e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 60367
Opinion Date : 07/14/2015
e-Journal Date : 07/16/2015
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : Clay v. Doe
Practice Area(s) : Negligence & Intentional Tort
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – Saad, M.J. Kelly, and Shapiro
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Issues:

Action for a slip and fall on a bus; Retroactive application of Atkins v. SMART; Paul v. Wayne Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Servs.; People v. Quinn; Pohutski v. Allen Park; Whether plaintiff complied with MCL 124.419 when he mailed a claim for no-fault benefits to defendant-Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation’s (SMART) insurance administrator; Nuculovic v. Hill

Summary

The court held that it “must follow the general principle that gives ‘judicial decisions . . . full retroactive effect,’ and apply Atkins’ holding to this case.” For this reason alone, plaintiff’s suit was properly dismissed pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). Also, it held that he did not comply with the mandates of MCL 124.419. While boarding a SMART bus, plaintiff slipped and fell on the wet floor of the bus aisle. He claimed that the “bus driver accelerated too quickly as he drove the bus away from the stop, and caused plaintiff to slip and fall, and incur injuries.” While plaintiff asserted that “Atkins should not apply to his suit, because the Michigan Supreme Court issued its decision after the events in issue,” this contention was not supported by Michigan law. Contrary to his arguments, under Michigan case law, there was “no reason that Atkins should not be applied to his action.” As SMART accurately observed, “Atkins did not create a ‘new principle of law’ or overrule binding case law—it merely interpreted a statute, MCL 124.419.” Plaintiff could “not reasonably rely on an ‘old rule’ that classified a request for no-fault benefits as compliance with MCL 124.419’s notice provisions, because no such ‘old rule’ existed.” Were the court to assume that Atkins’ ruling did not apply to plaintiff’s suit, “his claim should also be dismissed because he failed to comply with the notice provisions of MCL 124.419 under his preferred, but incorrect, interpretation of the statute.” As the trial court correctly held, MCL 124.419 requires “written notice” of an “ordinary claim against a common carrier” to be “served upon the authority no later than 60 days from the occurrence through which such injury is sustained . . .” Plaintiff did not “provide SMART’s insurance administrator with ‘written notice’ of his demand for no-fault benefits within 60 days of his fall—instead, SMART’s insurance administrator received plaintiff’s demand 78 days after the event.” He did not “serve” “written notice” on defendants “no later than 60 days” after his injury, and thus, did not comply with the mandates of MCL 124.419. Affirmed.

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