Sufficiency of the evidence of an intentional burning to support the defendant’s arson conviction; MI Crim JI 31.2; People v. Williams; People v. Horowitz; People v. Nowack; Great weight of the evidence; People v. Horn; Whether a discovery violation required a new trial; People v. Schumacher; People v. Chenault; Right to self-representation; People v. Russell; Whether defendant made an unequivocal request to represent himself; The trial court’s failure to give MI Crim JI 31.1; People v. Clark; Whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request the instruction; People v. Armstrong; The magistrate’s issuance of an arrest warrant; MCL 764.1a; People v. Elston; Defense counsel’s failure to raise a futile challenge; People v. Ericksen; Admissibility of evidence obtained while firefighters are lawfully on the premises putting out a fire; The “plain view” doctrine; People v. Taylor; Principle that the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches & seizures is personal & may not be invoked by third parties; People v. Zahn; Search conducted pursuant to a property owner’s consent; People v. Beydoun

Holding that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a burning of the dwelling occurred and that it was the result of an intentional criminal act by the defendant, the court rejected his sufficiency of the evidence and great weight of the evidence claims. It also held that he was not denied his right to self-representation, and that there was no error as to the trial court’s failure to give MI Crim JI 31.1. Defendant was convicted of arson of a dwelling house and domestic violence. A fire started in the closet of victim-D’s home. D and defendant were involved in a romantic relationship. D testified that “defendant consumed alcohol and became very aggressive and agitated. He assaulted and threatened to kill her, demanded that she return to her residence, and threatened to kill her ferrets.” D did not re-enter her home while he was still there. She saw “defendant running from the home and speaking on his phone requesting a ride. Shortly after she re-entered the home, she discovered smoke and a fire in the closet. Arson investigators determined that the fire originated in the closet and discovered a propane torch in the closet.” A fire marshal (S) “rejected the defense theory that an accidental burning occurred.” S’s analysis “of the charring and burn patterns caused him to conclude that the fire was intentionally set. He opined that the burn patterns indicated that someone held the propane torch to clothing hanging in the closet.” S also checked “for other mechanical, electrical, or gas issues, as well as accidental causes such as the failure to extinguish a candle or cigarette. He eliminated all other causes.” Defendant admitted that he went into the closet to smoke crack cocaine with the torch and a pipe. The jury could find from the evidence that he was enraged at D “because he was in a paranoid state from his use of drugs and believed that she had called the police, and because she refused to comply with his demands to return to the home.” Whether or not he “tried to open the ferrets’ cage, the jury could find that he decided to use the propane torch to start a fire in the closet,” where D “kept her family mementos, because he was angry” at her. Affirmed.