Sentencing; Imposition of court costs; MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii); Illegal tax claim; People v. Cameron; Waiver of claim as to the conditions of probation; People v. Carter; Whether the trial court delegated its authority to the probation officer

Under Cameron, the court held that defendant’s claim the court costs imposed on him were an illegal tax had no merit. He waived his claim that the trial court erred in requiring certain probation conditions, and the court concluded that the trial court did not delegate its authority to order probation conditions to the probation officer. He pled guilty to first-degree retail fraud. The trial court sentenced him as a second offense habitual offender “to 70 days in jail, with credit for 54 days served, followed by 36 months of probation, with the sentences to be served concurrently. As part of his probation, he was to be placed on a continuous alcohol monitoring system (SCRAM) or sober-link program requiring electronic alcohol monitoring, not to possess any alcohol, undergo substance abuse and mental health evaluations and complete any recommended treatment ‘as directed by the probation officer,’ and to pay $400 in court costs.” He argued that imposing “court costs in general is unconstitutional because it violates the Distinct Statement Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers.” But the court considered “the constitutionality of MCL 769.1k in Cameron and held the opposite.” Given that he requested substance abuse treatment as part of his probation, he waived his claim that the trial court erred in “requiring alcohol treatment and the use of a SCRAM device as part of his probation conditions because there was not a rational relationship between the conditions and rehabilitation of his convictions.” As to his contention that the trial court abdicated its discretion to order his probation conditions, the record showed that it ordered him “to undergo substance abuse and mental health evaluations and testing. Referring to the outcome and potential recommendations of the evaluation and testing, the trial court ordered [him] to participate in ‘treatment as directed by the probation officer.’” Thus, it did not abdicate its role, but rather instructed “the probation officer to follow-up and follow through with [defendant’s] testing outcomes by implementing any specific substance abuse treatment that [he] requested and the trial court ordered.” Affirmed.