Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to stipulate to defendant’s felony conviction before his previous judgment of sentence (JOS) was admitted & shown to the jury; People v Swint; Trial strategy; Outcome-determinative error; Jury instructions; M Crim JI 4.11; Whether the trial court’s instruction was an “adequate safeguard”; People v Green; Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Court costs; Constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii); People v Johnson

The court held that the trial court did not err by: (1) finding that defense counsel’s failure to stipulate to defendant’s felony conviction did not violate his right to effective assistance of counsel, (2) failing to include M Crim JI 4.11 in its jury instructions, or (3) admitting testimony as to the ownership of the firearms found in his vehicle. It also rejected his challenge to the constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii). He was convicted of FIP of a firearm, FIP of ammunition, fourth-degree fleeing or eluding a police officer, and felony-firearm. His convictions arose out of an incident in which he drove his vehicle into a field, following a high-speed police chase involving two deputies. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to stipulate to his felony conviction before his previous JOS was admitted and shown to the jury by the prosecution. Defendant failed “to present any authority for his contention that defense counsel was actually required to stipulate to the felony conviction, only that she had the option. Defense counsel testified that she decided to not exercise that option as a trial strategy to avoid drawing attention to the conviction. We will not second-guess matters of trial strategy on appeal.” In addition, “the presentation of defendant’s JOS to the jury was not outcome-determinative.” As to his jury instructions claim, the court noted the “trial court instructed the jury to ‘consider each crime separately in light of all of the evidence in the case.’” This instruction “was an ‘adequate safeguard’ pursuant to Green.” Defendant also “failed to overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s performance was sound trial strategy and failed to show that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” And even if “defense counsel’s performance was unreasonable and did not constitute sound trial strategy, defendant failed to demonstrate that, but for defense counsel’s deficient performance, a different result was reasonably probable.” The court next rejected his contention that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony as to the ownership of the firearms found in his vehicle, finding “the trial court’s resolution of this evidentiary question was not outside the range of principled outcomes.” And his challenge to the constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) failed under Johnson. Affirmed.