Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Breach of contract; Void or voidable; Lewis v Farmers Ins Exch; Whether the contract was unambiguous; “Null and void”
Concluding that the trial court erred in granting defendant summary disposition of plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim, the court reversed and remanded. In 1/21, the parties entered into a contract for defendant-May Builders (whose sole proprietor was May) “to perform renovations, and build a bedroom addition, for a house plaintiff owned.” Plaintiff alleged “that defendant failed to properly hire, manage, and supervise subcontractors, to the detriment of the construction project.” On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred “by determining that the contract was unambiguous and that ¶ 15 [of the agreement] left it unenforceable except for defendant’s right to be paid for work performed.” The court agreed. Plaintiff asserted “the most logical interpretation of ¶ 15 is that the contract would be cancelled, going forward, if May died or became incapacitated; however, plaintiff also argues that, if that interpretation is not clear from the wording of the contract, then at the very least the agreement is ambiguous.” Plaintiff further argued “the parties did not intend for the term ‘null and void’ in ¶ 15 to carry the legal meaning that the contract would be rendered void ab initio upon May’s death. Rather, according to plaintiff, the parties intended for ¶ 15 to cancel the contract prospectively from the time of May’s death, without extinguishing the existing rights and liabilities of the parties as they existed until then.” Defendant argued that “¶ 15 of the agreement operated to void and nullify the agreements between the parties upon the condition subsequent, which was the death of May.” The court held that pursuant to Lewis, “because a contrary meaning appears in the contract, we must presume that the term ‘null and void’ was not intended to be given its technical legal meaning, and instead was meant to be synonymous with ‘cancel.’ Interpreting the phrase ‘null and void’ as having its technical legal meaning would create an ambiguity in the contract because it would irreconcilably conflict with the phrase, ‘with the exception of payment for work completed.’” The court concluded that if “the contract is void, then it does not exist at law, meaning it has no legal force or binding effect.” Thus, the court found that “the phrase ‘null and void’ could not be read in concert with the phrase, ‘with the exception of payment for work completed,’ because plaintiff could not be contractually obligated to pay defendant for work completed if the contract did not exist. But ‘courts cannot simply ignore portions of a contract in order to avoid a finding of ambiguity or in order to declare an ambiguity. Instead, contracts must be construed so as to give effect to every word or phrase as far as practicable.’” The court held that when the contract was “read as a whole, reading the phrase ‘null and void’ to mean ‘cancel’ harmonizes it with the phrase ‘with the exception of payment for work completed,’ which was clearly the intention of the drafters based upon the rest of the document.”
Sentencing; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Posey; Scoring of OV 13 (continuing pattern of criminal behavior); MCL 777.43(1)(c) & (2)(a); Scoring of OV 19 (interference with the administration of justice); MCL 777.49(c); Mitigating factors; People v Bailey
The court held that defendant failed to show that his sentence was unreasonable or disproportionate. He was convicted of AWIM and felony-firearm for shooting the victim at a party. In a prior appeal, the court affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing on the ground that the trial court erred in scoring OV 13. On remand, the prosecution presented evidence as to OV 13 and the trial court recalculated defendant’s OV scores but imposed the same sentence, with credit for time served. In the present appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by resentencing him to the same term of years, and that his sentence was unreasonable and disproportionate. It noted the trial court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant previously committed a felony home invasion and third-offense domestic violence, “and appropriately calculated 25 points under OV 13.” Upon further review of his “criminal history, the trial court also found [he] attempted to influence a trial witness, adding 10 points to [his] score for OV 19, under which points are assessed for interference with the administration of justice.” As to “the seriousness of the offense, the trial court stated that defendant’s crime was a ‘very serious offense’ that ‘really could’ve been a murder,’ if the officer who resuscitated the victim had not arrived so quickly. Defendant did not contest any of the trial court’s findings, including his OV scores, nor does he do so on appeal.” In addition, the arguments he did raise on appeal were not a basis for resentencing. Affirmed.
Auto negligence; The No-Fault Act (NFA); Burden of production under MCR 2.116(G)(3) & (4); “Serious impairment of body function”; McCormick v Carrier; Objectively manifested impairment; Important body function; A plaintiff’s general ability to lead their normal life; Proximate causation
On reconsideration, the court concluded the “records all supported that plaintiff suffered impairments that were observable or perceivable from actual symptoms or conditions and were consistent with [his] complaints of pain.” Also, under the McCormick standard, the testimony “supported that plaintiff’s impairments were to body functions that were of ‘great value, significance, or consequence’ to him.” The court held that the trial court erred in granting defendant summary disposition “on the issue whether plaintiff suffered a threshold injury.” Finally, it found that plaintiff showed “that the accident was more than just a possible cause of his injuries.” Thus, it reversed the trial court’s order granting defendant summary disposition in this third-party action under the NFA and remanded. The case involved a 2021 motor-vehicle collision. Plaintiff argued that “factual disputes existed on whether he suffered a serious impairment of body function and whether the accident caused his injuries.” The court agreed with both arguments. Among other things, it found that examining “the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the medical records, including those from [his] urgent-care visit, his physical therapy sessions, his massage-therapy sessions, his pain-management doctor, and his chiropractor, supported that plaintiff suffered observable and perceivable impairments. To start, the day after the accident, plaintiff went to an urgent-care facility complaining of pain. For the most part, [he] had a normal examination with no ‘red flag’ signs. But plaintiff did experience pain when bending and rotating his neck, and his right hip was slightly tender to the touch. Thus, his impairments to his neck and hip were observable and perceivable.” Similarly, the court held that his “physical-therapy records also supported the existence of an objectively manifested impairment.” The court noted that his “impairments did not disappear with physical therapy, and he consulted a pain-management doctor and a massage therapist. He also continued to treat with his chiropractor.” The court additionally determined that a “reasonable fact-finder could infer from plaintiff’s young age, [his] activities before the accident, [his] reports of injuries the day after the accident, and the nature of [his] injuries, that the motor-vehicle accident caused his impairments.”
Surplus proceeds resulting from a tax sale; MCL 211.78t; Dismissal without prejudice pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6); Certification of a class in Hathon v State of MI
The court held that given the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Hathon, the trial court erred in granting petitioner-State Treasurer’s summary disposition motion under MCR 2.116(C)(6) in this case concerning tax sale surplus proceeds. Petitioner did not dispute that MCL 211.78t entitled claimant to the surplus proceeds at issue but asserted “that claimant, who never filed a claim in Hathon, was nevertheless a putative class member of Hathon and had not opted out of the class action.” Petitioner argued that as a result, claimant could not maintain this “action while being a putative class member of the action in Hathon at the same time, meaning the trial court’s dismissal without prejudice of the present action was proper pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6).” However, the court concluded that because the Michigan Supreme Court vacated its “order affirming recertification of the class in Hathon and remanded that case to the Court of Claims to reconsider the plaintiff’s motion for recertification of class, the basis for the trial court’s order for summary disposition in the present case no longer exists, i.e., plaintiff is no longer a putative member of a class certified in a class action.” Reversed and remanded.
Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Fried
Holding that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts and that respondent-mother failed to “benefit from or sufficiently cooperate and participate” in the provided services, the court affirmed the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights. The DHHS provided her with services that included “psychological evaluations, housing and employment resources, drug screenings, counseling, parenting skills, parenting time, and transportation assistance. Nevertheless, her compliance with the treatment plan was poor.” From the start of the case, she did not fully participate in services. “She missed four scheduled psychological evaluations” and more than half of scheduled parenting time visits, causing the child “significant distress[.]” Respondent also had positive drug screens and missed 17 random drug tests. She “failed to provide the necessary medical releases to show whether she received any mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, counseling services, or medications. She also failed to submit proof that she attended parenting classes. Although this matter was pending for about 13 months, [she] did not complete her psychological evaluation until during the middle of the termination trial. She also never provided verified drug screening results and the in-patient paperwork she provided to her caseworker during the middle of the termination trial showed that she left the rehabilitation facility after only seven days.” Despite the fact she “had a significant history of substance abuse, she never participated in the necessary and verifiable services to establish that she was no longer abusing substances.” She emphasized her transportation issues but “the gas cards that she did receive were not used properly because she misled her caseworker about needing them to travel to a rehabilitation facility even though she had returned from the facility the day before.” The court noted that to “prove a claim of lack of reasonable efforts, a respondent must show that she would have fared better had petitioner offered other services. . . . Respondent was provided numerous services over the course of this matter but failed to timely complete or benefit from” them and she failed to show “that she would have fared better had additional services been offered.”