Whether the denial of consent to adopt was “arbitrary and capricious”; MCL 710.45; MCL 710.45(7); In re Keast; In re Martin; In re Cotton; Involuntary dismissal under MCR 2.504(B)(2); Whether the trial court complied with MCR 2.517; Whether the superintendent’s consideration of the petitioners’ ages violated MCL 722.957(1) & the Michigan Civil Rights Act (CRA) (MCL 37.2101 et seq.); The Foster Care & Adoption Services Act (MCL 722.951 et seq.) (addressing adoption facilitators and refusal to provide services); Whether the superintendent and the trial court considered the child as well as her individual circumstances; In re CW; Claim that the motion for involuntary dismissal was prematurely granted; Claim that the trial court violated the child’s rights to due process and equal protection by refusing to permit the lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL) to present evidence and call witnesses at the § 45 hearing; Abandoned issue; Yee v. Shiawassee Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs; Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI)

Holding that the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that petitioners failed to present clear and convincing evidence showing that the MCI superintendent’s decision denying them consent to adopt was arbitrary and capricious, the court affirmed. Petitioners, the grandparents of the child (ASF), sought to adopt ASF after the parental rights of ASF’s biological parents were terminated. After conducting a hearing pursuant to MCL 710.45(2) (“§ 45 hearing”), the trial court found that the superintendent’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious and, thus, it upheld that decision. The court noted that the “MCI’s motion for involuntary dismissal under MCR 2.504(B)(2) was properly granted if, during their presentation of evidence, petitioners failed to show their entitlement to relief under MCL 710.45.” To obtain relief at a § 45 hearing, they “bore the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the superintendent’s denial of consent was arbitrary and capricious.” In reviewing the trial court’s assessment of the superintendent’s decision, the court noted that the trial court “made findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by MCR 2.517.” Petitioners asserted that the trial court did not comply with MCR 2.517 because it “referred to reasons offered by the superintendent that petitioners believe were contrary to the evidence.” The fact that they disagreed with the trial court’s findings as to the conflicting evidence did “not render the trial court’s findings inadequate under MCR 2.517.” Further, it was “clear that the superintendent’s opinions and the findings of the trial court were supported by the evidence.” While there may have been some conflicting evidence, “these conflicts were resolved by the superintendent and the trial court,” and thus, the trial court’s findings were supported by the evidence. “Recognizing that there was underlying factual support for the superintendent’s determinations, contrary to arguments by petitioners and LGAL,” the court also concluded that “the trial court did not clearly err when, at the close of petitioners’ case, it determined, based on the facts and laws, that petitioners were not entitled to relief because they had not shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that the superintendent’s denial of consent was arbitrary and capricious.” Also, the superintendent did not violate MCL 772.957(1) or the CRA by considering petitioners’ ages. He “did not withhold consent to adopt solely because of” their ages.