Confidential communication under the cleric-congregant privilege; People v. Bragg; MCL 600.2156; MCL 767.5a(2); Expert witness who vouched for the victim’s credibility; MRE 702; People v. Peterson; People v. Thorpe; People v. Palmer; People v. Nowack; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the admission of the expert witness’s testimony; People v. Head; People v. Heft; Smith v. Spisak; People v. Trakhtenberg; Strickland v. Washington; People v. Carbin; Trial strategy; People v. Unger; People v. Jackson; Cumulative effect of the alleged errors; People v. Knapp; People v. Dobek

The trial court did not err when it held that the cleric-congregant privilege under MCL 767.5a(2) was inapplicable. Also, the court could not conclude that the admission of the expert witness’s testimony here deprived defendant of his substantial rights. Further, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finally, because no error was established, reversal was not warranted on the basis of cumulative error. He was convicted of three counts of CSC I. Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his pastor’s testimony because it was not a confidential communication under the cleric-congregant privilege. His “pastor testified that when defendant first admitted to the pastor that he was having intercourse with his step-daughter, the two did, indeed, pray together about the situation. At the same time, the pastor testified that he was a friend of defendant’s and that defendant also asked him in that conversation to place a telephone call to his ex-wife and accompany defendant to a meeting with his attorney the following morning.” The next day, “defendant again admitted to having sexual intercourse with his step-daughter, and during that time, the pastor provided no advice or input other than praying for the family outside afterwards.” The trial court determined that he “had not necessarily communicated with the pastor as a pastor, but instead as a friend from whom defendant sought ‘help . . . with his mounting serious legal predicament.’” The court discerned no clear error regarding that conclusion. And, even more importantly, it noted that he did “not even dispute that the third element from” Bragg was met. The “pastor explicitly testified at the hearing on defendant’s motion to preclude the pastor’s testimony that he had concluded with his church elders that communications are not considered confidential in their denomination when they involve ‘harm to anyone else or their immediate family,’ or when the communication demonstrates that the congregant is a ‘threat to themselves or anyone else.’” Affirmed.