Judicial disqualification; Motion for recusal; MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a) & (b); Cain v Michigan Dep’t of Corr; Right to counsel; Failure to refer defendant for a competency evaluation; Alleged Brady violation; Sentencing comments

The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for recusal and the order denying his motion for recusal review under MCR 2.003(D)(3)(a)(i). He argued “that the sentencing judge should be disqualified under MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a) because she denied defendant’s motion for relief from judgment after he filed a notice of withdrawal of the motion, which deprived him of his right to counsel of his choice and his right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.” The court disagreed, noting that it had “reversed the trial court’s order, which provided defendant with an opportunity to renew his motion with the benefit of counsel. Further, the sentencing judge stated that she was unaware of defendant’s notice to withdraw his motion when she considered and denied his motion for relief from judgment. The sentencing judge’s erroneous denial of defendant’s motion after defense counsel filed a notice of withdraw did not demonstrate actual bias or prejudice and defendant” did not show “plain error affecting his substantial rights.” He further argued “that the judge’s failure to refer him for a competency evaluation deprived him of a fair trial and substantiated the judge’s bias against him.” He contended “that the trial judge knew that defendant suffered from a mental illness.” The court concluded he “failed to establish that the trial judge had knowledge of any irrational behavior that would have raised a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s competence or his ability to assist in his defense.” Thus, it found that there was “no indication of actual bias or prejudice and defendant” again failed to show plain error affecting his substantial rights. He also argued “that the sentencing judge’s remarks during sentencing established her bias and antagonism against” him. A review of the record revealed “that in one instance of alleged bias, the sentencing judge merely reacted to a perceived threat against her and the prosecutor contained in defendant’s description of the crime.” Defendant further claimed that she “referred to him as a monster.” But the record reflected that she “merely agreed with the victim’s aunt, who gave an impact statement, that defendant did not look like a monster or someone who would commit murder. The judge expressed frustration and anger that a man as young and as intelligent as defendant killed two people. [Her] comments resulted from the evidence introduced at trial and defendant’s actions at sentencing. Such opinions do not constitute bias or partiality.” The judge also reacted to his “continued claims of innocence after he had been convicted of murder by two juries in two separate cases. Defendant failed to establish that the sentencing judge’s comments went beyond opinions formed during trial, and instead, exhibited a deep-seated antagonism against” him.