e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 82749
Opinion Date : 12/03/2024
e-Journal Date : 12/16/2024
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : Lockhart Revocable Trust v. Paramount Enters. Land LLC
Practice Area(s) : Litigation
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – Borrello, Hood, and Young
Full PDF Opinion
Issues:

Interpretation of the scope of the court’s prior remand as to damages; Law-of-the-case doctrine; Rule of mandate; “Vacate” & “as necessary”; Paramount Enterprises Land, LLC (PEL)

Summary

Concluding the “trial court abused its discretion by entering its order without exercising” its discretion as to whether to allow defendant/counterplaintiff-PEL “to present evidence that it suffered damages[,]” the court vacated and remanded. “The trial court’s order followed a remand from” the court, after it had “affirmed the trial court’s earlier ruling that PEL had a prescriptive easement, but vacated trial court’s earlier award of damages.” At issue here was the trial court’s interpretation of the scope of the court’s remand order. Intervening plaintiffs argued that the court’s “order forbade the trial court from permitting PEL to submit evidence of its damages.” PEL asserted “that the trial court was required to permit it to submit evidence of its damages.” The court held that both were wrong. “The correct understanding of our remand order is that the trial court had discretion regarding whether to permit PEL to present evidence that it suffered damages.” The court noted that it previously concluded “PEL did not establish any damages of its own on the record that existed at the time of the prior appeal. Although we commented on what the evidence suggested, we did not hold that PEL necessarily had no damages that it could have suffered. With this clarification,” the court considered the trial court’s compliance with the remand order. It held that “a correct interpretation of our remand order is that the trial court had the discretion to decide whether (or not) to reopen the proofs as to damages suffered by PEL alone. The trial court necessarily abused its discretion by failing to recognize that it had the discretion to reopen the proofs.” Seeking to “avoid further confusion on remand,” the court emphasized “that the trial court need not reopen proofs. When deciding whether to reopen proofs, trial courts may consider whether the party was previously diligent and whether the party would gain an unfair advantage.” It has the discretion on remand to reopen the proofs.

Full PDF Opinion