Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Trakhtenberg; People v. Lockett; Strategic decisions; People v. Vaughn; Model criminal jury instructions; MCR 2.512(D)(2); Self-defense; People v. Dupree (Dupree I & II); The Self-Defense Act; People v. Guajardo; People v. Hardiman; People v. Musser; M Crim JI 7.15 & 7.21; MCL 780.973; Remedy for the deprivation of the right to counsel; People v. Whitfield; People v. Gridiron; People v. Smith

Holding that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, the court vacated his convictions and sentences and remanded for a new trial as to felony-firearm and felon in possession (FIP) only. He was convicted of those charges and acquitted of a second-degree murder charge. He argued that his trial attorneys were ineffective for, among other things, failing to ensure that the jury received proper instructions as to self-defense and defense of others as affirmative defenses to FIP. The court agreed. The prosecution argued that the evidence failed to show that his “resort to potentially lethal force satisfied the legal standard for necessity” or that he “took and maintained possession of a firearm only for the time necessary to respond to an imminent threat,” relying on the court’s note about relevant circumstances in Guajardo. The court observed that “the prosecution explicitly agreed to such instructions below, and it was the prosecution, not the defense, that prepared the proposed instructions that attempted to modify M Crim JI 7.15” and 7.21 to fit FIP. Also, it disagreed. Defendant claimed “in a written statement that he obtained the gun-safe code from his wife, and then obtained the handgun, only after an unidentified man dressed fully in black, with black gloves, showed up at [his] house unannounced after dark.” Evidence was introduced showing that victim-A “was armed with a knife and a revolver not registered in his name,” that A had indicated to others he intended to confront defendant, that A “had an inclination toward violence and ‘busting in’ to others’ premises,” and that A had reason to be upset with defendant because he had recently cut A “out of a planned heist. It was the jury’s prerogative to credit or reject the evidence of how or when defendant obtained the handgun, whether [he] had adequate reason to believe his possession of” the gun was necessary, and the witnesses’ credibility. The court did “not believe defendant’s possession of the gun for longer than the literal amount of time taken to perform the act of shooting it inherently precludes a self-defense instruction.” Thus, he was entitled to a proper jury instruction as to self-defense and defense of others as to his FIP charge, and the instructions given did not sufficiently address this charge. On the record, it could “conceive of no valid strategic rationalization for counsel’s failure to object or to request different instructions.” Thus, it found that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.