Whether a robocall pertaining to mail in voting falls within the limiting construction of MCL 168.932(a); Overbroad; People v Burkman (Burkman I & II); Probable cause that defendants knew the robocall contained false information; Probable cause to believe the robocall related to voting procedures; Whether MCL 168.932(a) was unconstitutional as applied to defendants

In these consolidated appeals “on remand from our Supreme Court with the direction to consider whether defendants’ conduct in disseminating a robocall pertaining to mail in voting falls within the limited construction test created to remedy MCL 168.932(a) as unconstitutionally overbroad and to address any remaining constitutional arguments,” the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion to quash. The parties disputed whether the robocall was intentionally false. Defendants urged the court “to apply a narrow interpretation of false and that ‘intentionally false’ should be read to mean empirically false, resulting in dismissal of the charges against them.” On the contrary, the prosecutor contended that the issue of falsity was previously decided in Burkman I and II. The court was “tasked to determine, as a matter of law, whether the statements were actually intentionally false, but whether there was ‘probable cause to believe that’ defendants’ statements were intentionally false.” It concluded that “there was sufficient circumstantial evidence at the bindover to establish probable cause that defendants knew the robocall contained false information.” The court held that “because defendants lied about distributing the robocalls, it was reasonable to infer they knew what they were doing was wrong.” Thus, it found that because “there was probable cause to support the intentional falsity element, the trial court’s order denying the motion to quash was not erroneous on that ground.” Next, the court addressed “whether the robocall was ‘related to voting requirements or procedures . . . .’” It concluded that “there was probable cause to believe the robocall related to voting procedures.” It held that “there was ‘a quantum of evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief’ that the robocall contained intentionally false speech related to a voting procedure.” Stated differently, it determined that “there was probable cause to believe defendants’ actions fell within the Court’s limiting construction.” Thus, it held that “the circuit court’s order affirming the district court’s bindover was not erroneous.” Finally, defendants claimed “that MCL 168.932(a) was unconstitutional as applied to defendants because the statements in the robocall were opinions and plausibly true.” The court concluded, “as a matter of law, that the robocall content reflected that it was merely an opinion regarding mail-in voting procedure and plausibly true.”