Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Dispute arising from the alleged removal of the general partner from a limited partnership; Declaratory judgment; Actual controversy; MCR 2.605(A)(1); Michigan Ass’n of Home Builders v City of Troy; Laches; Bayberry Group, Inc v Crystal Beach Condo Ass’n; Yankee Springs Twp v Fox
The court held that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition based on its conclusion that an actual controversy did not exist, and by dismissing plaintiffs’ declaratory-relief claim based on laches. It declined to consider whether plaintiff-Kings Lane GP was properly removed as the general partner under the parties’ limited partnership agreement (LPA). Plaintiffs sought a declaration that Kings Lane GP had not been removed as general partner of the parties’ limited partnership. Plaintiffs also brought several other contract and tort claims. The trial court granted defendants’ motions for summary disposition and dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims. In a prior appeal, the court reversed as to the declaratory judgment claim. On remand, the trial court concluded there was no actual controversy, and rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the court had previously decided this issue to the contrary. It also found plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief was barred by laches. As such, it severed the counterclaims and entered an order of dismissal. In the present appeal, the court agreed, in part, with plaintiffs that the trial court erred by granting defendants’ motions for summary disposition and by denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition. “Because some of the claims against Kings Lane GP are based on its alleged failure to comply with terms of the LPA following its removal as general partner of the limited partnership, the validity of those claims and the availability of monetary relief could be impacted by a determination that Kings Lane GP was not properly removed as the general partner. Because such a determination is necessary to decide ‘the rights and other legal relations’ of plaintiffs and the limited partners, the trial court erred by concluding that an actual controversy did not exist under MCR 2.605(A)(1).” Further, because the undisputed evidence did not establish that the delay in this case “was ‘unexcused or unexplained,’” dismissal based on laches was erroneous. Finally, it noted that the lack of evidence on remand “may be because defendants collectively moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), claiming that declaratory relief was not appropriate under MCR 2.605(A)(1) because an actual controversy did not exist.” Because the court “is an error-correcting” court, it concluded that it “would not be appropriate for [it] to decide this issue on appeal.” Reversed and remanded.
State law claims for alleged exposure to radioactive materials released by a nuclear plant; Preemption under the Price-Anderson Act; 42 USC § 2210(n)(2); Nieman v NLO, Inc; “Public liability action” (§ 2014(hh)); “Nuclear incident” (§ 2014(q)); “Occurrence”; Removal of claims from state court; Applicability of the Act to injury claims resulting from periodic releases of toxic materials; Distinguishing Cook v Rockwell Int’l Corp (Cook II); “Extraordinary nuclear occurrence” (§ 2014(j)); Claim that Price-Anderson Act preemption violates the Fifth Amendment’s Takings & Due Process Clauses
Concluding that plaintiffs asserted a “public liability action” under the Price-Anderson Act, the court held that the Act preempted their state law claims arising from alleged exposure to radioactive materials released by a nuclear plant. As claims asserting liability arising from a nuclear incident must be brought under the Act, and plaintiffs disclaimed any reliance on it, the court affirmed the dismissal of their complaint for failure to state a cognizable claim. Plaintiffs sued entities involved in the plant’s operations in Ohio state court, asserting claims under Ohio law. Defendants removed the action to federal court and successfully argued in the district court that the Price-Anderson Act preempted plaintiffs’ claims. On appeal, the court considered whether they asserted a public liability action – if they did, their state law claims were removable and preempted. It first determined that they alleged a “nuclear incident.” The complaint asserted “that the plant expelled ‘radioactive materials,’ including uranium, neptunium, and plutonium, as well as ‘other metals into the air, water, and soil’ of the surrounding community. These are the types of substances that, when they harm persons or property, can give rise to a ‘nuclear incident.’” They also alleged that “exposure to these substances caused them to suffer ‘illnesses,’ ‘cancers,’ and other injuries that are included as the types of physical harms encompassed by a ‘nuclear incident.’” In addition, according to their allegations, these injuries “resulted from an ‘occurrence,’ as that term is used in the Act’s definition of a ‘nuclear incident.’” As the word was not statutorily defined, the court applied its ordinary meaning – “something that occurs, happens, or takes place” – and concluded that the alleged radiation-related injuries arose from an “occurrence.” Thus, plaintiffs alleged facts constituting a “nuclear incident.” And because they asserted “claims based upon that incident, they are asserting claims for ‘public liability.’. . . Taking all of this together, plaintiffs’ state law claims amount to a ‘public liability action,’ meaning” they were preempted by the Act. The court rejected their arguments to the contrary, concluding among other things that “‘ongoing releases’ can constitute an ‘occurrence’ within the meaning of ‘nuclear incident’ under the Act.”
Parentage dispute; The Revocation of Paternity Act (ROPA); Effect of a finding that a party committed intrinsic fraud & fraud on the court; Baum v Baum; Allen v Allen; Relief from judgment under MCR 2.612(C)(1); “May”; The trial court’s discretion; Consideration of the child’s best interests in deciding whether to vacate the ROPA judgment & revoke plaintiff’s paternity; MCL 722.1443(4); The best-interest factors; Attorney fees as a sanction; The trial court’s inherent authority; MCR 1.109(E); MCL 722.1443(11); The contempt statute (MCL 600.1721)
Holding that the trial court had discretion as to whether to vacate the ROPA judgment and revoke plaintiff’s paternity after finding that he committed intrinsic fraud and fraud on the court, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant defendants this requested relief. It rejected their argument that it was improper for the trial court to consider the relevant best-interest factors in MCL 722.1443(4). As to attorney fees as a sanction, it upheld the award of only 25% of defendant-Tracy Ahola’s requested fees, but remanded as to the denial of any fees to defendant-Derek Ahola given the trial court’s apparent failure to address his requests. This parentage dispute arose in 2014. The child at issue (J) was conceived while plaintiff and Tracy “‘were engaged in an extramarital sexual relationship . . . .’” She was married to Derek. Whether plaintiff had committed intrinsic fraud and fraud on the court in the trial that led to issuance of the ROPA judgment was not in dispute. Defendants asserted that the trial court lacked the authority to exercise discretion as to the proper remedy after finding he committed fraud. But this argument ignored “the plain and unambiguous language used in the court rule” on which they relied, MCR 2.612(C), which uses the permissive word “may.” They next contended that the trial court erred in considering J’s best interests. “MCL 722.1443(4) unambiguously states that a trial court should consider the best interests of a minor child under a distinct set of circumstances in a ROPA case. One such situation is a decision regarding whether to set ‘aside a paternity determination.’” Further, the inapplicability of a few of MCL 722.1443(4)’s factors did not render the whole statute inapplicable. Finally, the trial court did not clearly err in ruling that J’s “best interests favored maintaining his parental relationship with plaintiff.” J has spent over half of his life with him as “his father and he spends half of his time at plaintiff’s home[.]” The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award Tracy “all of her attorney fees for years of litigation that might have been solved in months had she immediately alerted the trial court to her discovery of plaintiff’s fraud.” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for the limited purpose of considering Derek’s claim for attorney fees as a sanction.
Application for asylum & withholding of removal; Non-governmental conduct; Juan Antonio v Barr; Waiver; Failure of the initial Notice to Appear to state the time & place of the removal hearing; Applicability of Pereira v Sessions & Niz-Chavez v Garland; Satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of 8 USC § 1229(a); Due process; Prejudice
In an opinion originally issued as unpublished, the court held that petitioner-Ramos Rafael failed to meet her burden of proof as to her claim “that the Guatemalan government is or was unable or unwilling to protect women from” persecution in the form of kidnapping or violence by private individuals. Her jurisdictional challenge based on the absence of the time and place in her initial Notice to Appear also failed. Finally, she waived her due process argument based on this omission and even if she had not, she failed to allege actual prejudice. Thus, the court denied her petition for review of the BIA’s dismissal of her appeal of the IJ’s denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal. She asserted that “the IJ and BIA ‘erred in finding that she did not meet her burden of proving that she possessed a well-founded fear of persecution on account of her membership in a particular social group should she return to Guatemala.’” However, she failed to “acknowledge the BIA’s ruling that she waived any claim or argument” as to the persecution she claimed to fear. In addition, pursuant to Juan Antonio, an applicant asserting an asylum claim focused on non-governmental conduct “must show that the alleged persecutor is either aligned with the government or that the government is unwilling or unable to control him.” The court noted that the closest Ramos Rafael came to addressing this issue on appeal was “a single, conclusory statement that ‘corruption and impunity continues to be a widespread issue in Guatemala’s government; therefore, [she] could not seek the assistance of the Guatemalan government and reasonably expect assistance.’” This was insufficient. As to her argument that her removal proceedings were void for lack of jurisdiction, the cases on which she relied, Pereira and Niz-Chavez, did not apply. Further, for “jurisdictional purposes, it is not necessary that the Notice to Appear contain all the required information or that all the information be included in a single document.” Given that she received a later Notice of Hearing that “provided the required time and date information that was missing from the Notice to Appear, Ramos Rafael received the necessary notice and the IJ had jurisdiction.”
Land contract dispute; Motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) & (10); Whether the trial court required defendant to submit evidence beyond his pleadings; Whether it considered evidence attached to his pleadings
The court affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to plaintiffs-Christopher and Robin Dinsdale under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). This case arose after they purchased property from defendant-Staggs by land contract. He argued that “under MCR 2.116(C)(8), the trial court erred in looking beyond well-pled allegations in” his counterclaim (which alleged breach of contract, “that any addendum was void due to duress and misrepresentation,” and sought a judgment of forfeiture) “for admissible evidence in support of those claims.” He was correct in asserting that “in deciding a motion under (C)(8), the court only considers the pleadings and those documents attached to the pleadings.” However, consideration of such evidence was permitted under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiffs offered, among other evidence, the affidavit of Robyn and text messages between her and Staggs’ mother, M, to support their “position that Staggs was a willing participant in drafting and a benefactor” of the 2018 addendum. In her affidavit, Robyn claimed that it “was entered into because Staggs was unable 1) to pay outstanding mortgage and utility payments, and homeowner association’s dues; and 2) to perform improvements on the property promised in the land contract.” She further claimed that “at no time during the addendum’s execution did Staggs express an inability to understand the document and that Staggs provided information to fill in the addendum’s blanks, including (a) the down payment, (b) the purchase price, (c) the monthly payment, and (d) that he wanted any extra money sent to” M. Text messages between Robyn and M “evidenced Robyn acting in accordance with the addendum by, for example, paying outstanding bills and depositing overages into an account shared between” Staggs and M. Staggs admitted “he did not file an affidavit and did not submit evidence in opposition to Robyn’s affidavit.” He argued that he was not required to show anything beyond his pleadings. But the court found that his failure to offer anything additional left “the Dinsdales’ evidence uncontroverted, . . . making summary disposition of Staggs’ counterclaim under MCR 2.116(C)(10) appropriate.”