Medical malpractice; Standard of care (SOC) expert; MCL 600.2169(1)(a); Stokes v Swofford; “Specialty” & “subspecialty”; Woodard v Custer; MCL 600.2169(2) & (3); American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS); The American Osteopathic Association (AOA); The American Board of Physician Specialties (ABPS)

On remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration of the admissibility of plaintiff’s SOC expert (Dr. N) in light of Stokes, the court held that “the ‘specialties’ matched for purposes of satisfying MCL 600.2169(1) under Stokes[.]” Thus, it vacated in part and affirmed in part the trial court’s order granting defendants’ summary disposition motion, and remanded. This medical malpractice case arose from a hernia repair surgery. The Supreme Court concluded in Stokes “that the Woodard Court ‘incorrectly conflated the terms “specialty” and “subspecialty” in a manner that is inconsistent with the plain language of’” MCL 600.2169, and “‘essentially negated MCL 600.2169(2) and (3), which provide significant discretion to trial courts to exclude experts even when such experts qualify under Subsection (1).’ . . . As used in MCL 600.2169(1), the terms ‘specialist’ and ‘specialties’ ‘are defined as the specialties recognized by the’” ABMS, the AOA, the ABPS, or other such entities. It also determined “that ‘the “matching” requirement under MCL 600.2169 follows the listed general board certifications, which are the baseline “specialties” recognized by such entities for certification purposes.’” The court here concluded the trial court erred in ruling there was a question of fact as to whether defendant-Dr. Abbassi “was practicing in surgical critical care or general surgery. The general board certification forming the baseline specialty was general surgery. The American Board of Surgery recognizes surgical critical care as a subspecialty of the specialty of general surgery.” In this case, Abbassi “was working as a resident under board-certified general surgeon” defendant-Dr. Yaldo “and was a resident in the general surgery program and could, therefore, potentially obtain board certification in that specialty. In addition,” N was a board-certified general surgeon. As a result, the trial court’s order had to be vacated on this basis. The court noted that no party raised any arguments in the trial court “under MCL 600.2169(2) or (3), and the trial court did not consider either provision” in denying defendants’ motion. Thus, on remand, “consistent with Stokes, the trial court shall, ‘at minimum,’ evaluate the” criteria set forth in MCL 600.2169(2)(a)-(c) as to N. Further, pursuant to MCL 600.2169(3), it has “discretion on remand to ‘disqualify an expert witness on grounds other than the qualifications set forth in [MCL 600.2169].’” It is also to address an argument raised by defendants that it did not decide.