Uninsured motorist benefits; DeFrain v. State Farm; Insurance policy interpretation; Twichel v. MIC Gen. Ins. Co.; Use of dictionary definitions; Michigan Millers Ins. Co. v. Bronson Plating Co.; Uninsured motor vehicle defined; Effect of the fact the object struck was stationary; Ordinary meaning of “hit”; Principle that identical language should receive identical construction when found in the same act; Empire Iron Mining P’ship v. Orhanen

After hearing oral argument, in lieu of granting leave to appeal the court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 67303 in the 3/1/18 edition for the published opinion), holding that it erred in ruling that the unidentified truck did not cause an object to hit the insured vehicle (an ambulance) when the ambulance hit drywall the truck had left in the road. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary disposition for defendant-insurer on the basis plaintiff-insured was not entitled to coverage under the “policy’s uninsured motor vehicle provision as a matter of law.” The court noted there was no dispute that the drywall left the truck bed, “came to rest in the road; and that, shortly thereafter, the ambulance collided with the drywall as the drywall lay stationary in the road. Using the commonly understood meaning” of the policy’s terms, “one way of triggering coverage under the provision is for an unidentified vehicle to cause an object to come in contact with a covered auto.” This was what occurred here when the unidentified truck “lost its load in the path of the oncoming ambulance. By depositing the drywall directly in the path of an oncoming vehicle, the unidentified vehicle caused the drywall to come in contact with the oncoming vehicle. Thus, whether the drywall was moving or was stationary at the time of the contact is not dispositive.” While the dissent wanted to “reframe the issue as a theoretical semantic one, asking whether a stationary object can be said to ‘hit’” a moving one, this did not “apply the ordinary meaning of the term ‘hit’ or” interpret it in the context in which it appeared in the policy. Rather, the proper inquiry under the policy was whether a vehicle that lost its load in the road, “placing a stationary object in the path of a moving vehicle, can be said to have caused the stationary object to come in contact with the moving vehicle. When the question is properly framed, the answer is straightforward: depositing drywall directly in the path of an oncoming vehicle is sufficient to cause it to come in contact with that vehicle. Accordingly, the phrase ‘cause an object to hit’” did not bar coverage simply because the drywall was stationary at the time. This conclusion was also supported by “the presence of the word ‘hit’ in both scenarios in which a hit-and-run accident may give rise to” benefits under the provision. Remanded to the trial court.

The dissent found that the correct disposition of the case turned “on one specific issue: whether the stationary drywall can properly be said to have ‘hit’ the moving insured motor vehicle.” The dissenting justices concluded that, as the parties conceded the drywall was “stationary when the accident occurred, the unidentified vehicle did not cause an object to ‘hit’ the insured vehicle” and thus, plaintiff was not entitled to coverage.