Other acts evidence of sexual abuse; MCL 768.27a; MRE 404(b); People v. Watkins; People v. McGhee; People v. Mardlin; Effect of temporal gaps; People v. Starr; People v. Solloway; Right to counsel of choice; People v. Akins; People v. Portillo; Waiver; Godinez v. Moran; People v. Carter; Non-reversible error; People v. Krueger; People v. Hall; Expert testimony; People v. Peterson; People v. Thorpe; Judicial bias; People v. McDonald; Cain v. Department of Corrs.; People v. Stevens; Effect of a juror’s inability to follow the law; MCL 750.520h; MCR 2.511(D)(3); People v. Gursky; People v. Lemmon; Excusal of a juror for cause; MCR 6.412(D)(2); Rape-shield law; MCL 750.520j; People v. Adair; Parental presence during forensic interviews with children; MCL 722.628(6); Principle that sexual penetration includes “cunnilingus”; MCL 750.520a(o); People v. Legg; People v. Harris; Jury instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense; People v. Cornell; People v. Lemons; People v. Heflin; Sentencing; People v. Lockridge; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v. Dixon-Bey; People v. Lampe; People v. Walden; Scoring of OV 4; MCL 777.34; Psychological injuries; People v. Anderson; Scoring of OV 13; Continuing pattern of criminal behavior; MCL 777.43(1); Three or more sexual penetrations against a person less than 13 years of age; MCL 777.43(1)(a)

Holding that there were no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s conviction of 3 counts of CSC I for sexually abusing his former girlfriend’s young daughter beginning when she was 4 years old and ending when she was 9 years old, and his sentence of 35 to 80 years in prison. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting other acts testimony that was more prejudicial than probative, noting the factors to be considered under MRE 403 weighed in favor of admission. It also rejected his claim that the trial court denied him his right to counsel of his choice by refusing to appoint an attorney after he advised the trial court that he fired his retained counsel. “The trial court correctly explained to defendant that he had a right to retain any counsel of his choosing, but he did not have a right to have any particular counsel appointed.” In addition, he “did successfully retain his specifically desired attorney, so it is difficult to understand how he can claim any prejudice.” The court next rejected his contention that the trial court erred by permitting an expert in the dynamics of child sexual abuse to testify at trial and at an evidentiary hearing held to determine whether to admit the testimony from the other victims. “Aside from defendant’s own questioning, [the expert’s] testimony fell entirely within the parameters of Peterson. Bolstering the victims’ testimonies preemptively against a likely attack or a likely misapprehension is, in fact, the point.” It further rejected his argument that he was denied a fair trial by judicial bias, noting there was “nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court was anything but scrupulously fair and impartial.” It also rejected his claim that he was denied his right of confrontation, finding he was “still seeking to elicit hearsay to prove the central issue in the case, not for impeachment.” The court next found that the trial court properly denied his motion for a directed verdict, and properly declined to instruct the jury on the cognate offense of CSC II. Finally, the court held that “departing upward from the guidelines and imposing a sentence beyond the 25-year mandatory minimum, the trial court properly considered the seriousness of the offenses and surrounding circumstances as well as the circumstances surrounding the offender. A number of the factors identified by the court were not fully accounted for by the sentencing guidelines.”