Motion to terminate the PPO; Pickering v. Pickering; Hayford v. Hayford; Pirgu v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n; Ross v. Auto Club Group; Berryman v. Mackey; MCL 600.2950a(1); Stalking; MCL 750.411h; MCL 750.411h(1)(d); MCL 750.411s(1); Aggravated stalking; MCL 750.411i

Given the trial court’s lack of record findings supporting the entry of a PPO under the statutes, the court vacated the order denying respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO and remanded to allow the trial court to make reviewable findings. The parties each have a child with the same man—M. They accused each other of “harassment and other misdeeds.” The trial court stated that it “could not discern ‘what the truth is,’ but declined to terminate an ex parte PPO because it was ‘concerned about the level of animosity that’s going on.’” It decided “to continue the PPO without resolving the credibility dispute between the parties, without making sufficient findings of fact on the record, and based on hearsay. The parties gave conflicting testimony and directly contradicted each other’s allegations.” The trial court was required to find that one side was “more credible than the other.” Had it done so, the court would be required to defer to its assessment. But it did not resolve the credibility dispute; it stated, “I don’t know what the truth is.” If the trial “court could not gauge the truth, it could not conclude that the PPO was properly entered.” Further, it “failed to make findings of fact supporting the entry of a PPO.” It cited its “concern[] about the level of animosity that’s going on.” However, the court held that “animosity does not equate with a ‘willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.’” And although the trial court could not determine how respondent knew where petitioner and M lived, it “did not find that respondent used her knowledge of petitioner’s address to engage in activity that amounted to stalking. [It] found that petitioner had blocked respondent on social media but that respondent had contacted petitioner and her sister in the past. [It] further found that respondent had ‘no need . . . to talk to [petitioner] or contact her anyway.’” The court held that this did not amount to a violation of MCL 750.411s. “Petitioner alleged that respondent had created fake Facebook profiles in an attempt to contact petitioner after she had been blocked on social media. This might amount to repetitive unconsented contact. However, petitioner presented no evidence tracing the false accounts back to respondent. And the trial court did not resolve the parties’ contradictory testimony in that regard.”