Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
View Text Opinion Full PDF Opinion
Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) benefits eligibility; Self-certification requirements; 15 USC §§ 2102(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I)(dd) & (gg); The Continued Assistance for Unemployed Workers Act (CAA); The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Commission (UIAC); The Department of Labor & Economic Opportunity/Unemployment Insurance Agency (the Agency); Administrative law judge (ALJ)
Holding that the claimant never qualified for PUA benefits under federal law, the court reversed the trial court’s order that affirmed the UIAC’s decision that she was eligible, and remanded. Appellant-Agency contended that “the trial court erred in ruling claimant was eligible for PUA benefits because [she] did not present documentation of prepandemic employment.” The court agreed that “the trial court erred, but for different reasons.” It determined that the “trial court did not apply the correct legal analysis when it affirmed the UIAC’s ruling that claimant was eligible for PUA benefits. [It] erred in affirming the UIAC’s decision, just as the UIAC erred in ruling ‘[t]he ALJ properly applied the law’ to the facts in this matter. The trial court stated the standard of review ‘gives great deference to the agency[.]’ However, . . . ‘substantially less deference, if any, is accorded to the circuit court’s determinations on matters of law[]’ than to [its] review of agency fact-finding.” Reviewing the claimant’s testimony, the court concluded that had she “been offered a position as an esthetician, and the spa shuttered because of the pandemic, she would have qualified under § (gg). And had claimant started working, but had to leave her job because her children’s school closed and she needed to stay home with them, [she] would have qualified under § (dd). But the evidence claimant provided is insufficient under the plain language of the statute to prove eligibility for PUA benefits.” The court held that her “testimony, even if it showed she planned to begin employment, would not qualify as the documentation required by the CAA, which is ‘proof of recent attachment to the labor force.’” Yet the ALJ ruled that she “was eligible for benefits because but for the pandemic, she could have received a job offer. This ruling was contrary to law, and was clear error.”
Dispute over a non-compete agreement; MCL 445.774a(1); St. Clair Med, PC v Borgiel; Standing; MCR 2.201(B); Effect of a failure to attach a relevant document to a complaint; MCR 2.113(C)(1); Liggett Rest Group, Inc v Pontiac; Leave to amend; MCR 2.118(A)(2); Futility; Effect of delay; VHS of MI, Inc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co; Prejudice; Wolfenbarger v Wright
The court held that the trial court did not err by denying plaintiffs-technology service providers’ (RCC and MIDS) claims against defendants (former employees), but should have allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs sued defendants alleging various tort claims as well as breach of contract after defendants were terminated and formed their own company. The trial court dismissed the action. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred by granting defendants summary disposition on the basis of standing, but agreed with them that the trial court erred by denying their request to amend the complaint. In the affidavits attached to defendants’ motion for partial summary disposition, they each attested “that they never used RCC’s confidential information or solicited any of” its customers. And they claimed on appeal “that in response to the motion for summary disposition, plaintiffs failed to produce evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact that RCC had any reasonably competitive business interest to protect by enforcement of the Non-Compete Agreements.” The court noted that “in their response to the motion for partial summary disposition, plaintiffs asserted that while still employed with RCC,” one of the defendants provided a digital marketing proposal to a customer, and later sent that same proposal to the customer after leaving RCC. “But it is unclear from the attached proposals that defendants did as plaintiffs asserted.” As such, “plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that RCC had standing to sue defendants.” As to MIDS’ standing, the court found that, “on the record presented, the trial court properly granted summary disposition of plaintiffs’ claims against MIDS.” However, it “abused its discretion by failing to allow plaintiffs to file an amended complaint along with the complete Assignment and Assumption and Purchase Agreements attached in accordance with its earlier grant of leave to amend on this basis.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Amending an invalid sentence; MCR 6.429(A); Whether the addition of lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM) to defendant’s sentence for a 2011 conviction violated ex post facto protections; Retroactive applicability of People v Comer; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Advice in plea negotiations; Prejudice; Lafler v Cooper; Alleged miscalculation of the OV score at the original sentencing; Judgment of sentence (JOS)
The court held that defendant’s 2024 amended JOS including LEM was valid. It also rejected his claim that adding LEM to his sentence for a 2011 conviction violated ex post facto protections, concluding that applying Comer did not violate his right to due process. His ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to advice in plea negotiations failed for lack of prejudice. Finally, any alleged error in the OV scoring at his original sentencing was cured when he was “resentenced, at his request, with reference to guidelines calculations” he did not challenge. He was convicted of kidnapping, CSC I, and CSC II. The trial court initially sentenced him in 2011, as a third-offense habitual offender, to 25 to 50 years for the kidnapping and the CSC I convictions, and 10 to 15 years for the CSC II. In 2023, it amended the JOS to include LEM. After a resentencing hearing in 2024, it issued a second amended JOS, “which continued the original sentence plus LEM.” On appeal, defendant’s appellate counsel asserted the trial court did not have the authority to amend defendant’s judgment in 2024 to add LEM. The court noted that because “the trial court was required to impose LEM, and the original [JOS] did not include that mandatory facet, defendant’s original sentence was invalid.” While appellate counsel was correct that the original invalid sentence “could properly be amended sua sponte only until” 1/13/12, when the trial court amended the JOS in 2023, defendant had a pending “request to amend his sentence to include LEM.” After he moved “to add LEM to his sentence, and after [his] attorney’s motion for resentencing, the trial court held a hearing before issuing its final” 2024 amended JOS, again including LEM. “MCR 6.429(A) provides that the trial court may correct an invalid sentence on a motion from either party, and in that circumstance the rule imposes no timing limitations[.]” As to his ex post facto argument, the court concluded that because the statutes mandating LEM for CSC I “convictions such as defendant’s were in effect at the time of [his] original sentencing, and there was no precedent stating that LEM” did not apply to CSC I “sentences involving a victim older than 13 years, and because defendant does not argue otherwise, . . . Comer neither announced a new rule of law, nor was unexpected or indefensible as applied to defendant.” Affirmed.
Probable cause to arrest for OWI under MCL 257.625(1); Motion to suppress
The court held that the district court properly concluded that a deputy (J) “had probable cause to arrest defendant for OWI, and the circuit court erred by reversing the district court’s order denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.” The court noted that J “testified, and body camera footage admitted at the suppression hearing demonstrated, that defendant reported consuming between one and three beers several hours before striking a mailbox near his home. Additionally, upon making contact with defendant, [J] noted a ‘very strong’ odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and red, bloodshot eyes.” The court found that those “facts were sufficient to allow a reasonable person to believe that defendant operated his vehicle while intoxicated.” Thus, it reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
Divorce; Custody; Children’s best interests; MCL 722.23; Factors (d), (f), (i), (j), & (k); Demski v Petlick; Fletcher v Fletcher; In camera interview; Supervised parenting time; MCL 722.27a(1) & (7)(a)-(i); Property division; Sparks v Sparks; Categorization of property as marital or separate; Cunningham v Cunningham; Equitable distribution
The court held that the trial court did not err in (1) determining that it was in the children’s best interests for plaintiff-mother to have sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ children or (2) awarding defendant-father supervised parenting time. But it reversed the award to plaintiff of the entire value of two properties and remanded for the trial court to make findings on their value, “and on the extent of any distribution of those properties and associated debt.” As to custody, defendant challenged the trial court’s findings on best-interest factors (d), (f), (i), (j), and (k). The court concluded that because “the trial court did not explicitly address ‘the desirability of maintaining the continuity of those environments,’ with plaintiff, it erred in finding that factor (d) favored” her. But it did not err in finding that factor (f) favored plaintiff. Further, from “the brief findings placed on the record, some of which supported plaintiff’s position as to defendant’s poor relationship with the children,” the court could not “conclude that the trial court’s findings in favor of plaintiff on factor (i) were against the great weight of the evidence.” It also found no merit in “defendant’s argument that the in camera interview violated his due-process” rights. And it found that the trial court’s conclusion that factors (j) and (k) weighed in plaintiff’s favor was not against the great weight of the evidence. As to the property division, the court noted that the Detroit “house was purchased during the marriage,” the parties lived there together “during the marriage, and defendant testified that he extensively renovated it. Further, [he] continued to reside in the house when plaintiff left with the children, a period of approximately three years. The trial court failed to make findings on all the relevant factors, suggesting that awarding to plaintiff the house and any equity in it was inequitable, at least in the absence of an explanation why defendant’s renovations (if any) and contributions while living in the house during the entire marriage does not garner [him] any interest in” it. The record did not contain sufficient information to allow the court “(or the trial court) to determine whether the purported Jamaica property was marital or separate, its value, and whether the trial court’s distribution was equitable. Further, the trial court’s awarding of all assets to plaintiff and all debt to defendant” appeared inequitable. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Action seeking PIP benefits; MCL 500.3172; Domicile; MCL 500.3114(1); Grange Ins Co of MI v Lawrence; Domicile factors under Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch & Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Ins Co; Whether a claimant is dependent on his or her parents for support; Mapp v Progressive Ins Co; Michigan Auto Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF)
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-insurer summary disposition of plaintiff’s action seeking PIP benefits. Plaintiff sued defendant (an insurer assigned by MAIPF) seeking coverage for injuries she sustained in a car crash. Defendant claimed plaintiff was ineligible for PIP benefits because she had other available coverage through her parents’ insurer, and because she “knowingly made materially false statements” in her application for benefits to the MAIPF. The trial court agreed and granted its motion. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by finding there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding her domicile at the time of the accident. Applying the Workman and Dairyland factors, the court found she “failed to establish a question of material fact regarding her domicile.” Although she emphasized “the first factor regarding her subjective or declared intent to remain with her parents, this factor [did] not favor either of the parties because there was no evidence presented as to whether plaintiff intended to stay with her parents indefinitely.” As to the second factor, “the relationship between plaintiff and her parents appeared to be informal.” Under the third factor, she “clearly lived upon the same premises as her parents, since she had a bedroom in their house.” And as to the fourth factor, plaintiff testified she kept an “apartment ‘in [her] inventory,’ but she received mail and maintained her belongings at her parents’ house.” The remaining factors, “which are particularly tailored to plaintiff’s situation as an adult child of her insured parents, strongly indicate[d] that plaintiff was domiciled at her parents’ house.” Given how strongly the factors indicated “that plaintiff was domiciled with her parents, reasonable minds would not disagree on the issue.” Affirmed.
Imposition of property taxes to cover the cost of healthcare insurance for retired police officers & firefighters; Act 345 (1937 PA 345); MCL 38.559(2); Bate v St Clair Shores; Ruman v City of Warren; Effect of defendants’ use of separate pension & “Other Post-Employment Benefits” plans; The Headlee Amendment (Const 1963, art 9, § 31); MCL 141.91; Effect of a city official’s admissions; Distinguishing Dailey v San Diego (CA App)
The court held that Bate and its companion case, Ruman, controlled in this dispute over defendants-municipalities’ imposition of “property taxes to cover the cost of healthcare insurance for retired police officers and firefighters.” And it declined to request a conflict panel because it found Bate was based “on sound principles of statutory interpretation.” Thus, it affirmed summary disposition for defendants. Plaintiffs contended that defendants violated the Headlee Amendment. As the court in Bate framed it, the key question was “‘whether Act 345 permits defendant cities to set aside and use tax dollars to help pay for healthcare benefits to retired firefighters and police officers who are members of the retirement system.’” After considering dictionary definitions of terms not defined in the statute, the Bate court held that “cities are ‘permitted to appropriate tax dollars to help pay for healthcare benefits to retired firefighters and police officers who are members of the retirement system and entitled to those benefits.’” It addressed the “argument that the term ‘other benefits payable’ as used in MCL 38.559 referred to MCL 38.556, which described the ‘retirement benefits payable under’ Act 345 ‘with no mention of healthcare benefits.’” Plaintiffs there asserted “‘MCL 38.556 only authorized the payment of pension benefits, disability benefits, and death benefits, and therefore, it does not authorize the payment of healthcare benefits.’” But the Bate court disagreed with their interpretation. It also rejected their “argument that healthcare benefits are distinct from pension benefits as a matter of law.” The Bate court concluded that “‘cities were permitted under Act 345 to appropriate tax dollars to fund healthcare benefits for retired firefighters and police officers who are members of the retirement system and entitled to those benefits. Because the tax was authorized before the Headlee Amendment was ratified, plaintiffs cannot establish a violation of Const 1963, art 9, § 31.’” The court here also rejected plaintiffs’ assertion that a different outcome was warranted “because the trial courts disregarded defendants’ use of separate pension and OPEB plans.” Finally, plaintiffs-Watts’ argued that “they raised a factual distinction” as to defendant-Westland’s plans. But the court was not persuaded that a Westland official’s “admissions establish that Westland’s taxation to cover retirees’ healthcare benefits are factually something other than a benefit under MCL 38.559.”
Governmental immunity; The motor vehicle exception (MCL 691.1405); Motion to amend; Delay; Causation; Robinson v Detroit; Excess economic damages; MCL 500.3135(3)(c); Serious impairment of an important body function; MCL 500.3135(5)
In this case for excess economic and noneconomic damages as a result of a motor vehicle accident, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants-city and its employee (Nock), reversed the order denying plaintiff’s motion to amend, and remanded. Plaintiff “did not expressly plead that she was bringing her claim under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity or cite to MCL 691.1405.” Instead, she alleged that the city “was liable under a theory of negligent entrustment.” The court found that because “plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim does not fit within the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, . . . the trial court did not err by finding that plaintiff failed to plead in avoidance of governmental immunity.” However, she sought “permission to amend her complaint, should the [trial] court conclude that it was not properly plead.” The court held that her “delay alone did not warrant denial of her motion to amend.” And it found that “given the facts of the accident, it would not have been futile for plaintiff to amend the complaint to properly allege a negligence claim under the motor vehicle exception. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff’s motion to amend.” She also argued that “there was a genuine issue of material fact whether her injuries were caused by the underlying motor vehicle accident.” The court noted that “to survive summary disposition, plaintiff was required, under MCL 691.1405, to demonstrate that Nock’s alleged negligence caused her injuries.” It concluded that based on the evidence presented, there was “a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation.” The court held that the conclusory affidavit from plaintiff’s provider failed to “create a question of fact regarding whether plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the accident. However, the testimonial and medical record evidence created ‘a logical sequence of cause and effect’ between the accident and plaintiff’s injuries[.]” Finally, the court concluded that while “defendants’ experts both agreed that plaintiff’s injuries were not the result of a traumatic event, this does not defeat plaintiff’s claim, rather, it demonstrates that there is a factual dispute regarding causation. As a result, the trial court erred by granting” defendants summary disposition.
Premises liability; Trespasser
In this premises liability case, the court reversed the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), and remanded. Plaintiff, a door-to-door salesman who fell on defendant’s steps, argued that “he was not a trespasser on defendant’s property.” The court held that the “trial court erred in finding that plaintiff was a trespasser. There was no factual dispute that [he] only approached defendant’s door to leave a flyer, and the front porch area of a single family home is customarily used by the public.” The court found that plaintiff “did not exceed the generally implied license granted to the public, and thus, there is no factual dispute regarding whether he was a licensee.” It also found that there was “no evidence of any ‘no trespassing’ or ‘no solicitors’ signs that could have potentially revoked defendant’s implied consent.” The court held that while “plaintiff admitted that defendant did not know plaintiff was coming to his house, defendant’s prior knowledge is not required for the implied license to approach a house and knock on the door.” It concluded that as “plaintiff was a licensee, the question then becomes what duties were owed to him and whether those duties were breached.” The court noted that these “issues were not addressed in the trial court since defendant was granted summary disposition after the court concluded plaintiff was a trespasser. These issues are best resolved initially in the trial court.”