Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Trakhtenberg; Factual predicate; People v. Hoag; Matters of trial strategy; People v. Unger; People v. Putman; People v. Davis; Decision whether defendant would testify; People v. Boyd; People v. Fields; People v. Tommolino; People v. Bonilla-Machado; Failure to raise a futile objection; People v. Ericksen; Prosecutorial error; People v. Brown; People v. Callon; People v. Cross; Prejudice; People v. Chelmicki; Arguing from the facts a witness should be believed; People v. Seals; People v. Thomas; Sufficiency of the evidence to support a first-degree home invasion conviction; MCL 750.110a(2); Assault defined; People v. Cameron; Witness credibility; People v. Lemmon; People v. Solloway; Request for a jury instruction on third-degree home invasion; People v. Gillis; People v. Armstrong; MCL 750.110a(4); Misdemeanor malicious destruction of property; MCL 750.377a(1); People v. Nelson; Statutory basis for necessarily included lesser offense instructions; MCL 768.32(1); People v. Wilder; Principle that both misdemeanor & felony assaults may properly be charged as crimes underlying first-degree home invasion; People v. Sands

Rejecting defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial error claims, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support his first-degree home invasion conviction, and concluding that there was no error in the denial of his request for a third-degree home invasion jury instruction, the court affirmed. As to defense counsel’s failure to call any witnesses, defendant did not present any affidavits from potential witnesses stating what their testimony would have been. He simply stated in his affidavit that an unnamed witness could have testified that the victim (S) “had been assaultive to defendant in the past.” However, this witness did not see the event that gave rise to this case, and S’s “potential character for being aggressive toward defendant was not an issue at trial. Thus,” the court concluded that failing to call this one unnamed witness “did not deprive defendant of a substantial defense.” The record showed that defense counsel made repeated efforts to impeach S and to call into question his credibility. In addition, “in light of facts on the record and defendant’s statements at trial,” he was not denied his right to testify and defense counsel was not ineffective for advising him not to testify. Finally, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a futile objection to the prosecutor’s proper closing arguments. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. S testified that “defendant and his unnamed friend broke through the entry door to his apartment and attempted to kick and punch him.” He was unable to recall if they “actually did hit him because he was using the front door to his apartment as a shield after he fell through his closet door.” Defense counsel impeached his “testimony and cast some doubt on” his story, but S’s “testimony was not seriously impeached or so inherently implausible that it could not be believed by a reasonable juror.” The police officer (D) who responded to S’s 911 call saw that the apartment door “was on the floor and broken off its hinges.” D also saw a second door in S’s apartment that appeared broken. D’s observations supported S’s story. Finally, the court found that a third-degree home invasion instruction was unnecessary as defendant did not contest that S was in his apartment, and S’s presence was the factor that elevated the offense to first-degree home invasion.