Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Contractual attorney fees; “Relevant factors”; Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n; The law of the case doctrine; Rott v Rott; “Rule of mandate”; Great Lakes Eye, PC (GLE)
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed Part II(B)(4) of the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 81210 in the 3/20/24 edition). It held that the trial court “was free to consider ‘relevant factors’ when determining the appropriate attorney fee award” and that it did not abuse its discretion in ruling “that the fact that defendant prevailed in this litigation based upon a false premise was a ‘relevant factor’ when fashioning” the award. The court noted that the application of the law of the case doctrine is limited to questions of law and requires that the underlying facts materially remain the same. In addition, when new evidence is presented, the “doctrine does not preclude a trial court on remand from revisiting a factual question underlying a legal determination.” The doctrine in this case “prevented the lower courts from revisiting the judgment that was granted in defendant’s favor. Because neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals had previously made an attorney fee determination, however, the . . . doctrine did not preclude the trial court from considering newly introduced evidence to determine the appropriate attorney fee award.” The court further noted that “the ‘rule of mandate’ ‘embodies the well-accepted principle in our jurisprudence that a lower court must strictly comply with, and may not exceed the scope of, a remand order.’” The trial court here correctly determined “that the rule of mandate prohibited it from granting plaintiff’s motion to reinstate the original judgment.” But the rule did not prohibit it “from making its finding. The Court of Appeals remanded the current matter to the trial court ‘to determine whether plaintiff is a successor to GLE’s liabilities under the employment contract and whether plaintiff is liable for defendant’s attorney fees under’” § 18 of that contract. Thus, on remand the trial court “was within its mandate to consider newly introduced evidence when considering the attorney fee issue because that evidence was dispositive of the mandate to determine ‘GLE’s liabilities under the employment contract.’” The court vacated the Court of Appeals’ remand instructions and reinstated the trial court’s judgment awarding defendant-Krebs $0 in attorney fees. It denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.
Royalties; Whether plaintiff’s Michigan state-law contract claim arose under federal patent or state contract law; Jurisdiction; Whether the relevant contracts created a royalty that extended beyond the 20-year patent expiration date; Brulotte v Thys Co; Kimble v Marvel Entm’t, LLC
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that plaintiff-Lavery’s breach of contract claim sounded in Michigan state law, not federal patent law, and that defendant-Pursuant Health was not required to pay royalties on Lavery’s device past the expiration of his patent. Lavery invented a vision screening device and contracted with Pursuant Health to sell it, transferring the patent in exchange for a percentage of sales in royalites. The contract at issue was a Contribution Agreement. When the 20-year patent expired, Pursuant Health stopped paying. Lavery sued, seeking a declaration that the royalty did not have a time limit, and damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Pursuant Health argued, among other things, that even if the Contribution Agreement had provided for royalties after the patent expired, “the patent’s expiration rendered the royalty agreement void and unenforceable.” The district court granted Pursuant Health summary judgment on this ground. On appeal, Lavery challenged only the ruling on his claim for breach of the Contribution Agreement. The court first held that his claim turned on state, not patent law, requiring that the courts only determine whether the contracts created a royalty that continued beyond the 20-year patent expiration date. While his claim “concerns the value of a patent, it does not turn on its validity, infringement of it, or any other patent-law-centric dispute.” The court further found that “Pursuant Health’s invocation of the 20-year patent bar raises an affirmative defense that does not eliminate our jurisdiction. While Congress vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit over cases with compulsory patent counterclaims, . . . it has not done the same for affirmative defenses.” Thus, the court held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal. Turning to the merits, it cited the cases of Brulotte and Kimble as illustrating the courts’ unwillingness to enforce royalty provisions beyond the patent’s expiration. Considering the terms of the Contribution Agreement, it concluded that by “every measure that counts, Pursuant Health and Lavery agreed to a 1% and 3% royalty for use of Lavery’s patent. Now that Lavery’s patent has ended, he may no longer receive either cut.” Affirmed.
Plea validity; Effect of failing to move to withdraw the plea; MCR 6.310(D) & (C); Whether there was a People v Cobbs sentencing agreement; Agreement under People v Killebrew; Whether the plea was knowing & voluntary; Compliance with MCR 6.302(C)(3); Substantial compliance; People v Brinkey; Waiver; Operating while intoxicated, third offense (OWI-III)
In addition to finding that review of defendant’s challenge to the validity of his plea was precluded by his failure to move to withdraw it, the court concluded there was no Cobbs agreement and that his plea was knowing and voluntary. He pled guilty to OWI-III and was sentenced to 14 months to 5 years. He argued that his plea was invalid because the trial court sentenced him above the specified term in a Cobbs agreement without giving him an opportunity to withdraw his plea. But the court noted that he was “precluded from challenging the trial court’s failure to abide by the purported Cobbs agreement because he failed to move in the trial court to withdraw his plea.” It further determined that he “would not have otherwise been entitled to relief because there was no Cobbs agreement and defendant engaged in misconduct.” Given that the nine-month minimum sentence agreement was “reached by the parties, defendant’s plea agreement was a Killebrew agreement rather than a Cobbs agreement.” Further, regardless of which type of agreement it was, “defendant would not have been entitled to withdraw his plea because of his subsequent misconduct.” Between his plea and his sentencing, he “violated the terms of his probation on” a prior CCW conviction multiple times. Next, review of his claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary was precluded by his failure to move to withdraw it or for relief from judgment. Further, he “waived this argument in the trial court, thereby extinguishing any possible error.” The court added that, although the trial court failed to inform him “that, if it chose not to follow the agreement, [he] would be allowed to withdraw from the agreement[,]” it disagreed that the trial court failed to inform him “that it was not bound to follow the agreement for the” nine-month minimum sentence. While “not perfectly stated, the trial court informed [him] that ‘anything that happens between now and then can upset that apple cart.’ This statement informed [him] that the trial court is not bound by the agreement.” The court noted that strict “‘compliance with MCR 6.302 is not essential’” and he did not “address how the trial court’s failure to strictly comply with MCR 6.302(C)(3) affected the voluntary and knowing nature of the plea.” Affirmed.
Habeas corpus; Whether the state trial court’s rulings prevented petitioner from establishing a complete defense; Washington v Texas; Chambers v Mississippi; Ungar v Sarafite; O’Neal v Balcarcel; Ferensic v Birkett; Whether the state court unreasonably applied “clearly established” law; Application of the Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act standard; Whether the errors were “prejudicial”; Brecht v Abrahamson
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that the Michigan trial court deprived petitioner-Chandler of his “right to present a complete defense” and the Michigan Court of Appeals “unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s governing principles to Chandler’s case and improperly denied his constitutional claim.” Thus, it reversed the district court and granted Chandler a conditional writ of habeas corpus. He was convicted of CSC I, based primarily on the testimony of one of his foster children (A.C.). On appeal, the court considered whether Chandler was deprived of his right to present a complete defense. After reviewing key precedents, it concluded “the decisive issue at trial was the reliability of A.C.’s testimony, and Chandler’s defense hinged on challenging her credibility.” It found that preventing evidence from being offered based on discovery violation sanctions “w[as] likely inappropriate and disproportionate under the Supreme Court’s case law because of the weighty interests Chandler had at stake.” While the state appellate court determined that he “had a fair trial because he was represented by counsel[,]” the court noted that “the defendants in Chambers, Washington, and Ferensic had counsel at trial—but the mere presence of competent counsel was insufficient to render their trials fair. Thus, as this court has recognized, the Supreme Court’s case law clearly establishes that Chandler’s claim may not be defeated on the basis that he was represented by counsel at trial.” The state appellate court also determined that he “had a fair trial because defense counsel ‘presented defendant’s argument that the victim fabricated the allegations against defendant.’ . . . It is true that defense counsel tried to present Chandler’s side of the story through cross-examination—by suggesting that A.C. had a history of false allegations and had a motive to accuse Chandler of abuse. But at every step, the trial court prevented Chandler from producing any evidentiary support for his position, making his defense appear unsubstantiated and perhaps even manufactured.” The court found that his “right to present a complete defense was clearly circumscribed even more severely than in Chambers, Washington, and O’Neal” where Chandler was barred “from calling any witnesses or introducing any evidence on the most critical element of his defense—whether A.C.’s testimony was credible given her history of false allegations.” The court then applied the Brecht “actual prejudice” test and concluded that the “paucity of direct evidence inculpating Chandler on this record, coupled with the considerable excluded evidence casting serious doubt on A.C.’s credibility leaves us with grave doubt about whether Chandler’s verdict was affected by the trial court’s errors.”
Custody; Proper cause or a change in circumstances (COC); Shade v Wright; Vodvarka v Grasmeyer; Notice of a motion; Due process; Friend of the Court (FOC)
The court held that “the trial court erred by referring the case to the FOC without adequately addressing whether there was proper cause or a [COC] warranting a reexamination of legal custody or parenting time.” Further, the error was not harmless. As to plaintiff-father’s notice issue, while defendant-mother’s “counsel failed to comply with applicable court rules governing notice” of a motion, the court found that plaintiff did not show that his due-process rights were violated. As to proper cause or a COC, the court held that “the trial court failed to adequately consider, both during the motion hearing and in its subsequent order referring the underlying matter to the FOC, whether proper cause or a [COC] had arisen to justify revisiting parenting time and legal custody as established in the consent judgment of divorce.” It concluded that the “trial court further erred when it determined that the lesser legal standard iterated by this Court in Shade governed the underlying legal custody and parenting time issues.” It found that “because the contested order referred the matter to the FOC as to both legal custody and parenting time, the trial court erred when it neglected to apply the more stringent proper-cause-or-change-of-circumstances standard stated in Vodvarka to the parties’ dispute.” The court directed the trial court on remand to make the “threshold determination, using the proper standards and considering the best-interest factors, before deciding whether the case warrants referral to the FOC.” Reversed and remanded.
Dispute over rescission of an insurance policy; Unilateral rescission without court involvement; Innocent third party; Proof of loss; Delayed payment; Griffin v Trumbull Ins Co; Fraud; Rescission; Graham v Jackson (Unpub); Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co; Penalty interest; MCL 500.3142(2); Attorney fees; MCL 500.3148(1); Moore v Secura Ins
The court held that the trial court erred by denying plaintiff-medical provider’s motion for summary disposition as to interest and attorney fees. Plaintiff’s patient, nonparty-C, was injured when his car was struck by a car insured by defendant-insurer (Falls Lake). Defendant denied plaintiff’s claim on the basis it had rescinded the policy at issue based on fraud. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition concerning plaintiff’s request for interest and attorney fees. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that “it did not fail to pay within 30 days of receiving proof of loss because it paid within 30 days of the trial court’s ruling on the issue of rescission.” It noted “this argument ignores the principle that rescission is a remedy ordered by a court, not unilaterally chosen by an insurance company. This is particularly true here, where an innocent third party” is the individual affected by defendant’s decision. And because defendant “failed to pay plaintiff’s invoices within 30 days of receipt, plaintiff was entitled to penalty interest under MCL 500.3142(2), and the trial court erred when it denied plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition.” Further, because C was innocent in the purported fraud, defendant “also should have known that it could not simply rescind the policy unilaterally” with its insured and “in effect, pull the rug out from under [C’s] feet, to avoid its obligations under the policy. Allowing gamesmanship like that played by Falls Lake would incentivize insurers to delay or withhold payment on their own belief that they are entitled to avoid the requirements of the no-fault act by entering into collateral agreements with their insureds.” Reversed and remanded.
Action alleging zoning violations; Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 2.612(C); Heugel v Heugel; Practice of law; MCL 600.916(1); Dressel v Ameribank; Application of the criminal exclusionary rule; Long Lake Twp v Maxon; Substantial rights of the opposing party; Prohibition against lawful uses of land; Gust v Canton Twp; “Aesthetic concerns”; Adams Outdoor Adver, Inc v City of Holland; Zoning ordinance (ZO)
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting plaintiff-township’s motion for summary disposition and later denying defendants’ motion for relief from judgment. Plaintiff sued defendants for alleged violations of its ZO as they prepared the subject property for operation of a mushroom-growing operation. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff and issued an order giving defendants six months to abate a nuisance. After six months had passed, defendants moved for relief from judgment as to that order, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the court rejected defendants’ argument that they presented extraordinary circumstances that justified setting the judgment aside, and that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding otherwise. The trial court “was not the entity preventing an attorney from appearing, and did not rush matters in a way that unfairly denied” defendant-Rogers the chance to find counsel. In addition, the “trial court did not err by proceeding with the hearing while Rogers was self-represented, and a different result likely would not have resulted even if the trial court had delayed matters until Rogers engaged a new attorney.” Further, the “length of time leading up to the summary-disposition motion, the persisting violations, Rogers’ goals at the time of the hearing, and the amount of time before a new attorney for defendants did appear, indicate that an adjournment would have made no difference in the decision on the merits, and if anything would have only further delayed matters.” Moreover, the “ordinance violations were neither obscure nor trivial. There have been persistent violations that risked even ‘loss of life.’” The court also rejected defendants’ claim that plaintiff’s substantial rights would not be detrimentally affected by setting the judgment aside, and that the trial court abused its discretion by not so concluding. “Defendants too hastily discount aesthetic concerns for zoning purposes.” In addition, their “focus on the detrimental effects on themselves is also not the proper way to analyze this issue.” The court noted that “[s]afety, and an end to the drain on plaintiff’s attention and resources, are clear substantial rights of plaintiff that would be detrimentally affected by setting the judgment aside. Even aesthetics may be a legitimate, if lesser, concern here.” Affirmed.
Promissory estoppel; Cove Creek Condo Ass’n v Vistal Land & Home Dev, LLC; Quiet title; MCL 600.2932; MCR 3.411; Trademark Props of MI, LLC v Federal Nat’l Mtg Ass’n; The trial court’s findings of fact & conclusions of law; MCR 2.517(A); Clean hands
The court held that the trial court did not err by quieting title to the disputed property in favor of appellee and dismissing appellant’s counterclaims. It also did not err by declining to apply the doctrine of clean hands to appellee. The trial court entered an order quieting title to a 12-foot strip of property in favor of appellee, and dismissing appellant’s quiet title and promissory estoppel counterclaims regarding the same property. On appeal, the court rejected appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in denying him relief on promissory estoppel or quiet title grounds. “[T]he trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law met the requirements of MCR 2.517(A). [It] set forth a fairly lengthy statement of facts before concluding that [appellant] did not meet his burden of proof. [Its] finding that the parties executed the deeds as a sham foreclosed [appellant’s] argument that [appellee] promised to convey the 12-foot strip of property for as long as” appellant needed. “These findings established that the trial court was aware of the factual issues and correctly applied the law to the facts to satisfy the requirements of MCR 2.517(A).” In addition, under either scenario regarding quiet title, the sole owner of the contested property was appellee, and appellant had no rights to the contested property. The court also rejected appellant’s claim that the trial court erred by applying the doctrine of clean hands to him and declining to apply it to appellee. Granting appellant “relief or applying the doctrine to [appellee’s] claim would have permitted the fraud orchestrated against the Township to continue. In context, it served the Township’s interests for the trial court to quiet title in” appellee’s favor. Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Reasonable reunification efforts; Admission of evidence; Hearsay; In re CR; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to hearsay evidence; Prejudice; Child’s best interests
The court held that the trial court did not plainly err in finding the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, and that respondent-father was not entitled to relief based on his evidentiary claims. Further, (1) he could not establish prejudice as to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (2) terminating his parental rights was proper under § (c)(i), and (3) doing so was in the child’s best interests. Thus, the court affirmed the order terminating respondent’s rights. While he “was not specifically provided with domestic violence counseling or classes during the proceedings,” the case-service notes supported that he “initially refused domestic violence services because he had completed them in the past. Later, when [he] was agreeable to receiving” them, the DHHS repeatedly tried to enroll him in these services. In addition, he “was provided with individual counseling, which addressed (1) domestic violence; (2) emotional stability; (3) problem solving; and (4) providing a stable environment for the minor child. Respondent was also provided with one-on-one parent skills training with a parenting coach, which were geared toward appropriate discipline of children and regulating emotions. [He] failed to benefit despite the parenting coach’s service being ‘above and beyond’ what was usually provided. Importantly, in 2020, respondent completed a domestic violence treatment program in relation to a domestic violence conviction. He clearly did not benefit, and there is no indication [he] would have fared better if DHHS had offered other services or additional services.” As to his claim about inadmissible hearsay, although he denied he slapped another of his children (his daughter) in the face, as alleged in a 2/23 police report, he “admitted he physically abused his daughter more than one year after [she] entered care and while he was participating in services.” As a result, “legally admissible evidence—i.e., respondent’s own testimony—supports the abuse occurred. Because ‘the mere existence of hearsay at the termination hearing does not warrant reversal,’” he was not entitled to relief. As to § (c)(i), over 182 days passed between entry of the initial dispositional order and entry of the termination order. His lack of stable housing was the condition that led to the adjudication. The court held that the totality of the evidence supported that he “‘had not accomplished any meaningful change’ in” this condition, and that he would not be able to rectify it “within a reasonable time considering the” child’s age.