Governmental immunity; The Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) (MCL 691.1401 et seq.); Disparate-impact & disparate-treatment claims under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) (MCL 37.2101 et seq.); Principle that the GTLA does not grant immunity from ELCRA claims; Does 11-18 v. Department of Corr.; Whether the gravamen of the claims sounded in tort; Diamond v. Witherspoon; Distinguishing Robinson v. City of Detroit; Whether the cases should be transferred to the Court of Claims; Doe v. Department of Transp.

Given that plaintiffs did not expressly allege an ordinary tort claim, but rather asserted disparate-impact and disparate-treatment claims under the ELCRA, the court rejected the argument by defendants-State of Michigan and Michigan State Police that they were entitled to immunity under the GTLA. It also declined their request to have the case transferred to the Court of Claims. It affirmed the trial court’s denial of their motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). These consolidated appeals arose from auto accidents involving “MSP patrol cars engaged in high-speed chases. As alleged, plaintiffs were bystanders who were injured or killed as a result of the chases, and plaintiffs sued defendants.” Their complaints did “not allege that defendants owe them no-fault benefits or any ordinary tort-related relief.” Instead, they asserted claims under the ELCRA. The GTLA does not “grant immunity for civil-rights claims under the ELCRA.” Defendants contended that the gravamen of plaintiffs’ allegations sounded “in tort, not disparate impact or treatment.” The court noted that it considered a similar issue in Diamond, where it permitted plaintiffs to pursue ELCRA claims “based on alleged sexual assaults committed by a police officer. The plaintiffs in that case could have brought ordinary tort claims, but they did not, and this Court declined the invitation to rewrite the complaints.” The court also found defendants’ reliance on Robinson unpersuasive, noting that the plaintiff there did not raise an ELCRA claim. Here, the court concluded that “plaintiffs are masters of their complaints, and they did not expressly allege an ordinary tort claim.” It did not have to decide “whether the gravamen of the allegations could support an ordinary tort claim, because plaintiffs have made plain that they are not pursuing such a claim.” In addition, given that defendants did not raise the issue of whether the gravamen of the allegations supported a viable ELCRA claim in their motions, this was not before the court. Relatedly, given that “the trial court has concurrent jurisdiction over ELCRA claims against state defendants,” the court declined to transfer the cases to the Court of Claims.