Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Sentencing; Downward departure; Consideration of the guidelines; Justification of the extent of the departure; Proportionality; People v Dixon-Bey; Presentence investigation report (PSIR)
Rejecting the prosecution’s arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a downward departure sentence, the court affirmed. Defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a chemical irritant causing death after she threw lye powder at the victim, her father. She had planned to celebrate her 18th birthday on the day of the incident. Her minimum guidelines range was 51 to 85 months. The PSIR recommended a sentence of 5 to 25 years with jail credit. The trial court sentenced her to a year in jail and five years’ probation. On appeal, the prosecution argued that the trial court abused its discretion “because it failed to 1) consider the guidelines, 2) justify the sentence imposed, and 3) issue a proportional sentence.” The court disagreed in all respects. It noted that the trial “court referenced the guidelines multiple times during the sentencing hearing[.]” The court concluded the facts supported that it “consulted and considered the guidelines when sentencing defendant, and decided to depart from them.” As to justification of the extent of the departure, “the trial court detailed its considerations at length during the sentencing hearing, which included defendant’s home life and the victim’s alcoholism, defendant’s limited criminal history, and [her] mental health struggles. Citing United States Supreme Court cases for support, [it] stressed defendant’s youth and lack of brain development, recognizing the impact of age on cognitive and emotional development, and capacity for rehabilitation and change. [It] recognized that defendant had the capacity for change and reformation, and that she was ‘not a threat to society,’ and placed [her] on ‘an intensive probation program’ to ‘allow her to get on track,’ rather than ‘suffer the penalty imposed by law.’” The court held that this articulation was “sufficient justification of the basis for the [trial] court’s imposition of sentence, including its decision to impose jail time and intensive probation in lieu of a lengthier prison sentence.” As to proportionality, the court concluded “the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it properly evaluated the involved circumstances, and imposed a proportionate sentence in light of” them.
Child custody action; Paternity & child support; MCL 722.717(1)(c); Personal jurisdiction; MCR 2.105(K)(1); Process; MCR 2.105(A) & (J)(1); The sovereign citizen movement
The court held that the trial court did not err by adopting the interim orders of support following a hearing on defendant-father’s objections to the judgment of support and uniform child support order previously entered as interim orders. Defendant’s paternity was established when he failed to answer plaintiff-mother’s complaint seeking to establish paternity. He subsequently entered objections, claiming the trial court established jurisdiction over a legal entity instead of his true person. The trial court dismissed his objections and entered an order adopting both the interim judgment of support order and the uniform child support order. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred when it dismissed his objections and entered the order because it failed to establish personal jurisdiction over him. It noted “plaintiff made multiple attempts to serve defendant personally.” Eventually a “court officer successfully served ‘a copy of the summons and complaint and order for alternate service upon Alvis Perry’ by ‘[t]acking or firmly affixing [the documents] to [defendant’s] door.’” As such, “defendant was properly served the summons and complaint under MCR 2.105(J)(1), and consequently, the trial court appropriately exercised personal jurisdiction over” him. The court also found “defendant’s argument concerning his position as a ‘freeman’ and ‘sovereign citizen’” unpersuasive, noting he attempted “to skirt the trial court’s jurisdiction under the guise of ‘Alvis Perry’ being a fictious legal entity. The sovereign citizen movement attempts to create a distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ persons.” Federal courts have also dismissed such claims “as frivolous and fictitious.” Defendant presented “a sovereign-citizen style argument. In his objections to the trial court’s interim orders regarding paternity and child support, [he referred] to himself as ‘[I,] a freeman known to use the name Eleyah-Ben: Avadliel-El, In the Interest of ALVIS EUGENE PERRY – LEGAL ENTITY.’” In his brief on appeal, he similarly referred “to himself as ‘Eleyah-Ben: Avadliel-El on behalf of the legal entity/persona known as ALVIS PERRY.’” This argument, “that he is a distinct person or entity from ‘Alvis Perry,’ lacks legal merit and is a fictitious argument. Thus, we agree with the trial court that defendant’s objections ‘contain no legally cognizable claim.’” Affirmed.
PIP benefits under the No-Fault Act (NFA); Priority; Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF)
In this action for first-party PIP benefits under the NFA, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant-Nationwide. Nonparty-G was injured in an auto collision. At the time of the accident, G “did not own a motor vehicle, did not maintain a no-fault insurance policy, and had healthcare coverage through” Medicaid. G lived with her grandfather, O, who owned a vehicle and had a no-fault policy with nonparty-USAA. When O renewed his policy, he “elect[ed] to not maintain coverage for [PIP] benefits.” At issue on appeal was “whether Nationwide, the assignee of the MAIPF, is required to pay PIP medical benefits to” plaintiff-American Physio for its treatment of G. The primary dispute was “whether the USAA policy maintained by [O] qualifies as ‘personal protection insurance [] applicable to the injury.’” Under MCL 500.3172(1)(a), the court held that G “was not entitled to PIP coverage from an insurer assigned by MAIPF. Because American Physio’s rights, having been assigned from [G], were entirely derivative of [G’s] rights, American Physio also was not permitted to seek benefits from Nationwide[.].” American Physio argued O’s “USAA policy is not in the order of priority under MCL 500.3114(1) because it does not qualify as ‘a personal protection insurance policy described in [MCL 500.3101(1)] . . . .’” The court disagreed. American Physio asserted G “did not have qualified health coverage as required by MCL 500.3107d(1) to allow her to be ‘opted out’ of PIP medical coverage and thus [O] failed to purchase a policy that conformed with the requirements of the no-fault law.” The court held that plainly, under MCL 500.3114(1), G “would be required to seek replacement-services and work loss benefits from USAA because the USAA policy applies to the injuries she sustained in the subject accident and the policy is in the order of priority.” The court found “the trial court did not err by concluding that the USAA policy is applicable to the injuries [G] sustained in the accident and thus [G] was not entitled to seek benefits from the MAIPF, and neither was American Physio as an assignee.” American Physio contended “that Nationwide should litigate the coverage issue with USAA after paying PIP medical benefits to American Physio.” The court again disagreed. There was “no evidence that Nationwide failed to act diligently here.” American Physio further argued “the trial court erred by relying on MCL 500.3113(e)[.]” The court agreed. “There was no allegation or proof of [G] using a ‘transportation network company’ at the time she was injured in the” auto accident. Thus, “no exclusion was authorized under MCL 500.3017, and MCL 500.3113(e) did not disqualify [G] form receiving PIP benefits.” Despite this error, “the trial court did not rely on that ground alone and it reached the right decision[.]”
Action seeking to quiet title & alleging a violation of the anti-lockout statute (MCL 600.2918); Standing; MCL 600.2932(1); MOSES Inc v SEMCOG; Race-notice; MCL 565.29; Constructive notice by possession; Smelsey v Guarantee Fin’l Corp; Whether defendant was a good-faith purchaser; Unclean hands; New Prods Corp v Harbor Shores BHBT Land Dev, LLC; Estoppel by laches; Home-Owners Ins Co v Perkins
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting plaintiffs summary disposition as to their quiet title claim. Both parties received deeds to the property from the original owner. Plaintiffs sought to quiet title and alleged defendant violated Michigan’s anti-lockout laws. The trial court granted summary disposition for plaintiffs on the quiet title claim and to defendant on the anti-lockout claim. On appeal, the court first found that because plaintiffs claimed title to the property, they had standing. It next found that defendant was not a good-faith purchaser, noting defendant had actual knowledge that plaintiffs “possessed the property (which constituted constructive notice of title) but refrained from gaining any knowledge about their potential interest therein.” It noted defendant waived “all of the provisions in its purchase agreement” that would have confirmed plaintiffs “were, in fact, tenants.” And while it “took some steps to determine title to the property by buying title insurance, the policy [it] purchased did not protect against ‘[r]ights of claim of parties in possession not recorded in Public Records,’ i.e., any unrecorded claim [plaintiffs] may have had in the property.” Further, despite its knowledge of plaintiffs’ occupancy, defendant “never made ‘[a] simple inquiry directed to’ [them]—an inquiry that Smelsey says was ‘required’ after” defendant learned of their “possession—to determine their interest in the property.” Because defendant “not only failed to reach out to [plaintiffs] before purchasing the property but took affirmative steps to ensure its ignorance about [their] interest in the land despite its actual knowledge of” their possession, the court found defendant “was not a good-faith purchaser.” The court also rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by finding it had unclean hands, and that plaintiffs had uncleans hands by failing to timely record the deed. Defendant was “not entitled to equitable relief because it does not have superior title” and it presented “no evidence in this matter indicating that” plaintiffs sought to mislead or deceive it. Finally, the court rejected defendant’s alternative argument that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief based on estoppel by laches, even though they “waited a significant amount of time to record the quit claim deed[.]” Affirmed.