“Gross negligence”; MCL 691.1407(8); Maiden v. Rozwood; Tarlea v. Crabtree; A school bus driver’s failure to activate the overhead caution lights; MCL 257.1855(2)(b); Rebuttable presumption of negligence created by violation of a statute; Candelaria v. BC Gen. Contractors, Inc.; Effect of evidence of ordinary negligence; Xu v. Gay; Vicarious liability; MCL 691.1407; The motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity; MCL 691.1405; Goodhue v. Department of Transp.; Yoches v. Dearborn; Montague Area Public Schools (MAPS)

On remand from the Michigan Supreme Court, the court held that defendant-school bus driver (DeMorrow) was entitled to summary disposition because there was no genuine issue of material fact that she was not grossly negligent and thus, defendant-school district (MAPS) was entitled to summary disposition because, absent DeMorrow’s gross negligence, MAPS could not be held vicariously liable. As a result, the court again reversed the trial court’s order denying defendants’ motion for summary disposition and remanded. There was conflicting evidence as to whether DeMorrow activated the bus’s caution light before the accident. The court held “that, even accepting plaintiffs’ evidence that DeMorrow did not activate the bus’s lights, this omission does not support a conclusion that DeMorrow was grossly negligent.” It determined that her “failure to activate the overhead caution lights, at most, creates a rebuttable presumption that DeMorrow was negligent” – that she did not “exercise the care that a reasonably careful person would use under the circumstances.” The evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact that her “conduct was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” Where she did not give plaintiff-Loren “any instructions to cross the road and DeMorrow did not know that Loren had started to cross the road, reasonable minds could not conclude that DeMorrow, by failing to activate the caution lights, simply did not care about the safety or welfare of Loren.” Thus, the court held that she was not grossly negligent. Therefore, she was entitled to summary disposition. Having resolved the gross negligence issue, the court also held MAPS could not be held vicariously liable.