Slip & fall; Premises liability; Open & obvious danger; Joyce v. Rubin; Bullard v. Oakwood Annapolis Hosp.; Hoffner v. Lanctoe; Whether the condition was effectively unavoidable; Lugo v. Ameritech Corp., Inc.; Whether the wet floors presented an unreasonable risk of harm; Bertrand v. Alan Ford, Inc.

Holding that the dampness of the freshly-cleaned carpets in defendant’s hotel was an open and obvious condition, and that plaintiff failed to establish a special aspect existed, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant. When she returned to the elevator after visiting a friend, “she slipped when transitioning between the carpet in the hallway and the tile in the elevator lobby. She said that it was like stepping on oil.” Her friend also slipped but did not fall. Plaintiff “testified that a gentleman who came to help her said that the area was ‘slippery as snot,’ and two other hotel patrons also commented that the floor was slippery.” She sustained a knee fracture. “Defendant’s general manager testified that she placed six red warning signs on each floor of the hotel to warn patrons of the wet floor.” A photo of plaintiff sitting where she slipped and fell showed “that one of these signs was hanging directly above” her head. The court concluded that objectively viewing the facts, “reasonable minds could not disagree that defendant exercised reasonable care.” Plaintiff’s deposition testimony showed that she was aware “the first floor of defendant’s premises was ‘slippery.’ Based on these facts, it is reasonable to expect that an average person with ordinary intelligence would have discovered, upon casual inspection, that the transition between the carpet and the tile floor could have been slippery.” The court also rejected plaintiff’s assertion that “the condition was effectively unavoidable.” In contrast to the hypothetical in Lugo, this case did not present “a situation in which standing water is covering the floor and there is only one exit. Here, based on plaintiff’s deposition testimony, the floors were wet, but passable. Further differentiating this case from Lugo, there was more than one exit because plaintiff could have used the stairs rather than the elevator.” There was no record evidence supporting her assertion “that the ‘same slippery conditions’ would have existed ‘at the other end of the hallway[.]’” She did not establish that the wet floors posed “an unreasonable risk of harm.”