Order of disposition; Probable cause to authorize the petition; In re Ferranti; Blue Cross Blue Shield of MI v. Milliken; Reasonable efforts to prevent the children’s removal; MCR 3.965; Applicability of In re Mason; Principle that a parent cannot be ordered to engage in services until adjudicated unfit; In re Sanders; Statutory grounds to assume jurisdiction; In re Brock; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2)

Holding that the trial court did not err in authorizing the petition and in concluding that statutory grounds existed to assume jurisdiction over respondent-mother’s children, the court affirmed the order of disposition. In challenging the finding of probable cause to authorize the petition, she argued “that there were misrepresentations in the removal petition.” But the court concluded that even if there was no evidence to support some of the allegations, “the trial court did not clearly err in finding probable cause to authorize the petition.” As it correctly noted, probable cause is “not a demanding evidentiary standard” and it relied on unrefuted testimony by the caseworker that one of the children (A) “disclosed in her forensic interview that she reported the sexual abuse to respondent.” Statements by a grandmother to the caseworker and an incident in 12/18 also provided “circumstantial evidence that respondent was aware of the abuse.” Respondent failed to cite any “legal authority to support her position that services should have been provided to her before removal.” The case she cited, Mason, “concerned the reunification process, i.e., post-adjudication efforts and services.” The court noted that a “parent cannot be ordered to engage in services until adjudicated as unfit.” In addition, the language of MCR 3.965(C)(4) “strongly suggests that pre-removal services are not required in all cases.” The court further concluded that the DHHS “made reasonable efforts to determine the veracity of the allegations and whether respondents failed to protect [A] from abuse.” While respondent indicated “she would have continued to follow the safety plan, her compliance was not mandatory and the safety plan was not a permanent solution.” Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in determining “that reasonable efforts were made under the circumstances . . . .” As to its assumption of jurisdiction, “even assuming that respondent did not know of the abuse, the evidence established that she had reason to know that something inappropriate was occurring between the children, yet she took no meaningful steps to address that issue. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that, by reason of neglect, respondent failed to provide proper care and that her home was unfit.”