Duty of care; Doe v. Henry Ford Health Sys.; Fultz v. Union-Commerce Assoc.; Clark v. Dalman; Bailey v. Schaaf (On Remand); Whether there is a duty of care by an “organizer of an outdoor event . . . to warn a spectator of approaching severe weather”; Dykema v. Gus Macker Enters., Inc.; Whether there is a duty of care to exercise reasonable care in contractual undertakings; Loweke v. Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co., LLC; Scott v. Harper Recreation, Inc.; Breach; Badiee v. Brighton Area Schs.; Alleged breach of the duty of reasonable care when installing the tent flap behind the fryer despite knowing that a storm was imminent; Hill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Right result reached for the wrong reason; Etefia v. Credit Techs., Inc.; “Open & obvious danger”; Buhalis v. Trinity Continuing Care Servs.; Laier v. Kitchen; Eason v. Coggins Mem’l Christian Methodist Episcopal Church; Duty owed to “licensees”; Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship; Pippin v. Atallah

The court held that the undisputed evidence showed that defendants-Kalamazoo Jaycee, Dastoli & Associates, and Events were entitled to summary disposition. However, it held that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against defendant-Shawarma; as a premises possessor, Shawarma owed plaintiffs-Arwa and Ibtihaj “a duty of care and there was evidence that—when considered in the light most favorable to them—would permit a reasonable jury to find that Shawarma breached the duty and caused the injuries at issue.” Whether the open and obvious danger doctrine applied under the facts must be determined by the finder of fact. Thus, it affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Arwa and her then six-year-old daughter, Ibtihaj, went to the Kalamazoo Island Festival and were injured when the “winds billowed in the tent walls, which apparently struck and knocked over the table with the hot-oil fryer.” They argued that the trial court erred when it determined that Jaycee, Dastoli, Events, and Shawarma did not owe them any duty of care. There was “no evidence that Jaycee or Events took any action that caused the hot-oil fryer to fall and injure Arwa and Ibtihaj.” Further, to the extent that their “visit to the festival gave rise to a special relationship with Jaycee and Events—as the organizer and manager of the festival”—the court has held that “there is no duty on the ‘organizer of an outdoor event . . . to warn a spectator of approaching severe weather.’” Rather, inclement weather is “readily apparent to reasonably prudent people” and thus, it is “one’s own responsibility to protect himself from the weather.” Since Jaycee and Events did “not actively contribute to the creation of the danger at issue and had no duty to warn of impending inclement weather, the trial court did not err when it determined that Arwa and Ibtihaj could not establish that either Jaycee or Events breached its duty of care to them.” Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that “Events voluntarily undertook the task of monitoring the weather and using the information to protect the festivalgoers.” For that reason, they contended, Events “agreed to conduct this task with reasonable care and failed to do so by warning the festivalgoers belatedly and inadequately.” However, there was no evidence that Jaycees or Events explicitly guaranteed the plaintiffs’ safety as to inclement weather or the appliances used by vendors. Thus, there was no evidence to support the imposition of this duty.