Termination under §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), & (g); Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) & (c); MCL 712A.19a(2); In re Mason; A respondent’s responsibility to participate in offered services; In re Frey; Alleged denial of a meaningful opportunity to participate in the case; Plain error review; In re Utrera; Requirement that caseworkers make efforts to locate a parent absent from the proceedings; In re Rood; Absent Parent Protocol (APP); Suspension of parenting time; MCL 712A.13a(13); Child’s best interests; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Moss Minors; In re White; Effect of a relative placement; In re Mason; Claim the trial court failed to state its findings & conclusion as to the child’s best interests on the record; MCR 3.977(I)(1)

The court held that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under §§ (a)(ii), (c)(i), and (g), and that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts. It further concluded that any lack of meaningful participation in the case was due to respondent-father’s lack of cooperation. While the trial court plainly erred in suspending his parenting time, he did not show prejudice. Finally, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination was in the child’s best interests. Before the initial petition was filed, respondent did not visit the child “regularly and only sporadically provided support. Afterward, respondent was incarcerated for several months.” Upon his release, he started “participating in services and visited the child for about six weeks.” But between 5/4/17 and the termination hearing on 7/30/18, he “did not participate in services or visit the child. He also did not reach out to” her maternal grandmother, with whom she was placed. The workers testified he never asked for updates about her or provided any support. The court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred by finding that respondent deserted the child for 91 or more days and did not seek custody during that period.” Further, given his “lack of participation and progress, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that” § (c)(i) was also established. For the same reasons, it did not clearly err in finding that § (g) was established. As to his claim that he was denied an opportunity to meaningfully participate, the court concluded that even if the DHHS did not fully comply with the APP, he failed to show prejudice. The record showed “that the caseworkers continuously made efforts to contact” him and on numerous occasions, he did not follow up with them. The trial court plainly erred in suspending his parenting time where it “made no findings of harm, but instead conditioned parenting time on respondent addressing the outstanding warrant and complying with the service plan.” It lacked the authority to suspend parenting time for these purposes. But he “stopped participating in this case and left the state without informing the caseworker” or his attorney, and next appeared before the trial court, by phone, at the termination hearing. There was no indication that he “would have taken a different course of action had his parenting time not been improperly suspended.” Affirmed.