e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 82874
Opinion Date : 12/19/2024
e-Journal Date : 12/20/2024
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : People v. Cole
Practice Area(s) : Criminal Law
Judge(s) : Gadola, K.F. Kelly, and Redford
Full PDF Opinion
Issues:

Motion to destroy a DNA profile & sample collected related to a dismissed charge; MCL 28.176(4) & 10(b)

Summary

The court held that MCL 28.176(4) and (10)(b) required the destruction of defendant’s “DNA profile and sample obtained from him in connection with the felony home invasion charge because that charge was dismissed.” He was sentenced to a year of probation for aggravated assault and illegal entry. He pled no contest to these charges in exchange for the dismissal of the felony second-degree home invasion charge and a misdemeanor charge. The trial court denied his motion to destroy his DNA profile and sample the police collected in connection with the home invasion charge. On appeal, the court found that the relevant statutory language was “clear and unambiguous. MCL 28.176(1) provides that law enforcement ‘shall permanently retain a DNA identification profile of an individual obtained from a sample . . . [if] [t]he individual is arrested for committing or attempting to commit a felony offense.’ However, MCL 28.176(4)(a) provides that ‘the individual’s DNA sample or DNA identification profile, or both, must be destroyed or expunged, as appropriate, if the charge for which the sample was obtained has been dismissed or resulted in acquittal, or no charge was filed within the limitations period.’ Likewise, MCL 28.176(10)(b) provides that the state police forensic laboratory shall dispose of a DNA sample or profile or both when ‘the charge for which the sample was obtained has been dismissed or has resulted in an acquittal or that no charge was filed within the applicable limitations period.’” The court disagreed with the trial court and the prosecution “that all dismissals are not equal under MCL 28.176. The statute plainly states that DNA must be destroyed when ‘the charge for which the sample was obtained has been dismissed.’” The court noted that the “statute does not in any way qualify the term ‘the charge for which the sample was obtained’ or the term ‘dismissed.’ Rather, the plain and unambiguous language of the statute requires the DNA profile and sample to be destroyed when the charge for which the sample was obtained has been dismissed. Because the dismissal in this case falls squarely within the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language of MCL 28.176(4)(a) and MCL 289.176(10)(b), the destruction of defendant’s DNA profile and sample is mandated.” Reversed and remanded.

Full PDF Opinion