The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); Quid pro quo sexual harassment; Collateral estoppel; Hostile work environment; Motion to amend the complaint

Concluding the trial court appropriately granted summary disposition to defendants-Trinity and Infinity on plaintiff’s claims of quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment, the court affirmed. She argued that collateral estoppel did not apply to her quid pro quo sexual harassment claim because the federal court in her prior case resolved the Title VII “claim against Trinity, but declined to consider the ELCRA quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.” The court held that “all the elements of collateral estoppel are met. The federal court ruled on a question of fact that was essential to the judgment, and plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue.” It found that while “mutuality of estoppel is not required here, there is mutuality because the federal case involved the same parties.” The court also found “no merit in plaintiff’s theory that the federal court’s ruling on the Title VII claims cannot have preclusive effect on the ELCRA claims.” Further, the trial court “correctly granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).” The court concluded no evidence suggested “that plaintiff’s ‘employer or the employer’s agent used her submission to or rejection of the proscribed conduct as a factor in a decision affecting her employment.’” As to the dismissal of her ELCRA quid pro quo sexual harassment claim against Infinity, plaintiff merely asserted that defendant-Dr. Vettraino ‘“was in a position to threaten her career’ and ‘in a position of extreme power over her.’” However, this was “insufficient to establish that Dr. Vettraino had the requisite authority. Because that is an essential element of the ELCRA quid pro quo sexual harassment claim,” the court held that the trial court did not err in granting Infinity summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on this claim. It also concluded “the trial court appropriately dismissed plaintiff’s claim of hostile work environment against Trinity under MCR 2.116(C)(7).” In addition, it “correctly granted Trinity summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because no genuine issue of material fact existed, so Trinity was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” As to plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim against Infinity, the court determined the “trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff was collaterally estopped from arguing the notice element of her hostile work environment claim, so summary disposition was appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(7).” Also, the court held that “the trial court did not err when it awarded Infinity summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because there was no genuine issue of material fact about the notice, or lack thereof, so Infinity was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The same lack of notice fatal to plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim against Trinity dooms her hostile work environment claim against Infinity.” Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her leave to amend her complaint.