Other acts of domestic violence; MCL 768.27b(1); People v. Cameron; Domestic violence defined; MCL 768.27b(6); MRE 403 balancing test; People v. Watkins; People v. Railer; People v. Propp; Presumption jurors follow their instructions; People v. Abraham; Whether an error is outcome determinative; People v. Feezel; Credibility; People v. Dunigan; Flight; People v. Unger; Sentencing; Scoring of 10 points for OV 9; People v. McGraw; People v. Sargent; MCL 777.39(1)(c); People v. Nickens; People v. Morson; People v. Davis

The court concluded that even if it were to determine that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the other acts evidence, defendant-Buelteman would not be entitled to a new trial because it was not more probable than not that its admission undermined the reliability of the verdict. Also, because a preponderance of the evidence supported that the victim’s cousin was in danger of physical injury during the ongoing assault on the victim, the trial court did not err by assessing 10 points for OV 9. He was convicted of domestic violence, third offense and sentenced as a second-offense habitual offender to 26 months to 7-1/2 years. He argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his other acts of domestic violence against the victim under MCL 768.27b. He conceded that his other acts of twisting her arm and slapping her were admissible under MCL 768.27b. But he argued that “evidence that he forced the victim to engage in sexual acts with his elderly relative by threatening her with physical violence and by pushing her head down ‘had only slight probative value.’” Thus, he argued that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to exclude this evidence under MRE 403. The court held that “the challenged evidence had significant probative value for establishing [his] propensity to engage in domestic violence with the victim.” It was also relevant to assess her credibility, “which was of particular importance in light of Buelteman’s argument that the victim’s testimony was not reliable. Finally, the other acts provided context for understanding the relationship and background of Buelteman and the victim.” Thus, the court held that “this was not marginally probative evidence that risked creating unfair prejudice.” Although he claimed that it was dissimilar to the 2018 incident, the other acts evidence involved the same victim and showed “a pattern of violence by Buelteman against the victim, thereby adding to its probative value. The risk that the jury would be distracted by extraneous considerations, such as bias, sympathy, anger, or shock, was addressed by the trial court’s instructions” about the permissible use of the evidence. The jurors were specifically instructed “that they could consider the prior acts to determine whether Buelteman committed the charged offense, but could not convict [him] solely because they believed he was guilty of the other bad conduct.” Further, any error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Affirmed.