Motion for substitution of counsel; People v. Mack; People v. Traylor; People v. Rose; Whether the trial court adequately considered the motion; People v. Strickland; Search & seizure; People v. Hellstrom; People v. Poole; “Probable cause”; People v. Darwich; People v. Russo; People v. Nunez; Prosecutorial error; People v. Leshaj; People v. Goodin; “Other acts” evidence; MRE 404(b); People v. VanderVliet; Relevance; MRE 401; People v. Mardlin; MRE 403; People v. Crawford; People v. Fisher; People v. Cameron; Offender Tracking Information System (OTIS)

Concluding that the trial court adequately considered the defendant’s motion for substitution of counsel, the court held that he was not entitled to the appointment of new counsel. Further, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably cautious magistrate could determine that the facts presented in the search warrant affidavit provided a “substantial basis for finding probable cause.” Finally, the court rejected defendant’s challenge to the admission of an officer’s testimony about looking up his name and photo in OTIS. Thus, it affirmed his convictions of breaking and entering, stealing from a bank, safe, vault, or other depository, and violating MCL 750.81d(1). Defendant contended that defense counsel’s decision not to file certain pretrial motions constituted a conflict as to a fundamental trial tactic, requiring the appointment of new counsel. However, “because an attorney’s ‘decision not to file . . . motions clearly falls within the categories of professional judgment and trial strategy that are matters entrusted to the attorney,’ an attorney’s refusal to file motions does not require new counsel.” The search warrant affidavit “identified defendant as the perpetrator of a breaking and entering and confirmed” that he recently lived at the address to be searched. While it “did not expressly state that a burglar often keeps evidence of his or her criminal activities in the places he or she resides a ‘magistrate . . . [is] free to make . . . logical inference[s] on his own.’” Thus, the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant was permissibly used as substantive evidence at defendant’s trial. The court also concluded that the prosecution offered the officer’s testimony for a permissible purpose under MRE 404(b) (to explain his process of identifying the suspect for one of the incidents), and the references to OTIS “established a foundation for his identification” of the suspect. Further, the probative value of the testimony “likely outweighed any prejudicial effect.” The officer and the prosecutor did not identify OTIS as a criminal database, or identify any of the specific crimes defendant committed. As his identity as the suspect for the 138 Harrow Lane incident “was integral to the prosecutor’s case, the evidence was admissible.”