Legal malpractice; Bowden v. Gannaway; Standard of care for an attorney; Coleman v. Gurwin; Eggleston v. Boardman; Whether the notice of intent was sufficient; MCL 600.6431; McCahan v. Brennan (McCahan I & II); Signature requirement; MCL 600.6431(1); Substantial compliance; Fairley v. Department of Corrs.; Timeliness; MCL 600.6431(3)

The court held that plaintiffs’ notice in the underlying case, as filed, did not comply with the statutory requirements of MCL 600.6431(1) and that the trial court erred by finding that, at the time their attorney filed it, the law only required substantial compliance with that provision. Plaintiffs sued defendant-law firm for legal malpractice after a prior panel of the court found that their notice of intent to file their claim against the state was deficient because they themselves were required to sign pursuant to MCL 600.6431(1). In this appeal, the court agreed with plaintiffs that defendant “should have been aware of the relevant law regarding full or strict compliance with the statute at the time notice was filed in the underlying case.” It also noted that, contrary to the trial court’s assertion, “Fairley did not change the law regarding compliance with MCL 600.6431(1).” The signature requirement “is no different than the timeliness provision; all parts of the statute must be complied with in order for notice to be effective.” The court concluded that “‘an attorney of ordinary learning, judgment or skill’ would have fully complied with the statutory notice requirements in MCL 600.6431(1).” As such, defendant “breached the applicable standard of care by failing to comply” with the statute, and the trial court “properly denied defendant’s summary disposition motion, but erred in denying plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary disposition.” As the first two elements of a legal malpractice claim were "established (attorney-client relationship, negligence),” the only remaining issues to be resolved "in the trial court are whether defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of an injury and the fact and extent of the injury alleged.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.