Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); The Railway Labor Act (RLA); 45 USC §§ 151, 181–82; Subject-matter jurisdiction; Emswiler v CSX Transp, Inc; Virts v Consolidated Freightways Corp of DE; Collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court affirmed the district court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Title VII and ADA claims raised by a group of plaintiffs (the Pilot Plaintiffs) where they were “minor disputes” under the RLA and could not be fully resolved without interpreting the parties’ CBA. The Pilot Plaintiffs sued their employer, defendant-Kalitta, for civil rights violations relating to the company’s COVID vaccination requirements. The district court ruled that their Title VII and ADA claims for failure to accommodate and for perceived disability discrimination were “minor disputes” that, pursuant to the RLA (which governs the airline industry), were required to go through arbitration under the CBA. The district court found that it could not rule on the claims because that would require it to interpret the CBA. The court agreed, citing Emswiler. Kalitta argued that granting the Pilot Plaintiffs’ requested accommodations would result in its violating the CBA. The court explained that under Virts, “requiring an employer to violate a CBA by taking actions that would affect seniority provisions can impose an undue hardship on that employer.” It held that “[d]etermining whether adjusting flight schedules would constitute a sufficiently undue hardship to Kalitta would necessarily require a court to interpret the CBA to determine whether, and to what extent, senior pilots’ bidding preferences would be impacted.” Thus, the court concluded the district court was precluded from hearing the claims. It further determined that the Pilot Plaintiffs forfeited their “intentional discrimination” claim where they failed to sufficiently plead it.
Breach of contract; Res judicata; Failure to state a claim; Claim for monies had & received; Youmans v Charter Twp of Bloomfield; Unjust enrichment; Whether the defenses of unclean hands & recoupment were properly before the court
The court held that while dismissal of plaintiff’s contract breach claims was not warranted based on res judicata it was proper based on failure to state a claim. But it concluded the trial court erred in dismissing their claims for monies had and received and for unjust enrichment. The case arose “from a series of business dealings between” plaintiff-Iyad Isaac, his business, plaintiff-Isaac Investments, his deceased brother, Imad, and Imad’s business, defendant-Future Holdings (FH). The trial court granted FH summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). On appeal, the court first determined that res judicata did not apply here. Given that “the trial court’s prior order did not fully resolve whether plaintiffs could plead or prove a breach-of-contract claim against [FH] and the breach-of-contract claim asserted in the second amended complaint was authorized by the trial court’s prior order, the trial court erred to the extent that it dismissed plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim in the second amended complaint” based on res judicata. However, it was undisputed FH “was not a party to the promissory note that is the basis for plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim. Further, to the extent that [they] alleged that [FH] also promised to pay the debt evidenced by Imad’s promissory note, such a promise is unenforceable under the statute of frauds, . . . unless it is in writing and signed by the party charged with the promise. Plaintiffs did not allege the existence of any such writing signed by” FH. Further, any prior promises it “had made regarding repayment were superseded by the promissory note Iyad accepted.” But as to the claim for monies had and received, while “only Imad promised to repay the money, plaintiffs’ allegations indicate that the funds from Isaac Investments were actually transferred to” FH, and deposited into its “bank account. These facts, accepted as true, are such that equity may be able to intervene to allow plaintiffs to recover their funds from [FH], the party actually in possession of the $190,000 loaned by Isaac Investments with the expectation of repayment.” The court further held that their allegations of unjust enrichment were “not ‘so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.’” It declined to consider the merits of FH’s unclean hands and recoupment defenses because they were not properly before it. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Criminal contempt resulting from violations of a PPO; MCL 600.2950(23); MCR 3.708(B)(1) & (H)(3); In re LT; Stalking; MCL 750.411h & i; Sufficiency of the evidence; Right to present a defense; Denial of an adjournment; MCR 2.503; Good cause; People v Daniels; Unavailability of a witness or evidence; MCR 2.503(C)(1)
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support respondent’s criminal contempt convictions. It also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his adjournment request, and he was not deprived of his right to present a defense. The trial court found respondent in criminal contempt for twice violating the PPO against him, and sentenced him to 93 days in jail for each violation, to run concurrently. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Petitioner testified that he “contacted her many times, loitered outside of her home, attempted to enter her home, attempted to run her car off of the road, impeded her attempt to enter a family member’s car, touched her buttocks, spit in her face, and repeatedly punched her in the face, causing her to lose consciousness and seek medical treatment.” Her testimony “was corroborated, in part, by her mother’s testimony and photographs depicting her alleged injuries.” There was “an abundance of evidence that respondent violated the PPO at least twice.” It also rejected his claim that he was deprived of his right to present a defense because the trial court denied his adjournment request, thereby preventing him from presenting alibi evidence and testifying on his own behalf. It found that he failed to establish good cause warranting an adjournment, and that even if he “had done so, he failed to demonstrate prejudice stemming from the trial court’s denial of his adjournment request.” The circumstances indicated that he “failed to make a diligent effort to identify and present alibi evidence.” In addition, it was unclear whether any of the evidence respondent referenced “actually existed. Without more, there [was] no reason to believe [he] was prejudiced by the denial of his adjournment request.” Affirmed.
Evidentiary error claim based on the exclusion of evidence; MRE 103(a)(2); Testimony from a child abuse & neglect adjudication hearing; MRE 804(b)(1); Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; In camera review of counseling records; People v Davis-Christian; MCR 6.201(C)(2); Waiver of claim a juror improperly interpreted defendant’s choice not to testify as a sign of guilt
The court rejected defendant’s evidentiary error claims and held that “the trial court acted within its discretion to deny” his request for an in camera review of counseling records. It further found that he waived his claim that at least one juror improperly interpreted his decision not to testify as a sign of guilt. Thus, the court affirmed his CSC I and II convictions. Two girls (NH and MH) were involved. Defendant argued the trial court erred in excluding evidence that they “made prior false accusations of rape or other sexual misconduct against his son, WC.” He submitted testimony from an individual (I) who provided counseling to the victims and WC in 2016. But I “did not testify that NH or MH accused WC of sexual assault. Further, the trial court specifically ruled that, contrary to defendant’s similar claims in a child protective proceeding involving himself and WC, there was no evidence that NH or MH accused WC of sexual assault or any similar wrongdoing. Therefore, [I’s] testimony contained no evidence of prior false claims of sexual assault, and” was irrelevant in this criminal case. The court also rejected his contention that the trial court erred in not admitting I’s “testimony from the child abuse and neglect adjudication hearing under MRE 804(b)(1).” The court noted the record showed “that at the 2018 neglect proceedings involving WC and defendant, the parties had an opportunity to cross-examine [I] at length about her observations during counseling with NH, MH, and WC. This may be enough to satisfy the hearsay exception under MRE 804(b)(1), but that does not make [I’s] testimony relevant, which is always a requirement for admissibility.” The court determined “the trial court correctly ruled that [I’s] testimony was not relevant to any fact at issue in defendant’s case because he failed to show any nexus between [I’s] observation regarding NH’s demeanor in her mother’s presence in an unrelated counseling session and accusations of repeated sexual molestation by defendant. And, notably, the jury convicted defendant regarding the sexual assault of MH, not NH.” As to his request for review of I’s counseling records, the court concluded he “failed to show that viewing the records would be anything more than a fishing expedition.”
Lesser offense of CSC II instruction; Effect of CSC II being time-barred; Specific unanimity instruction; Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request a specific unanimity instruction; Sentencing; Proportionality
The court concluded that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s request for a jury instruction on CSC II. Also, because a specific unanimity instruction was inappropriate, his argument that his attorney was ineffective for failing to request one was unpersuasive. Finally, the “trial court did not rely on suffering of the victim in choosing a sentence above the guidelines range, so” this argument was unsustainable. Defendant was charged with CSC I. He requested a jury instruction on the lesser offense of CSC II. He asserted this instruction “was appropriate because, from the testimony, it was unclear whether the touching involved penetration.” The parties disagreed whether CSC II was a necessarily included lesser offense or a cognate lesser offense of CSC I. The trial court asserted that CSC II was not a necessarily included offense, and that CSC II was barred by the statute of limitations. It “said that the jury already had the option of returning a not-guilty verdict if they found that penetration had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Thus, the trial court denied his request. “Defendant undoubtedly could not be convicted of [CSC II] because it was time-barred.” Because CSC II “was time-barred and there was no indication that he ‘waived the statute of limitations defense, whether defendant was innocent or guilty of [CSC II] was ‘per se, not submissible to a jury[.]’” The court held that if the jury had been instructed on CSC II “despite the fact that it was time-barred, it ‘would simply introduce another type of distortion into the factfinding process.’” Without citation to authority, defendant asserted that the fact CSC II was time-barred was no reason to deny his “request for a jury instruction on that lesser offense. But that position is directly contradicted by binding precedent.” Because CSC II “was time-barred and nothing in the record suggested that [he] had waived the statute-of-limitation defense, the trial court was precluded from instructing the jury on” CSC II. Affirmed.
The 2019 amendments to the No-Fault Act (NFA) as to Michigan residents injured as passengers in an out-of-state accident; PIP benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP); Steanhouse v Michigan Auto Ins Placement Facility (On Remand) (Steanhouse III); Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF)
Relying on Steanhouse III, the court concluded that defendants-MAIPF and MACP “were entitled to summary disposition, and the trial court did not err by granting” them summary disposition in this case involving a claim for PIP benefits. Plaintiff provided physical therapy services to a Michigan resident who was a passenger injured in an auto accident in Ohio. Plaintiff argued that the Legislature, through its 2019 amendments to the NFA, “intended for Michigan residents who are injured as passengers in an out-of-state car accident to be able to claim PIP benefits through the MACP. According to plaintiff, MCL 500.3111 and MCL 500.3114(4) create a separate path to PIP-benefit eligibility through the MACP for out-of-state accidents irrespective of the language contained in MCL 500.3172(1) because MCL 500.3172(1) only applies to in-state accidents.” Plaintiff claimed that as a result, defendants were not entitled to summary disposition. The court noted that it “squarely addressed and rejected this same argument in Steanhouse III,” which determined “that ‘MCL 500.3114 [did] not impact Steanhouse’s eligibility to claim benefits through the MACP’ and reaffirm[ed] that MCL 500.3172(1) controlled the issue and ‘require[d] an individual claiming PIP benefits through the MACP to show that the accident giving rise to the claim occurred in Michigan.’” The court concluded that “Steanhouse III is a precedentially binding case, and” controlled the outcome here. Affirmed.
Effect of MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) on the accrual date for civil claims based on allegations of criminal sexual conduct (CSC) against minors; Retroactivity; LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC
The court held that MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) creates a discovery rule for measuring the accrual date for the limitations period for civil claims for CSC occurring after its passage. It further held that the statute’s discovery rule “does not apply retroactively to revive limitations periods that have already expired.” As a result, plaintiff’s negligence claim was barred by the statute of limitations because it “would require retroactive application of” the statute. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which remanded for entry of summary disposition to defendant-Diocese. The case concerned “the effect of MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) on the accrual date for civil claims based on allegations of” CSC against minors. The first question presented was “whether the Legislature intended that MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) operate as a discovery rule to toll the accrual date for claims” based on CSC against minors. The court determined that it did. “Reading the statute in its entirety, it is clear that the Legislature intended to allow minor victims of [CSC] to bring a cause of action either by the time they turn 28 (an extension of the otherwise applicable statute of limitations) or within three years of when they discovered, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, their injuries and the causal relationship between their injuries and the [CSC] (discovery rule-based accrual), whichever is later.” The next question was “whether this statutory discovery rule, enacted in 2018,” applied here, where “the claims accrued and the statute of limitations had already expired under the relevant statutes that were previously in effect.” The court concluded the LaFontaine factors did “not support retroactive application of Subsection (1)(b). The plain language of the statute does not clearly indicate that the discovery rule accrual method described in Subsection (1)(b) should apply retroactively to resuscitate stale claims. In stark contrast,” Subsection (3) sets forth such intent in clear terms. The second and fourth factors did not apply, and the court declined to decide “whether the statute would impair a vested right under the third factor when the statutory text is dispositive.” Because plaintiff’s complaint alleged “damages caused by sexual abuse that occurred nearly 30 years ago, it" was untimely.Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Justice Zahra (joined by Chief Justice Clement and Justice Viviano) disagreed “with the majority opinion’s understanding of MCL 600.5851b(1) as affecting the accrual date for the limitations period for claims of” CSC and thus, dissented “from Part III(A) of the majority opinion.” But he concurred “with the majority opinion’s conclusion in Part III(B) that the statute does not apply retroactively and with the majority opinion’s resultant holding that the Court of Appeals correctly held that plaintiff’s negligence claim is barred by the statute of limitations.”
Medical malpractice; Due process; Whether summary disposition was granted based on an argument not raised in the motion; Causation; Badalamenti v William Beaumont Hosp-Troy; Motion for reconsideration; Deep vein thrombosis (DVT); Pulmonary embolism (PE)
The court rejected plaintiff-estate’s due process argument, concluding the trial court did not grant defendants summary disposition based on an argument not raised in their motion. Further, “plaintiff failed to establish a question of fact whether the alleged breach” (failure to refer the decedent, Jones, for an ultrasound to evaluate him for DVTs) was a proximate cause of Jones’s death. And given that there was no error in granting defendants summary disposition, there was no basis to grant plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The 49-year-old Jones went into cardiac arrest and died two days after undergoing bariatric surgery. It was determined his cause of death was PE due to DVT. Defendant-doctor (Zarghami) was the cardiologist who cleared Jones for surgery. In rejecting plaintiff’s due process argument, the court concluded “defendants’ original motion for summary disposition provided plaintiff with sufficient notice that defendants were seeking summary disposition on the ground of causation, and that plaintiff was required to present evidence to establish factual support for” its theory to avoid dismissal. They “challenged plaintiff’s ability to prove malpractice by Dr. Zarghami for failing to diagnose DVT during the cardiac assessment by arguing that there was no competent evidence that Jones had a DVT condition at the time of his evaluation. The trial court’s ruling addressed whether plaintiff could produce competent evidence to establish factual support for [its] claim. Nothing about the trial court’s ruling was outside the scope of defendants’ original motion.” As to causation, the court found this case was “similar to Badalamenti because plaintiff’s experts premised their testimony on the assumption that Jones possibly had DVTs in [3/18], when he was seen by Dr. Zarghami, given his clinical symptoms. However, it could not be determined whether he actually had DVTs at that time, despite” testimony by plaintiff’s expert “that it is not uncommon for morbidly obese people to have DVTs. That an untrasound performed in [3/18] would have revealed the presence of DVTs is pure speculation, plaintiff having produced no substantive evidence that they were in fact present at that time.” The court determined plaintiff did not “refute the autopsy evidence and [defendants’ experts’] explanations of how that evidence demonstrated that the DVT that caused Jones’s PE was of recent origin.” Affirmed.
Zoning; Chickens & coop on residential property; Accessory use & structures; Distinguishing Pittsfield Twp v Malcolm; Claims of future harm; Distinguishing Henry v Dow Chem Co; Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA)
On remand from the Supreme Court, the court concluded “the circuit court did not err by affirming the ZBA’s decision to deny plaintiffs’ request to keep chickens and a coop on their residential property because the accessory use and accessory structures did not comply with” the applicable zoning ordinance. The record reflected that the ZBA’s decision was “supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.” The ZBA relied on the information provided by a neighbor, nonparty-G, “to conclude that ‘the use of the accessory structure is inappropriate for the neighborhood and the location will hinder and discourage the adjacent neighbor to live in harmony on their property due to issues associated with the proposed use.’ As such, the accessory structure failed to comply with” Zoning Ordinance § 42-7.6.6. Plaintiffs focused only on the issues of G’s “allergies and the visibility of the chicken coop, but [G] listed several other ways in which the chicken coup would hinder her use of her property and ability to live in harmony, including the odor, noise, risk of predators, risk of disease, and decreased property values.” While another witness disagreed with G “and expressed support for plaintiffs having the chicken coop, the information provided by [G] supported the ZBA’s factual findings which must be affirmed, even if alternative findings could have been supported by the record.” Lastly, although plaintiffs did “not challenge the sufficiency of the ZBA’s findings, the ZBA did not ‘merely repeat the conclusionary language of the zoning ordinance without specifying the factual findings underlying the determination that the requirements of the ordinance were satisfied in the case at hand.’” The court held that even “though the ZBA did not address each requirement listed in the ordinance, not all were applicable.” It concluded that the “circuit court appropriately reviewed the record and applied correct legal principles. The circuit court did not misapprehend or grossly misapply the substantial-evidence test to the ZBA’s factual findings.” Affirmed.
Slip & fall on ice; Premises liability; Whether a common area was fit for its intended use; MCL 554.139(1)(a); Whether MCL 554.139(1)(a) applies to sidewalks in common areas of apartment complexes; Allison v AEW Capital Mgmt, LLP; Principle that the open and obvious danger doctrine is not available to deny liability for a statutory violation under MCL 554.139(1); Gabrielson v The Woods Condo Ass’n, Inc; Notice; Distinguishing Estate of Trueblood v P&G Apts, LLC
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim under MCL 554.139(1)(a) because she failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sidewalk in her apartment complex was fit for its intended use. Plaintiff sued defendants for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell on ice on the sidewalk. On appeal, the court agreed with plaintiff that the trial court erred by finding MCL 554.139(1) did not apply to walkways in common areas, but found reversal was not warranted because plaintiff “failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the sidewalk was fit for its intended use.” The court also agreed with plaintiff that the trial court erred by finding the open and obvious doctrine applies to claims under MCL 554.139(1)(a). Again, however, “the trial court’s erroneous conclusion about the applicability of the open and obvious doctrine to claims under MCL 554.139(1)(a) has no bearing on this case because [it] granted defendants summary disposition” based on the absence of “a genuine issue of material fact regarding the fitness of the sidewalk.” Finally, the court rejected plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred by granting defendants summary disposition of her claim under MCL 554.139(1)(a) because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the slab was fit for its intended use. “[E]ven assuming the weather created ice on the sidewalk, that is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the sidewalk was unfit for its intended use.” Plaintiff had “the burden of proving a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the sidewalk was fit for its intended use” and failed to do so. Without photos “or other evidence demonstrating the ice was so pervasive on the sidewalk that it made the sidewalk unfit for its intended use,” plaintiff failed to establish “a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the fitness of the sidewalk.” And even if she could successfully limit her argument to the slab, she “would still fail to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding its fitness.” Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i) & (j); Sexual abuse of a sibling; Principle that how a parent treats one child is probative of how that parent may treat other children; In re Mota; Best interests of the children; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Olive/Metts Minors
Holding that §§ (b)(i) and (j) were met, and that termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. His rights were terminated primarily on the basis of his sexual abuse of the children’s half-sister. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that a statutory ground for termination was not met. It was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake in finding that respondent sexually abused a sibling of” the children. In addition, there “was clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable likelihood that [the children] would suffer from abuse in the foreseeable future if placed with respondent.” Under the circumstances, it concluded his abuse of the sibling was “highly probative of how he may treat” the children. The court also rejected his claim that termination was not in the children’s best interests. “Considering all of the record evidence, there was abundant support for the trial court’s finding that respondent could not provide a safe, stable, and permanent home for” the children. Further, the trial court’s “findings that neither a custody arrangement nor guardianship would sufficiently protect the children and that termination was the best means for adequately protecting [them] from the continuing threat of harm from abuse, were supported by the evidence that the” children’s mother “did not have any concerns about respondent despite his abuse of his own child.”