Other acts evidence of robberies in which a defendant had participated; People v. McGhee; People v. Babcock; MRE 404(b)(1); People v. Starr; People v. Mardlin; MRE 403; People v. Knox; People v. Watkins; People v. Mills; Limiting jury instruction; People v. Martzke; People v. Torres; Sufficiency of evidence to show participation in the armed robbery; People v. Ericksen; People v. Hardiman; Identity; People v. Yost; People v. Hampton; People v. Tennyson; Restitution; MCL 780.767(1) & (4); People v. Cross; People v. Orweller; People v. McKinley; Motion for a remand for a preliminary exam; People v. Taylor; People v. Skowronek; People v. Jones; People v. Hall; Harmless error; MCL 769.26; People v. Lukity; Whether 11 text messages were timely disclosed; Good cause to excuse the notice requirement; MRE 404(b)(2); People v. Jackson; Whether a defendant was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor did not disclose a voluminous amount of phone records until the fifth day of the trial; People v. Rose; People v. Banks; People v. Davie (After Remand); Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 12 & 13; People v. Rosa; People v. Light; People v. Goodman; People v. Earl; People v. Wellman

The court held that other acts evidence was properly admitted, and that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant-Jones’s armed robbery conviction. Further, any error related defendant-Prince’s motion for remand for a preliminary exam was harmless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain text messages, and there was no showing of actual prejudice as to the phone records at issue. The court also found no error in the scoring of OVs 12 and 13. Thus, it affirmed defendants’ convictions and sentences. However, the trial court inaccurately recalled the amount that was taken from the victim (F), and based its restitution order on that incorrect recollection. Thus, the court remanded to correct the order of restitution to accurately reflect the $400 amount. In this consolidated appeal, both defendants were convicted of armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Prince was also convicted of felony-firearm. Jones argued that the trial court erred in admitting other acts of robberies in which she had participated. She contended that the “evidence against her was so weak that the jury could have been influenced to convict her on the basis of her acknowledged participation in the other robberies or to conclude that she had a propensity to commit” crimes. “The acts were frequent and close in time and place to the charged crime, which was committed in a similar way.” Notably, she confirmed to an officer (D) that she committed the other acts. Jones told D that “she and Prince, her boyfriend, ‘were doing Backpage Craigslist robbery [sic]’ and explained that ‘the robberies’ involved the same methodology [F] described, down to the location and specific video game system purportedly offered for sale. There was evidence that a woman assisted Prince, and given Jones’s testimony about the nature of their relationship and the extent and consistency of their robbery operation, it would be reasonable to infer that the robbery of [F] was part of the same operation.” Thus, the evidence was probative, and the court concluded that its use was not unfairly prejudicial under the circumstances. Further, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction as to consideration of this evidence. As to Prince’s claims, among other things, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the texts could be admitted despite the lack of earlier notice because the good cause requirement was met.