Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Motion to suppress blood alcohol test results; Expert testimony; MRE 702; People v Unger; People v Tipolt; People v Fosnaugh; Reliability; Effect of accreditation; Michigan State Police Lansing Forensic Laboratory (the MSP Lab)
The court concluded that the trial court’s failure to “state what scientific testimony, verification of data, or quality control aspect it relied upon in” determining the blood alcohol analysis here was reliable left the court unable to review its decision. Thus, in this interlocutory appeal it vacated the order denying defendant’s motion to suppress his blood alcohol test results and remanded “for articulation of the factual basis for admission of the” test. He contended the MSP Lab, “which conducted the analysis, did not follow the applicable administrative rule or the lab’s own procedures.” He further asserted that it “failed to properly maintain the equipment used for his analysis and applied unreliable principles and methodology.” The trial court was presented with competing expert testimony “about the MSP Lab’s process for testing blood samples across four days of testimony. These competing experts opined extensively regarding the process of analyzing blood samples, the procedure applicable to detect contamination, and whether those procedures were applied to the batch of blood samples.” The trial court then determined “that the policies and procedures had been satisfied, the initial burden of demonstrating enough reliability had been met, and the threshold of admissibility satisfied. In support of this conclusion, [it] explained that the data was provided by a lab that performed testing vetted through an accreditation process.” But the court noted that while it was “evident that accreditation would play a role in determining whether the MSP Lab’s blood alcohol analysis of defendant’s sample was reliable, there is no suggestion that accreditation alone suffices to satisfy the requirements of MRE 702.” Yet the trial court, apart from its statement as to accreditation, “did not explain how it determined that the blood alcohol analysis was reliable—that is, how the evidence satisfied MRE 702—effectively preventing this Court from reviewing the issue.” The court noted that its remand did “not limit the trial court’s discretion, upon articulation of its rationale, to grant or deny the motion to suppress the blood alcohol test.” In addition, it was “neither required nor precluded from taking further evidence; that issue” was left to its discretion.
Search & seizure; Probable cause; The automobile exception to the warrant requirement; People v Kazmierczak; Effect of the smell of marijuana on a search in light of Michigan legalizing recreational marijuana for those 21 years old & older; People v Armstrong; Other factors; People v Moorman; Investigative (“Terry”) stop; Terry v Ohio; Duration & scope of the Terry stop; Fruit of the poisonous tree; Utah v Strieff
The court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. He was charged with CCW after a weapon was found in his vehicle during the stop. His motion to suppress challenged the constitutionality of the search. The trial court denied the motion and bound him over, finding the trooper’s “actions ‘were based on specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the initial smell of marijuana and the age of the vehicle’s occupants.’” In this interlocutory appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that “the search was not justified under the automobile exception because the facts did not give rise to probable cause that the vehicle contained a criminal amount of marijuana over 2.5 ounces, as opposed to a lesser amount punishable as a civil infraction.” In addition to the smell of marijuana, the trooper “became aware at the outset of the traffic stop that both” defendant and his passenger were under 21. They “first denied the existence of any marijuana. But the passenger critically admitted that there was marijuana in the vehicle once she exited the car. Taken together, these facts supported that there a was a fair probability (and more like a guarantee given the admission from the passenger) that contraband would be recovered from the vehicle, therefore justifying the search under the automobile exception.” The court next agreed with defendant that the trooper “exceeded the permissible scope of Terry by preforming a pat-down search unjustified by any concerns for officer safety.” However, the “recovered weapon was not discovered by police exploiting the illegal pat-down, nor were the two searches causally connected.” It noted the pat-down “did not reveal any evidence whatsoever. Nor is there any indication in the record that the initial pat-down in any way opened the door for the later vehicle search, which was justified . . . . And the vehicle search notably occurred only after the passenger freely admitted that marijuana was present.” Given the facts, “the vehicle search was sufficiently distinguishable from the pat-down such as to purge any taint from the initial illegality.” Affirmed.
Action seeking medical benefits, declaratory relief, & double damages under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (MSPA); 42 USC § 1395y(b)(3)(A); Michigan Spine & Brain Surgeons, PLLC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co (6th Cir); § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii); Jarrad v Integon Nat'l Ins Co; Conditional Medicare payment; Bio-Med Applications of TN, Inc v Central States SE & SW Areas Health & Welfare Fund (6th Cir); Principle that a primary insurer must have knowledge that they owed a primary payment before a party can claim double damages under the MSPA; MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v ACE Am Ins Co (11th Cir)
The court held that the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff-healthcare provider’s claims in favor of defendant-insurer. Plaintiff sued for no-fault medical benefits, declaratory relief, and double damages under the MSPA, related to healthcare services it provided to DV, who was injured in a car accident. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, the court found defendant “never denied coverage or payment. Instead, it appears that defendant intended to pay the bill in June 2022, but a system error resulted in the delay of payment. Plaintiffs then sued defendant, and this resulted in defendant learning that plaintiffs had billed” DV’s Medicare Advantage plan (Aetna), “and Aetna had paid. This information plausibly led defendant to question whether Aetna was a Medicare payer.” In addition, the “MSPA contains no language specifically providing for how long a primary plan has to pay a bill before it will be determined that the primary plan has ‘failed’ to pay, but plaintiffs sued defendant only three weeks after defendant received the bill. And, at that point, defendant intended to pay.” The court agreed with defendant that it “could not have reasonably been expected to pay the bill before it knew about the bill. Defendant has now made full payment to plaintiffs.” The court held that the trial court “did not err by finding that double damages were not warranted.” Affirmed.
Dispute over ownership of real property; Quiet title; MCL 600.2932; Adams v Adams; Collateral estoppel; Estes v Titus; Judicial estoppel; Opland v Kiesgan; Harmless error
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants summary disposition of plaintiff’s quiet-title claim, or by denying summary disposition for plaintiff. Plaintiff sought to quiet title to the subject property in its favor. It did not present a deed, but claimed title to the property on the basis of various prior adjudications. The trial court denied summary disposition for plaintiff and granted it for defendants, finding plaintiff failed to present evidence to support it ever owned the property. On appeal, the court found harmless the trial court’s failure to consider plaintiff’s argument that it was entitled to summary disposition on the basis of collateral and judicial estoppel. In one of the prior adjudications, “the bankruptcy court did not address ownership of [the property], let alone determine that plaintiff owned it.” And in another of the adjudications, “the issue central to this case was not actually and necessarily” determined. Further, the trial court applied the proper standard in reviewing defendants’ summary disposition motion. “Because the undisputed evidence support[ed] plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of title to [the property], summary disposition was properly granted” for defendants. “It reasonably follows that plaintiff was not entitled to summary disposition in its favor on the quiet-title claim.” Affirmed.
Scope of an appeal; The court’s jurisdiction; MCR 7.203(A)(1); “Final order”; MCR 7.202(6); Effect of a default; Show-cause order; In re Moroun; Demolition of a blighted structure under a township ordinance
The court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to hear defendant-property owner’s appeal by right of the order for demolition of a blighted structure on her property, and even if it did, she would be unable to prevail on the merits. A default judgment was entered against her. “Despite enough time elapsing for multiple adjournments of the show-cause hearing, defendant never moved to set aside the default judgment. Instead, she simply asked the [trial] court for more time to comply with it. Further, the order from which defendant has filed this claim of appeal is a show-cause order.” The court noted it explained in Moroun “that ‘an order finding a party in civil contempt of court is not a final order for purposes of appellate review.’” It was unclear “from the record if defendant was formally held in contempt of court. However, even if framed as an order enforcing the prior default judgment, defendant still maintains no right to appeal because she never moved to set aside the default.” She argued that the trial “court abused its discretion and clearly erred by determining without any expert testimony that the building was blighted in violation of the Township’s ordinances.” The court disagreed, noting the ordinance did “not require any expert testimony for a court to make findings regarding whether a building is blighted. Moreover, the complaint went unanswered, the court records do not show any defects in the motion for entry of default, and the [trial] court followed proper procedure by entering a default judgment. Because defendant did not answer the complaint, the [trial] court accepted allegations in the complaint as true and deemed the allegations of the blighted conditions admitted by defendant.” Given that she never moved to set aside the default, she “effectively admitted that the building is blighted and in violation of the” ordinance. The court also rejected her claim that the trial court should have allowed her more time to rehabilitate the structure. It concluded the “trial court acted reasonably within its discretion by ordering demolition because defendant failed on numerous occasions to show any proof that she is capable of performing the necessary repairs.” Affirmed.
Quasi-judicial immunity; Denhof v Challa; Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); Gross negligence; Claims based on alleged falsification of business records produced pursuant to court order; Maiden v Rozwood; Estate of Voutsaras by Gaydos v Bender; Silas v Reilly (Unpub); Statute of limitations; Intentional interference with contractual relations (IICR)
The court held that plaintiff-White’s claims were in part barred by quasi-judicial immunity and the statute of limitations. According to the complaint, defendant-Munyan is the owner of defendant-Floor Savers. White was employed as Floor Savers’ chief financial officer from 2014 until his resignation in 2018. The complaint alleged “Munyan submitted an allegedly fraudulent insurance claim with” an insurance company, “stating that White and another former Floor Savers employee embezzled approximately $90,000 from the company during their employment.” A police report was also filed, and White was charged with embezzlement based on the report. The criminal case was eventually dismissed. Plaintiff then filed this action alleging claims for IIED, IICR, gross negligence, and stalking. The trial court denied defendants’ summary disposition motion. On appeal, the court concluded “White’s claims are barred by quasi-judicial immunity to the extent they are based on Munyan’s filing of the police report, testimony at the preliminary examination, or production of documents or records pursuant to court order.” As a result, Munyan was entitled to summary disposition on the “gross negligence claim and, to some extent, on White’s IIED claim.” While Munyan was “not entitled to immunity for White’s IICR and stalking claims,” these claims and his IIED claim were time-barred to the extent they were based on harm incurred before 3/17/19, three years before White filed his initial complaint.