Custody; Mitchell v. Mitchell; Phillips v. Jordan; Proper cause or a change of circumstances (COC); MCL 722.27(1)(c); Giving immediate effect to a Friend of the Court (FOC) recommendation; MCR 3.215(G); MCR 3.215(G)(3)(b); MCR 3.215(E)(1)(c); MCR 3.215(F); Interview with a child; MCL 722.23(i); Maier v. Maier; Bowers v. Bowers; Limiting the scope of the de novo hearing; MCL 552.507; MCR 3.215(F)(2); MCL 552.507(5)(a); Review the referee’s best-interest findings; The statutory best interest factors; MCL 722.23; The trial court’s obligations under the Child Custody Act; Harvey v. Harvey; Dailey v. Kloenhamer; Rivette v. Rose-Molina; Constantini v. Constantini; Child Protective Services (CPS)

The court held that while most of plaintiff-mother’s challenges lacked merit, the trial court failed “in its duty to independently address each statutory factor underlying its best-interest determination.” Thus, it remanded for a new de novo hearing. The mother claimed, among other things, that the trial court failed to make a threshold finding of proper cause or a COC before proceeding to an evidentiary hearing on defendant-father’s motion to change custody. At the onset of the findings of fact, the FOC referee indicated that it found proper cause or a COC warranting a reconsideration of the existing custody order because CPS had removed the child from the mother’s care and placed him with the father. “Only after stating this finding did the referee consider the child’s established custodial environment and whether changing custody was in the child’s best interests.” Thus, the court concluded that neither the FOC referee nor the trial court erred in this respect. It also noted that the mother did not challenge the validity of the FOC referee’s reasoning. However, it agreed with the mother that the trial court erred at the de novo hearing “by considering itself a ‘reviewing court’ and not making independent findings regarding each best-interest factor.” If a trial court does not “explicitly state its findings on each best-interest factor,” the court must reverse and remand for a new de novo hearing. In this case, the trial court “made some general findings, but did not address the individual factors in a reviewable fashion.” Thus, the court had to remand for a new de novo hearing, “at which up-to-date information may be presented, and after which specific findings of fact must be made in relation to each factor.”