined that all $4.1 million in losses was attributable to Igboba’s “own criminal activity, rather than others’ acts that were a part of ‘jointly undertaken criminal activity.’” The United States offered the testimony of a special agent from the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, who explained exhibits and spreadsheets relating to the amount of loss attributable to Igboba. Under § 1B1.3(a)(1), the district court must only “make a reasonable estimate” of the loss under the preponderance of the evidence standard. The court held that “the government’s loss-calculation spreadsheet connects each loss to Defendant individually—rather than to the conspiracy more broadly—through specific, identified pieces of evidence.” It found it unnecessary to consider the “‘factors relevant to determining the scope of the criminal activity that a defendant agreed to jointly undertake’” under Donadeo “because § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) ‘does not apply to conduct that the defendant personally undertakes.’” The court also rejected Igboba's argument that the district court erred by applying § 2B1.1(b)(10)’s two-level sentence enhancement for the use of “sophisticated means” to perpetrate fraud. The district court ruled that the enhancement was supported by his “use of a VPN, the Tor browser, the dark web, multiple bank accounts, and multiple email aliases in committing his offense.” It also noted the difficulty of acquiring the taxpayer personally identifying information “used to file the fraudulent returns.” Additionally, the scheme involved corporate shell companies.