Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Sufficiency of the evidence; CSC III; Force or coercion; Judgment of sentence (JOS)
The court held that there was sufficient evidence defendant-Barber “used force to sexually penetrate the victim beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain his” CSC III conviction. As such, his due-process rights were not violated. Thus, it affirmed his conviction and sentence and remanded for the trial court to make a ministerial correction to his JOS. He was convicted of CSC III. He was sentenced as a second-offense habitual offender to an upward departure sentence of 10 to 22 1/2 years. Barber’s claim “that there was insufficient evidence to establish force or coercion beyond a reasonable doubt” lacked merit. “The victim testified that she fell asleep on [his] bed while they were watching television and drinking. The next thing she remembered was waking up with her pants and underwear pulled down and Barber on top of her penetrating her vagina with his penis. The victim testified that she tried pushing Barber’s body and arms away from her, telling him repeatedly ‘no’ and ‘stop.’ The victim explained how difficult it was pushing Barber away while he penetrated her, and how she struggled for ‘about a minute or less’ before she freed herself.” This testimony demonstrated “Barber used physical force to penetrate the victim. And while Barber took the stand and testified that their sexual encounter was consensual, ‘a victim’s testimony may be sufficient to support’ the elements of a crime ‘and need not be corroborated.’” Further the court noted that, “[t]he testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under [MCL 750.]520b to 520g.” As to Barber’s claim “that the victim’s testimony was neither specific nor credible, ‘witness credibility is a question for the fact-finder, and this Court does not interfere with the fact finder’s role.’”
Referring to jurors by number rather than name; People v Hanks; Presumption of innocence; “Anonymous jury”; People v Williams; United States v Sanchez (5th Cir); State v Tucker (WI); Sentencing; Proportionality; People v Steanhouse; People v Posey
The court rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court compromised his presumption of innocence by referring to jurors by number rather than name. However, it held that the record lacked “a sufficient rationale to explain why” his within-guidelines sentence was proportional. Thus, it affirmed his second-degree murder, CCW, and felony-firearm convictions but vacated his sentences of 25 to 50 years for second-degree murder, 2 to 5 years for CCW, and 2 years for felony-firearm, and remanded for resentencing. He argued that “impaneling a jury and referencing its members only by the use of numbers infringed on” his presumption of innocence “because it suggested to the jury that he was a particularly dangerous defendant who posed a threat to the individual jurors.” But the court found that here, as in Williams, nothing in the record indicated “the trial court’s actions undermined defendant’s presumption of innocence. The trial court informed the jury venire it had the long-standing practice of referring to jurors by number. [It] emphasized there was ‘nothing special’ about any of the cases in which it applied this practice. In doing so, the trial court followed” the court’s direction in Hanks. “Based on the trial court’s statements, jurors had no reason to believe anonymity was unusual or defendant was dangerous.” However, his second-degree murder sentence was at the top of his guidelines range. In imposing sentence, “the trial court noted that it had read many letters from [victim-D’s] friends and family and clearly believed the psychological impact resulting from defendant’s murder of [D] warranted sentencing him at the higher end of his guidelines range.” Applying Posey, the court found that the trial “court’s reasoning was inadequate.” The court noted “that defendant had no significant criminal history, no history of substance abuse, and no history of mental health issues. He was gainfully employed before the shooting and in most respects appeared to be a well-adjusted individual.” The court found that the record did not “reflect whether the trial court considered [his] individual characteristics or the circumstances surrounding the offense, except to state that defendant was ‘not naïve’ in bringing firearms to” the house the night D “was killed. This does not explain how defendant’s sentence was proportionate, or how it met any of the goals of sentencing.”
Rebuttal testimony; Due process; Right to present a defense; Cumulative evidence; MRE 403; Applicability of MRE 106; Motion for a new trial; MCR 2.611(A)(1); MCR 6.431(B) & (C); Newly discovered evidence; People v Rao; Attorneys acting as an advocate & a witness in the same trial; Sufficiency of the evidence for felony-firearm & FIP convictions; Adequacy of the factual findings & conclusions of law after a bench trial
The court held that the trial court’s exclusion of defendant’s rebuttal “testimony as cumulative was not outside the range of principled outcomes” and that it did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. Further, there was sufficient evidence to support his felony-firearm and FIP convictions. He was convicted after a bench trial. The evidence at issue in defendant’s first argument on appeal was his testimony about “his responses during his interrogation with Officer [M]. The trial court stopped a line of questioning about what defendant said to [M] about the gun, noting that defendant had already ‘stated right here, under oath, he didn’t know it was there, and had nothing to do with it.’” Thus, the issue concerned “whether the trial court had proper reason to prevent defendant from testifying about telling [M] he had not seen the gun after he already testified that he had not seen the gun.” The court concluded that while the evidence was relevant, given that “defendant wanted to testify that he told [M] he had not seen the gun after testifying he had not seen the gun, the excluded evidence would plainly have been cumulative.” The court rejected his reliance on MRE 106, noting that the “rule does not allow for the introduction of testimony offered to supplement a recorded statement, nor does it suggest that the evidence it authorizes may never be excluded as cumulative.” As to his motion for a new trial, “the trial court’s decision to exclude certain cumulative testimony was not an irregularity, let alone one that denied defendant a fair trial.” Further, as to his proposed newly discovered evidence, “because defendant cannot establish that he satisfied the requirement of reasonable diligence to produce” this evidence, whether it “would make a different result probable is inconsequential. The trial court’s denial of the motion for lack of due diligence was within the range of principled outcomes.” Finally, as to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court determined “the trial court made the appropriate factual findings and legal conclusions in support of its ruling, and met the requirement to place a definite and pertinent statement on the record in accordance with” the court rule. Affirmed.
Habeas corpus; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to introduce the minor victim’s prior advertisements for sex work as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; FRE 412; Sex trafficking a minor in violation of 18 USC §§ 1591(a)(1) & (b)(1); Whether petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that petitioner-Gardner’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of the sex-trafficked minor’s (B.H.) prior prostitution ads because it made no difference to the charge against Gardner. Further, under FRE 412, “ads showing that B.H. voluntarily prostituted herself before reuniting with Gardner would not have been admissible to refute the government’s case that Gardner, on ‘particular occasions,’ forced or coerced B.H. to go on ‘dates’ with clients.” Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. A jury convicted Gardner of sex trafficking a minor and production of child pornography for prostituting B.H., his 17-year-old girlfriend, and recording himself having sex with her. “‘§ 1591(a)(1) criminalizes the sex trafficking of children (less than 18 years old) with or without any force, fraud, or coercion, and it also criminalizes the sex trafficking of adults (18 or older), but only if done by force, fraud, or coercion.’ . . . Gardner’s indictment alleged both theories” and the jury found him guilty of each. He argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce into evidence ads B.H. allegedly placed on a website during the period when the two were out of touch. He argued that the evidence “would have ‘negated’ the causation element of” the trafficking a minor charge and could have been used to impeach B.H. But a “minor cannot consent, so apparent consent by a minor is no defense.” Gardner admitted he knew B.H. was a minor; thus, “so long as Gardner knowingly engaged in a trafficking act with respect to B.H. . . . which he knew would facilitate her participation in a commercial sex act, he is guilty.” The ads were irrelevant, and trial counsel was not ineffective for not introducing irrelevant evidence. As for the other trafficking theory, the government had to show that “Gardner knowingly engaged in a trafficking act knowing that force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion ‘w[ould] be used to cause’ B.H. ‘to engage in a commercial sex act.’” It did not have to prove that he convinced her to be a sex worker, only that at certain times, he coerced her to engage in commercial sex. Gardner also claimed that the ads could have been used on cross-examination for impeachment purposes. But the court found that the “ads do not contradict B.H.’s testimony, which, consistent with Rule 412, was focused on the time after she reconnected with Gardner. . . . As a result, counsel was not deficient for failing to confront B.H. with them.” Lastly, the court found that he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Search & seizure; Motion to suppress firearm evidence; “Reasonable suspicion” to prolong a traffic stop; A driver’s travel plans & other circumstances; Applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
The court held that the district court erred by denying defendant-Taylor’s motion to suppress firearm evidence seized during a traffic stop. Under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer did not have “reasonable suspicion” to prolong the stop after she completed the tasks necessary to resolve the initial stop. The officer stopped Taylor for speeding. When she returned to her patrol car to prepare Taylor’s speeding ticket, she “requested a K-9 unit, stating that Taylor’s travel plans, criminal history, and air fresheners were the ‘only reason[s]’ she wanted a dog to sniff around Taylor’s vehicle.” Although the dog alerted, drugs were not found. However, a firearm was uncovered, and Taylor was indicted for FIP. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence found during the search, arguing the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop. It was undisputed that the initial stop was lawful. The issue was whether under the totality of the circumstances, the officer “had reasonable suspicion to detain him further after she completed the tasks necessary to resolve the initial stop.” The government argued that Taylor’s travel plans gave rise to such suspicion. But the court noted that the officer never asked where Taylor was going but “admitted that she just made a guess . . . .” The government also cited his criminal history involving firearms and narcotics, the multiple air fresheners on his gear shift, and his “odd movements while searching for proof of insurance.” Although the court gave “some weight” to his criminal history, the officer stated that she did not smell anything, which impacted consideration of the air fresheners. As to Taylor’s movements, he “only made those movements when instructed by [the officer] to look for insurance proof. This, along with [her] failure to contemporaneously mention the movements when she discussed her suspicions with the K-9 officer, decreases the weight of this factor.” The court held that “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the government, [the officer] did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop.” It rejected the government’s request to apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, finding that none of the five circumstances in which the Supreme Court has endorsed its application applied here. Reversed and remanded.
Divorce; Division of property; Donahue v Donahue; Wiand v Wiand; Spousal support; Attorney fees
The court affirmed “the trial court’s decision concerning the division of property.” Also, the trial court did not abuse “its discretion by imputing income to defendant and awarding plaintiff spousal support.” Finally, the “trial court did not clearly err by concluding that defendant ha[d] the ability to pay plaintiff’s attorney fees.” As to the division of the Bloomfield Hills (a second property) property, the court held that given “that the property was purchased during the marriage, we see no error in the [trial] court’s conclusion that it was marital property, and that plaintiff was entitled to an equitable distribution of the property.” As to the Sterling Heights (family residence) property, given “the evidence presented and the credibility determinations, the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that defendant dissipated marital assets.” Finally, the court concluded that considering “the trial court’s analysis as a whole, the division of assets was fair and equitable on the facts of this case.” As to spousal support, “the trial court made extensive findings of fact, none of which were clearly erroneous. Further, the trial court’s award of spousal support was just and reasonable under the circumstances. Indeed, the trial court balanced the incomes and needs of the parties so that neither would be impoverished.”
Surcharge for attendant-care services; Collateral estoppel; Bryan v JP Morgan Chase Bank
The court held that the probate court properly concluded that plaintiff was barred from relitigating an issue that had been previously litigated. In 1986, RB sustained serious injuries in an automobile accident, necessitating around-the-clock care. When RB’s mother died, plaintiff served as conservator, provider, and coordinator of RB’s care, and became the designated recipient of monthly lump-sum attendant-care payments. But she admitted that RB’s brother, who had moved in with RB, was caring for him full-time. The probate court found plaintiff breached her fiduciary duties and imposed a surcharge requiring her to pay $125,412.30 to RB’s estate. Plaintiff later filed a complaint in the circuit court, asserting the probate court failed to determine the amount due for her attendant-care services when it surcharged her. The circuit court found that judicial economy weighed in favor of deferring to the probate court. The probate court found it had already litigated the issues and determined plaintiff’s complaint was “a collateral attack” on the surcharge order, warranting dismissal with prejudice. On appeal, the court found that the parties in this case “and the surcharge proceedings were either the same parties or their privies: plaintiff was party to both actions, and although the conservator for RB in the previous proceeding (appointed after plaintiff’s removal) appears to be different from the current conservator, in their official capacities, they are privies because both discharged the fiduciary duties attendant to protecting RB’s interests.” And the “issues sought to be litigated were also the same: the extent to which plaintiff was liable to RB’s estate by way of the surcharge order.” In both cases, plaintiff claimed “entitlement to more than $120,000 surcharged by the probate court. But she also admitted that RB’s brother provided ‘full-time’ care to RB, and it appears that other family members also provided care.” Plaintiff repeatedly told the probate court previously “that she had no evidence and was entirely unable, and unwilling, to provide any accounting. And nothing in the record in this case indicates that [she] is any better prepared to present such evidence now.” The surcharge order resolved the issue, directing her “to repay RB’s estate more than $120,000, the amount of unaccounted-for benefits paid over several years.” That order “was a final order appealable by right” and plaintiff “had the opportunity to appeal and was unsuccessful because she failed to timely pursue her right to” do so. The order “is now final with any appellate opportunities exhausted.” Affirmed.
Governmental immunity; The written claim or notice of claim requirement; MCL 600.6431(1); Whether Christie v Wayne State Univ applies retroactively; New rule of law; Landin v Department of Health & Human Servs; Flamont v Department of Corr; Tyrrell v University of MI; Special panel under MCR 7.215(J)(3)
Under Landin, the court was compelled to find that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s summary disposition motion “because the decision in Christie should be applied prospectively only, as the rule announced in Christie amounted to a new rule of law.” But because it disagreed with Landin’s analysis, it called “for the convening of a special panel under MCR 7.215(J)(3) to consider the conflict between Flamont” and Landin as to Christie’s retroactivity. The case concerned whether the rule announced in Christie—i.e., “for waiver of sovereign immunity by the state to apply, the plaintiff must file a written claim or notice of claim with the clerk of the Court of Claims—applies retroactively.” The court’s recent decision in Landin was in conflict with another recent opinion, Flamont. The court found that its decision here was controlled by Landin, which distinguished Flamont. “In this case, like the plaintiff in Landin, the complaint was filed on [6/29/22], after Tyrrell but before Christie was decided. Under Landin’s formulation of the retroactivity analysis, the rule under which plaintiff was operating—i.e., the rule from Tyrrell—was a ‘new rule of law.’” The court found that “under Landin, all of the same considerations concerning the three-part test apply, and this Court is constrained to follow Landin and reverse the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition.” However, but for Landin, the court “would affirm the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition, consistent with the holding in Flamont that the rule in Christie was not a ‘new rule of law’ because the Supreme Court ‘does not announce a new rule of law when it overrules a decision of the Court of Appeals that misinterpreted a statute contrary to the statute’s plain language, legislative intent, and existing precedent . . . .’” Reversed and remanded.