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“Member’ of an LLC under the Michigan Limited Liability Company Act (MLLCA); MCL 450.4501; Common law & statutory conversion; Proper notice & an opportunity to be heard; Fraud; Unjust enrichment; Safe Transportation, LLC (STL); Safe Transportation 4, LLC (ST4L)
The court concluded that the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition to defendants-Kevin and ST4L, and dismissing all the claims against them, and it affirmed “those decisions. But the trial court improperly dismissed the claims against [defendant-]STL because plaintiff was not provided adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether summary disposition was warranted in” STL’s favor. Thus, the court vacated the dismissal of the claims against STL and remanded to the trial court for it to address them. Plaintiff argued, among other things, “that the trial court erred when it concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact whether Kevin was a member of STL.” The court noted that “plaintiff could only potentially prove that Kevin was a member of STL under MCL 450.4501(1)(b)(ii), which states that a person is admitted as a member if ‘[t]he person’s status as a member is reflected in the records, tax filings, or other written statements of the limited liability company.’” The trial court record did “not contain any tax filings of STL, so the only possibility for plaintiff was to provide ‘records’ or ‘other written statements’ of STL. In an apparent attempt to comply with this requirement, plaintiff submitted the Bank Signature Card Document, which was on a Chase Bank letterhead and listed Kevin as a ‘member.’” But the court found that “plaintiff’s argument must fail because the Bank Signature Card Document is not a record or other written statement ‘of the limited liability company.’” Rather, plaintiff provided “a record or other written document of Chase Bank. While it contains information on it suggesting that Kevin was a member of STL, the statute requires the information to be on records or statements of the LLC itself. This is important because the presumptive intent of the Legislature in codifying the statutory subsection at issue, which is discerned from the use of the phrase ‘of the limited liability company,’ was to allow LLCs to identify their own members in records or written statements produced by the LLC.” The court found that this “goal would not be realized by allowing written statements or records of a bank to be used to establish membership in an LLC.” As a result, Kevin’s “membership could not be established under MCL 450.4501(1)(b)(ii).” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to identification testimony; Failure to object to opinion testimony on shoplifting tactics; People v Oliver; Lay witness opinion testimony; MRE 701; Speedy trial; People v Williams; Cumulative effect of alleged errors
The court concluded that defendant-Morris was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Also, after weighing each of the speedy-trial factors, it held that his right to a speedy trial was not denied. Finally, reversal of his conviction due to cumulative error was not warranted where he did not show any errors of consequence. He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder “for immolating a single victim.” Morris argued “that he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to object to certain identification testimony and opinion testimony on shoplifting tactics.” But he could not “establish a resulting prejudice. And in the case of the shoplifting testimony, he cannot establish that trial counsel was deficient.” Because he could not “show a reasonable probability that the outcome of this trial would have been different had his counsel objected, reversal is not appropriate.” The court held that even “if defense counsel had grounds to object because [witness-H] identified Morris in the surveillance recordings, reversal is not required because it is not reasonably probable that counsel’s error impacted the outcome of this trial.” As to his trial counsel’s failure to object to H’s testimony on the basis that H offered expert testimony on shoplifting behaviors without ever being qualified to testify as an expert, “any opinion testimony he offered was as a lay witness only.” There was “no basis for finding that [H’s] observations in this matter are dependent on reliable principles or methods, as opposed to his own experience and observations. [H’s] observations and opinions about what Morris was doing in the store were properly admitted as lay witness opinion testimony, consistent with” Oliver. Similar to the officers in Oliver, H “relied on his experience in retail security to describe for the jury why Morris’s actions and movements were consistent with shoplifting items from the store. Again, [H’s] testimony was not dependent on scientific or technical principles or methods, but was based on his own perceptions, using his experience and training. Morris has not shown that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to [H’s] testimony on the ground that he should have been qualified as an expert witness when it is apparent that [H] was not offering expert testimony under MRE 702.” Such an objection would have been futile. The court added that “any error by counsel did not affect the outcome of this trial, given the overwhelming evidence of Morris’s guilt.” Affirmed.
Whether a statement constituted a clear & unequivocal assurance of just-cause employment; Rood v General Dynamics Corp
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 81036 in the 2/28/24 edition) and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that a statement by defendant-employer’s former administrator “constituted a clear and unequivocal assurance of just-cause employment.” The court reversed “the Court of Appeals’ holding that, as a matter of law, [the administrator’s] statement that the plaintiff ‘was not to be terminated other than for a proper cause’ fell short of describing an unequivocal and enforceable institutional commitment to guaranteeing the plaintiff employment but for just cause.” The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.
Termination of a child's guardianship; Failure to comply with a remand order; “Best interests of a minor” in the context of guardianship proceedings; MCL 700.5101(a); The trial court’s factual findings
Holding that the trial court failed to comply with its remand order and abused its discretion by finding termination of petitioners’ (grandparents) guardianship was not in the child’s best interests, the court again remanded. Early in the case, the trial court removed the child from respondent-mother’s care and placed her in petitioners’ care. Years later, respondent filed a motion to terminate the guardianship, which the trial court denied. In a prior appeal, the court found that the trial court applied the proper evidentiary standard, but “did not adequately articulate its best-interest findings on the record.” As such, it remanded “to allow the trial court to place on the record its findings regarding the relevant best-interest factors,” taking into account up-to-date information. On remand, the trial court found that considering “the sum total of all factors, the best interest of the [child] would not be met in granting the petition for termination of guardianship.” In the present appeal, the court agreed with respondent that the trial court failed to comply with the court’s remand order and abused its discretion by holding that termination of the guardianship was not in the child’s best interests. Although the trial court “made findings under each best-interest factor, it failed to state its conclusion regarding which party, if any, the factor favored. Nor did [it] indicate what weight or relative weight it gave each relevant factor.” And it “only made findings concerning petitioners on” certain factors. “In light of the fact that the trial court did not identify which factors supported its decision, or specify whether each factor favored a particular party, or both, or neither, and did not discuss what weight it gave various factors,” the record was insufficient for the court to make that determination. As such, “a second remand for the trial court to provide adequate articulation of the best-interest factors is required. On remand, the trial court should make findings regarding each relevant factor and, where appropriate, either make findings regarding both petitioners and respondent or state its rationale for not making findings with regard to a party.” It should “also state, for each factor, whether [it] has concluded that the factor favors respondent, petitioners, both, or neither party, and why.” And it should “indicate the relative weight it has given a factor where appropriate.” Further, in making its findings, it “should not rely on evidence that was not admitted into the record.” Finally, it “should consider up-to-date information when doing so.” The court retained jurisdiction.
Involuntary mental health treatment; “Person requiring treatment” under MCL 330.1401(1)(c); Whether a respondent presents a substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm to herself or others; Principle that when the probate court’s oral & written findings conflict, the written findings control; Cassidy v Cassidy
The court held that the probate court did not err by finding respondent, who suffered from schizoaffective disorder, was a “person requiring treatment” and ordering involuntary hospitalization. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that she did not qualify as a “person requiring treatment” because the probate court did not find that she presented “a substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm” to herself or others. It noted that she ignored the remainder of the probate court’s oral and written findings, in which it found “by clear and convincing evidence that [she was] a person requiring treatment because she has a mental illness, and her judgment is so impaired by that mental illness and lack of understanding of the need for treatment, has caused her to demonstrate an unwillingness to voluntarily participate in or adhere to treatment that is necessary on the basis of competent clinical opinion to prevent a relapse or harmful deterioration of her condition, and presents a substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm to herself or others.” The probate court also “checked the box indicating that, by clear and convincing evidence, respondent satisfied the criteria for Subsection (c), for which the language is nearly identical with that of [its] oral finding at the hearing, including that respondent ‘presents a substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm to herself or others.’” The court concluded that the probate court did not err in its findings, noting that both the psychiatrist and “the clinical certificates submitted in support of the petition that were prepared by a physician and a psychiatrist after they had examined” her, found that her “lack of understanding regarding her need for treatment presented a substantial risk of significant harm to herself or others.” Affirmed.
Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Whether an insurer was in the order of priority; MCL 500.3114(4); Applicable version of the statute; Availability of other benefits; MCL 500.3172(5); Coordination pf health insurance benefits & no-fault coverage; Same loss; Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF)
The court held that the trial court correctly granted defendant-Liberty Mutual summary disposition because plaintiff-healthcare provider was required, under MCL 500.3114(4), “to seek PIP benefits through the assigned claims plan.” But it vacated the trial court’s opinion “insofar as it ruled on the extent of” Liberty Mutual’s policy’s coverage. Further, it concluded the trial court erred in granting defendant-Nationwide (the MAIPF-assigned insurer) summary disposition under MCL 500.3172(5). Plaintiff treated nonparty-CJ for injuries he sustained in a 2/20 motor-vehicle collision. CJ was “driving a car insured by Liberty Mutual” pursuant to a policy issued to nonparty-BJ. There was no dispute that, at the time of the accident, CJ was not named in that policy and he was not her “spouse or relative domiciled in the same household.” As a result, CJ “was ‘not covered under a [PIP] policy as provided in [MCL 500.3114(1)],’ so, under Subsection (4), plaintiff, as [CJ’s] assignee, was required to ‘claim [PIP] benefits under the assigned claims plan.’” As to plaintiff’s argument about which version of the statute applied, its assertion that CJ had a vested right in BJ’s “policy with Liberty Mutual when the policy issued is incorrect; a party’s rights under an insurance policy ‘vest[] at the time of the accident.’” The current version of MCL 500.3114(4) was in effect at that time. But the court noted that it affirmed “the trial court based solely on the fact that, under MCL 500.3114(4), plaintiff was required to seek benefits through the assigned claims plan.” The court stated that neither its “opinion nor the trial court’s opinion bar Nationwide from pursuing reimbursement from Liberty Mutual under the policy it issued to” BJ. As to Nationwide’s summary disposition motion, the court held that the trial court erred in granting it “because Nationwide failed to establish that” CJ’s health insurance policy “covered the same loss that Nationwide was covering.” Because that policy “did not cover the injuries he sustained as a result of the” 2/20 accident, “Nationwide was not entitled to reduce the benefits it owed [him] (and consequently plaintiff, as [his] assignee) under MCL 500.3172(5) on the basis of” that policy. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the order granting Liberty Mutual’s summary disposition motion, reversed the order granting Nationwide’s summary disposition motion, and remanded.
Challenges to a trust; Undue influence; MCL 700.7406; Rebuttable presumption; Lack of capacity; Motion to file a second amended petition; Delay; Futility; Motion for reconsideration; MCR 2.119(F)(3)
The court concluded that even assuming that a presumption of undue influence existed, petitioner failed to show that respondent exerted undue influence on the decedent (Irene) when she executed the trust at issue (her 2015 Trust). It found that the trial court did not err in granting respondent summary disposition or in denying petitioner’s motions to file a second amended petition and for reconsideration. Petitioner was one of Irene’s children. Respondent is Irene’s grandson. The 2015 Trust named him the successor Trustee and “provided that, upon Irene’s death, the Trustee was to distribute the” trust property to her grandchildren. Petitioner challenged the 2015 Trust for undue influence and lack of capacity. The affidavit of Irene’s attorney indicated “that he met alone with Irene when discussing the substantive elements of the trust, and he did not see evidence that Irene was incapable or improperly influenced.” Affidavits by petitioner’s sisters showed “that Irene executed the 2015 Trust without undue influence, explaining that the 2015 Trust accorded with Irene’s stated intentions and that [she] did not lack capacity when executing it. The affidavits that petitioner submitted do not demonstrate that respondent, or any one else, subjected Irene to threats or coerced her in a way that destroyed her free will. The affidavits by the men who knew Irene in Dearborn do not support petitioner’s claims because it appears that Irene was no longer living in Dearborn when she executed the trust.” As to petitioner’s reliance “on a visit she allegedly had with Irene around the time” the 2015 Trust was created, her “recounting of that visit does not include descriptions of Irene as being threatened or coerced or unable to execute the 2015 Trust.” The court also concluded that records showed “that Irene, who was in her 70s and 80s through these relevant years, had various physical and mental health diagnoses, and took medications, but not that she lacked capacity at the time that she executed the 2015 Trust.” As to the motion to file a second amended petition, it was untimely and the court also found that it would have been futile. As to the motion for reconsideration, the probate court “properly determined that petitioner failed to demonstrate that [it] made a palpable error.” Affirmed.